Interpretation of Philosophical Texts in a European Language I & II

University of Tehran

Faculty of Literature & Human Science
(School of Letters & Humanities)

Department of Philosophy

Interpretation of Philosophical Texts in a European Language I & II

Course Syllabus

&

Readings

First and Second Semesters 2010-2011

(Eight Credits, equal to 104 teaching hours: 52 Sessions)

Course Description:

This course, which can be considered a chronological journey of western philosophy in the English language, has been structured based on a documentary DVD, containing expert commentary and analyses by leading scholars. The main aims of this course are: 1. To draw a realistic, comprehensive and methodologically appropriate picture of the history of philosophy in the western world; 2. To provide students with an understanding of philosophy in the English language; 3. To encourage students to interpret philosophical subjects, to ask fundamental questions about human nature and our world and to gain critical perspective on philosophical issues; 4. To examine the nature of philosophy itself by means of the historical development of philosophical thought, and an exploration of its relationship with contemporary philosophical issues and; 5. To encourage students to think about the role philosophy might play in the modern world.

The course will begin with some methodological issues and questions: What is philosophy? What does philosophy in a European Language mean? How can these phenomena be studied? It will be suggested that few concepts have come to dominate the human life as much as philosophy, yet there is very little agreement over what the term actually means. Thus, it will become obvious that philosophy is a controversial concept involved in numerous and frequently inconsistent understandings. Philosophy, as we will explore, is not the same as "life" - on the other hand, almost any other definition would seem too narrow. Although attempts at definition and interpretation of philosophy are certainly important, the study of philosophy often doesn't begin with a solid definition of the subject. Instead, it seems easier to define philosophy by doing philosophy.

One way of doing philosophy is to think about how the prominent philosophers begin doing philosophy and investigating philosophical topics. Throughout the historical journey of western philosophy we realize that the primary feature of doing philosophy is offering critical views that put aside a philosopher's claim, and maintain that some philosophical views are less defensible than others, and some are simply indefensible.

The course begins with Pre-Socratic philosophers, and ends with the great 20th century French philosopher John Paul Sartre. To extend the historical overview of western philosophy, the final two sessions of this course will be devoted to two contemporary leading scholars in the field of philosophy. Two significant issues, however, should be clarified here: First, the instructor has intentionally excluded the philosophers of the Frankfurt school in order to pay closer attention to them in the next semester; second, the primary aim of structuring such a wide-ranging course is to provide a very basic conceptual framework of western philosophy in the English language. In other words, the main purpose of this course is to introduce some fundamental English philosophical concepts related to the philosophers listed in the course outline, rather than a historical overview of western philosophy.

Each session of this course, excluding the first (introductory) session, is organized in five interrelated parts. Each session begins with a short chronological screening of a DVD documentary covering the key figures in the history of western philosophy, followed by a translation and interpretation of its transcribed text. The session continues by translating and interpreting selected primary source covering the same time period and specific philosopher.

The session will be structured by the translation and interpretation of some philosophical concepts, and end with an interactive philosophy quiz.

Goals for students enrolled in this course are to develop the ability to interpret philosophical texts in English, and to think both empathetically and critically about conflicting philosophical claims. This course can be classified as a semi-intensive course, focusing on several aspects of learning a language in its philosophical context: reading, writing and vocabulary, as well as close listening. Classes will also consist of discussion and question periods. Although the outline of the course and the selected materials may appear rather difficult to pursue, student shouldn't be daunted or discouraged. All topics will be clearly explained during class time, and the instructor will be available during office hours and/or by special arrangement to make clear any questions that may arise.

This course is suitable for students looking for an overview of historically grounded philosophical thought, and also for those interested in pursuing a significant research project related to the topic of the course. The course consists of two phases. The first involves a careful reading of several works relevant to the topic of the session. All students in the course are required to do this reading and to respond with brief critical reflections. The second stage will involve the translation and interpretation of a primary philosophical text related to the topic of the course, determined in dialogue with the instructor.

Required Texts: CD and Print Packets

Evaluation Method:
This course includes 10 journal reflections, a Mid Term Quiz, a conference presentation, a final assignment and a final exam. Every three sessions, excluding the first and the last two, students will be expected to submit a 1-2 page summary and critical reflections of the readings they have done. On some occasions the instructor will give specific guidance as to how the students should write about the readings (e.g., compare texts a and b); otherwise, straightforward summarization of the texts will be expected. Information on the Mid Term Quiz, conference presentation, final assignment (which will be on a topic of the student's choice, in consultation with the instructor) and final exam will be provided separately or explained during the course. Students are expected to put together all their writing in a portfolio consisting of their critical journals, and final translated and interpreted paper. The portfolio should be submitted to instructor no later than 13/3/86.

Grades will be determined as follows:

Class Participation	10%
Mid Term Quiz	15%
Journals	10%
Final assignment: translating and interpreting a 10 page primary philosophical text.	20%
Final exam	45%

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Sessional Readings

1st Session: Introductory meeting:

Methodological issues in this course.
Course goals
Description of the content of the course
Course requirements, grading policy, and criteria of assessment
Context and perspectives of the course

2nd Session: The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Pythagoras)

The transcript

WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Narrator:
For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize. So wrote Aristotle in the fourth century before Christ. That search for knowledge and meaning goes on. We still ask the same questions: "Who are we?" "Why are we here?" "How should we conduct ourselves?"

PART 1

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
By philosophy, we are talking about a study of areas of thought that include natural science, mathematics, ethics, and morality. It's very broad and very general, very fundamental, and the other point I would emphasize is that philosophers are quite fearless in their pursuit of rational argument. And this is a very important feature of the ancient Greeks, as well. They follow arguments wherever they lead, even if they lead into unwelcome areas.

Narrator:
Western philosophy begins with the Greeks, but not in Greece. Thales the earliest of the known philosophers came from the seaport of Miletus in Asia Minor. He claimed that the first principle of all things was water. One of his successors, Anaximenes [1] said that matter was formed from air by condensation and rarefaction. For the Greeks, the soul was the principle of life. The soul enclosed the body as air enclosed the world. Since air is essential to life, it followed that there was a link between it and the soul. Sadly, we have only three fragments of Anaximenes's writing. For most of our knowledge of the early philosophers, we are indebted to later scholars.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:

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[1] Anaximenes was the third Greek philosopher in canonical lists of successions, and like his predecessors Thales and Anaximander, an inhabitant of Miletus. According to the very meager sources on his life he flourished in the mid 6th century BCE and died around 528. He was said to be the student of Anaximander, and like him he sought to give a quasi-scientific explanation of the world.

The earliest philosophy is called pre-Socratic philosophy, and our knowledge of it is, as it is said, fragmentary, literally fragmentary, because we don't have complete books or writings from these people, but quotations of a few sentences, commentaries by other people on their works.

Pythagoras

Narrator:
Think of Pythagoras and we think of geometry and hours spent calculating the area of the square on the hypotenuse. His father was an engraver of gems, and the young Pythagoras noted the pure geometric shapes of the cut crystals. Quartz crystals would give him a perfect pyramid. Iron pyrites is found in cubes massed together. The dodecahedron is found in nature in the common garnet, and the barrel is a cylindrical hexagon. It was with these crystalline shapes that his imagination constructed the solid bodies of the universe.
Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:

He combined his interest in mathematics and science with his role as a sort of a leader of a cult. His principal contribution is that he sees the nature of reality as mathematical. Mathematics, the theory of number, the theory of shapes, arithmetic, geometry are seen by him as the understanding of everything, including things which seem perhaps quite unmathematical, like music or the fate of our souls after death. So that is the essence of Pythagorean vision, I think.

Narrator:
At the heart of Pythagoras philosophy was the concept of number. He was fascinated by the mathematical relationships between the faces, vertices, and edges of solid figures. A cube has six square faces, eight vertices and twelve edges. Much of this was influenced by astrology which had spread through the ancient world from Babylon. Even today, each sign of the Zodiac is associated with a precious stone. For Pythagoras, mathematics held the key to understanding the Cosmos, as he named the Universe. He believed the Earth was spherical and revolved around the great central fire which we cannot see. Around this revolved the Sun, the Moon, the five known planets and the fixed stars. He had long studied music and the mathematical ratio between the notes of the harmonic scale. He believed that each of the nine spheres that rotated round the central fire produced its own note. This was the music of the spheres.

Dr. James Ladyman, University of Bristol:
Pythagoras noticed a mathematical relationship between the length of a column of the air or string in a musical instrument and the pitch that was produced when that column of air or string vibrated, in particular, if you take a string or column of the air of half the length of the original, you will get the note that is an octave above the original note produced. If you take them in the ratio two to three, then you will get the fifth of the scale and so on.

Narrator:
But the theory that the universe was controlled by rationale numbers came crashing down with the discovery of irrational numbers.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
An irrational number is a number which cannot be expressed as a ratio between two whole numbers. An example, an example which mattered very much to the Pythagoreans is the

square root of two. That there is such a number as Pythagoras' own geometrical theories indicated, but it can't be expressed in terms of the whole numbers. This was, therefore, a source of scandal and shock to the Pythagoreans. It seemed to undermine their program, and so this gave rise to the story, probably a story, not a true one, but a plausible one, that somebody who revealed that there are irrational numbers was punished by being drowned at sea

Narrator:
Aside from his experiments in music and geometry, Pythagoras is best known for his beliefs in the transmigration of souls. Pythagoras believed that there was a scale of reward and punishment for the soul after death. He took his ideas from an ancient religious sect associated with Orpheus. It was the Orphics who first developed the concept of the soul and its relationship to the body. In his famous Republic, Plato describes how the soul of Adelanto, famous for her running prowess, returned to Earth in the body of an athletic, while that of the vile was trapped in the body of an ape. After several reincarnations, the soul of the true believer could find release from the wheel of birth, and achieve eternal peace.

Dr. Jimmy Doyle, University of Bristol:
Some of the earliest philosophers or earlier philosophers, like Pythagoras as we've mentioned, would think of the soul as something that could travel between different bodies, which lends itself to a conception of the soul as immaterial, and an immaterial being that can inhabit one body or another. Whereas other of the earlier philosophers notably, Leucippus and Democritus would have said that the soul is merely a material aspect of the body, or actually a material part of the body made up of like superfine particles.

3rd Session: The Pre-Socratic Philosophers- Continued (Heraclitus, Parmenides, Zeno, Empedocles)
The transcript

Heraclitus

Narrator:
Heraclitus arrived in Ephesus early in the 5th Century B.C. He had lived as a hermit, eating grass and had contracted dropsy. He tried to cure himself by being buried up to his neck in cow dung. Sadly he died, but the idea wasn't nearly stupid as it sounds. Heraclitus had often observed how the heat of the sun drew off moisture from the earth. He reasoned then that the heat of the cow dung would draw off the excess fluid from his body. The early philosophers had thought that either air or water was the basic substance from which the Universe was derived. Heraclitus believed it was fire. Fire lives the death of Earth, and air lives the death of fire. Water lives the death of air, Earth that of water. Heraclitus discovered an intriguing paradox, that one of the great constants in life was change. Sometimes it can be sudden and obvious like an earthquake. Other changes such as a stone step worn away by constant use, are gradual and unobtrusive. All change was caused by Universal Law. Heraclitus held religion and its attendant mysteries in contempt. He believed that his disciplines should use reason to work out the meaning of life. He rejected Pythagoras' idea that people should steer a middle course between two extremes.
Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
The Heraclitus' insight seems to have been in effect this, that opposites are identical. That change and stability, for example, are two sides of the same coin, that they complement each other. Good and bad, sweet and bitter, many such opposites, he was able to show by example, are, in fact, not as opposed and contrasted as they seem to be. He says that gold is good for men, but bad for asses. Straw is good for asses but bad for men. The good and bad, therefore, are the same. The same things are good and bad. Heraclitus identified opposites, therefore, but the main effect of this was to stimulate in later philosophers, a sense of the deep need to distinguish opposites and provide a really well motivated and well justified grounding for the view that good and bad are not the same. They really are different from each other.

Parmenides and Zeno

Unlike Heraclitus, Parmenides denied the concept of change. He put forward the idea that nothingness or void could not exist. If there was no void in which matter originated, or to which it returned, there could be no change.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:

Parmenides is accredited with the view that change is an illusion. That's the way that Parmenides' theory is put and it's not misleading, but it is important to see that that is presented as a conclusion of a very rigorous argument and perhaps Parmenides really should be regarded as the first person to present a really strict deductive argument, and the argument concluded the claim that there is one unchanging reality, but it's how he got there that is interesting.

Narrator:

Zeno is one of Parmenides pupils. He believed that the world was one and indivisible. He was also intrigued by the phenomenon of motion and produced several paradoxes which set out to prove the impossibility of motion.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
It is natural suppose like to get up for me to get out of this chair and walk across to the other end of the room, say a distance of 10 yards. Zeno, however, maintained that in order to complete this 10 yard walk, I'd have to first to walk 5 yards. I'd have to get halfway before I could get the whole way. But before I can get halfway, I'd have to get a quarter of the way. Before that I'd have to get an eighth of the way. Now you can see that this is an infinite series that we are embarked upon, and that there is literally no first single step, no first distance that I can cover in order to get embarked on my walk. So, I can't complete it. I can't even start it. And the thought that I couldn't walk and move and that anything could change is thus revealed to be far more problematical, in fact, a straightforward illusion.

Narrator:
We rely for our experience and understanding on our senses. To many of the early philosophers though, the senses were unreliable. A large object looked miniscule when viewed from a distance. A straight oar blade inexplicably bent when placed in the water. It would be left to later generations of scientists to unravel the mysteries of perspective and refraction. In Parmenides and Zeno we see humankind beginning to describe the world in abstract, rather than in concrete ways. But Parmenides' view of the world was over simplistic. Either it is, or it is not. Later philosophers would recognize that life is full of paradox and contradiction. Sometimes it is and it is not. The continued effort to solve such paradoxes is the beginning of knowledge.

Empedocles:

Narrator:
Like the early philosophers, Empedocles believed the entire universe to be composed of the four elements. To them he added two forces: love and hate. Love brings all the elements together. Hate forces them apart. Empedocles defined life as the fitting together of the elements by the rivets of love. How could nature produce such diversity from just four elements? Empedocles drew a parallel with painters mixing colours. They create from them forms like to all things making trees and men and women and animals and fish nurtured in water. Like Pythagoras, Empedocles based his theories of the nature of matter on the observation of everyday life. Twenty-three centuries before Charles Darwin, he was already beginning to grasp the concepts of evolution.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
Empedocles was another of these philosophers whose intellectual personality was very wide ranging. He ranged from cosmological speculation to religious pronouncement. He, for example, pretended himself to be a god as well as investigating natural phenomena. That's the kind of intellectual range we don't find nowadays.

Dr. James Ladyman, University of Bristol:
Empedocles remarkably reasoned that the speed of light in air was finite, and of course, we now think that it is indeed finite. But it took 2000 years for people to do experiments to determine the speed of light in air was finite, given that the speed of light is so fast that it is not easy to notice the time it takes for light to travel from an object to the eye.

Narrator:
Empedocles believed that all matter gave off emanations through pores on its surface. These emanations were in turn consumed by other matter. Tradition has it that he died by hurling himself into the fiery crater of Mount Etna because he thought himself a god. This is certainly an exaggeration. Empedocles may not stand in the pantheon of the gods, but he ranks amongst the greatest of the philosophers.

4th Session: The Pre-Socratic Philosophers- Continued (Anaxagoras)

The transcript

Anaxagoras

Narrator:
Anaxagoras was the first Athenian philosopher and a contemporary of Pericles[2] who soon found himself expelled from the city. His crime was to teach that the sun and moon were not gods as worshipped by the Athenians, but huge lumps of molten rock. Like Empedocles he did not believe in the void. Matter did not just appear from nowhere, or disappear into nothing. It changed and grew. Anaxagoras was fascinated with the problem with growth, and how food became flesh and bones. The answer, according to Anaxagoras, was that bits of matter were capable of infinitely dividing themselves without the particles disappearing. Each grain of wheat contained, what Anaxagoras called, seeds of flesh, blood, bones and hair. Digestion separated out these seeds adding like to like. Because the seeds of wheat are on the surface of a grain of wheat, the other seeds are invisible to the human eye. Anaxagoras like others before him tried to explain the phenomenon of movement. He believed that matter had been set in motion by a primal power, which he called nous.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
Nous means mind. And Anaxagoras talked about the mind. He maintains that in general, everything is mixed with everything, by which he meant that if you take any kind of substance, gold, water, blood then in addition to being blood and gold, whatever it is, it's everything else, as well. In other words, by analysis he would reveal that it contains all sorts of different kinds of things, and by this view, this insight, he thought he could explain how one thing can turn into another. It's not really turning into another, the other thing, because it's the other thing already. It's already there. Mind, on the other hand uniquely was quite different. Mind was not mixed with anything. Mind comes in pure form. So, what Anaxagoras seems to be doing is introducing a very fundamental distinction between two kinds of things. Mind on the one hand, everything else - he didn't call it matter - we might call it matter, on the other hand. Mind was pure, and going along with this view, Anaxagoras maintained that mind was the ultimate source of change and movement. He explained movement by the operation of mind.

Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

apeiron. The earliest known philosophical term. Literally 'without limit', it is used by Anaximander for the material out of which everything arises. Plato in the *Philebus* applies it to things signified by words which, like 'hot' and 'large', admit of comparatives, but these for him play the same material role. Aristotle, followed by Hellenistic writers, uses it to express

[2] Pericles or Perikles (c. 495 BC - 429 BC, Greek: Περικλῆς, meaning "surrounded by glory") was a prominent and influential statesman, orator, and general of Athens in the city's Golden Age (specifically, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars). He was descended, through his mother, from the Alcmaeonid family.

the notions of infinite quantity and infinite progression.

aporia, or ‘apory’ in English, is the cognitive perplexity posed by a group of individually plausible but collectively inconsistent propositions. For example, in Pre-Socratic times, philosophers were involved with the following incompatible beliefs: (1) Physical change occurs. (2) Something persists unaffected throughout physical change. (3) Matter does not persist unaffected through change. (4) Matter (in its various guises) is all there is. There are four ways out of this inconsistency: (1-denial) Change is a mere illusion (Zeno and Parmenides). (2-denial) Nothing whatever persists unaffected through physical change (Heraclitus). (3-denial) Matter does persist unaffected throughout physical change, albeit only *in the small*—in its ‘atoms’ (the Atomists). (4-denial) Matter is not all there is; there is also *form* by way of geometric structure (Pythagoras), or arithmetical proportion (Anaxagoras), or abstract form (Plato). To overcome aporetic inconsistency, we must give up at least one of the theses involved in the inconsistency. There will always be different alternatives here and logic as such can enforce no resolution. The pervasiveness of apories throughout human inquiry has led sceptics ancient and modern to propose abandoning the entire cognitive enterprise, preferring cognitive vacuity to risk of error.

axiom. An axiom is one of a select set of propositions, presumed true by a system of logic or a theory, from which all other propositions which the system or theory endorses as true are deducible—these derived propositions being called theorems of the system or theory. Thus, Pythagoras’ theorem is deducible from the axioms of Euclidean geometry. The axioms and theorems of a system of logic—for instance, of the propositional calculus—are regarded as being true of logical necessity.

bald man paradox. Suppose a man has a full head of hair: if he loses one hair he will still have a full head of hair. But if he loses enough hairs he will become bald. Clearly, though, there is no particular number of hairs whose loss marks the transition to baldness. How can a series of changes, each of which makes no difference to his having a full head of hair, make a difference to his having a full head of hair? This is an example of an ancient paradox called sorites (from the Greek word meaning ‘heaped’), after a well-known variant which involves the removal of grains of sand from a heap of sand.

dichotomy. In logic, a division of a whole into two parts, as with a class into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subclasses, or a genus into two likewise disjoint species. Usually called ‘division by dichotomy’, this procedure is sometimes also known as ‘dichotomy by contradiction’ because the resulting binary classification may be defined by ‘contradictory marks’, as when we say ‘Everything must be red or not red’. One major application of the concept is to ‘ definition by division‘, in which an entity is classified by differentiation of genus and species. Aristotle criticized the procedure for lacking the apodeictic certainty of syllogistic deduction, on the grounds that since one cannot be sure that the right differentiae have been selected, one cannot be sure that the resulting division is exhaustive. Zeno of Elea’s ‘paradox of the stadium‘ is sometimes called ‘The Dichotomy’, ‘dichotomy’ in this connection meaning arithmetical or geometrical division. The paradox is that one cannot cross a given space because to do so one must first get half-way, and before that half-way to the half-way point, and so on *ad infinitum*; but we cannot traverse an infinite number of such points in a finite time.

Quiz

5th Session: Socrates (469-399 B.C.E.)
The transcript

Socrates

Narrator:
Socrates lived frugally observing the Athenian craftsmen and using them to illustrate his theories. The shoemaker had the skill to make shoes, so the politician should have the skill to practice justice, truth and statecraft. Sadly, this was often not the case. Socrates concluded that men act foolishly and wickedly because they don't know what's best for them. Whilst the good person never knowingly does wrong.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
Socrates sought to understand how we should live and to practice the development of understanding. And that he called the cultivation of the soul. Sounds rather – mystic sounding enterprise, the cultivation of the soul. Really what he seems to have understood about it is developing of self and what does that mean? What is it about – what is your self? What is the essence of a person? Well, it's our ability to reflect on things, to think about things, to seek the answers to questions. That fundamentally is what human life is about. And so that's what Socrates tried to do, and he went around talking to people asking questions, engaging in arguments. That's what human life is. That's the good life.

Narrator:
Socrates became a thorn in the flesh of the Establishment, criticizing them for their amateurism and self interest, like some Old Testament prophet. There was certainly something about the monk about him. He taught that man should avoid the material pleasures of the world, and think of their souls. Perhaps it isn't surprising that in 399 B.C., he was charged with impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens, and was sentenced to commit suicide by drinking hemlock. He remained calm and controlled to the end. Either death is annihilation and the dead have no consciousness of anything, or as we are told, it is really a change, a migration of the soul from this place to another.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
Well, Socrates, I think, must be counted as one of the senile figures in the history of philosophy. He emphasized the importance of values as a central element of human reflection. Moral theory, ethics has remained at the heart of philosophy ever since. This is a very important part of Socrates' legacy. He insisted on argument, on rigorous argument on, as he would call it, dialectic, or dialogue. And again, philosophers in various ways and various forms, but always in one form or another have held firm to this project of engaging in argument, of disputing with each other. So that's very Socratic. Not taking things on trust, asking questions where there were questions to be asked, not remaining content with assumptions or with authority. This is very Socratic. In all of this, Socrates really shows, in exemplary fashion how to be a philosopher. And that probably is his greatest influence.

Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

Temperance. Though Socrates's discussion of temperance in *Gorgias* initially appears rather specific and therefore off limited impact, its key role in the attainment of virtue quickly renders its impact far-reaching. Temperance (separate from its application) signifies a certain quality of self-control and discipline. In this sense, it is a fairly simple and non-contentious

concept. Socrates goes on, however, to define such integral notions as power, justice, and proper living (among others) to a large degree by reference to temperance. In this way, individual power lies in slowly tempering desires into nothing, justice lies in tempering the balance of power so that all maintain equal shares, and virtue consists in tempering the body and soul into a balance of fitness, justice, and the good. Consequently the establishment of a clear definition of temperance ultimately serves as a foundation by which to resolve most of the dialogue's main issues. This clarification and elevation of temperance frequently returns to Plato's writings throughout his life, since for him understanding and pursuing virtue (known now to be based upon temperance) represent the ultimate human activity.

Art .Essentially, an art is a skill directed towards some form of the good and intended for the benefit of those practicing and/or those on whom a particular art is practiced. In this sense for example, medicine is an art because it aims at improving the physical health of those for whom a specific treatment is prescribed, while serving alcohol is not as it creates a deceptive impression of physical health grounded in the bodily pleasure of intoxication. In *Gorgias,* Socrates first mentions the notion of art as part of an inquiry into the nature of rhetoric. In discussing this topic, he distinguishes between true arts (defined above) and false ones (routine/flattery) which create an incorrect impression of good by means of the pleasant (which Socrates later defines as different from—and less desirable than—the good).

This distinction becomes increasingly relevant as the dialogue progresses, since Socrates maintains that most of his contemporary Greeks and Athenians have been led astray from the path of virtue exactly because they mistake false routines of pleasure for true arts of good. Consequently, for Socrates's fellow citizens, the nature of politics, justice, power, good living and the like is based upon a fundamental conflation of true and false arts corresponding to a belief that the pleasant equals the good. The entire text considers how this confusion of art with flattery manifests itself, and as such it adds great strength to Plato's overall philosophical project of defining virtuous existence.

Power

The nature of power embodies a concept crucial both in *Gorgias* as well as to Plato's larger philosophical beliefs. For Socrates's contemporaries, the rampant view of power is as the ability to rule over others and to satisfy one's own desires. This position is best expressed by Polus (466–69) and Callicles (490–492).

Plato takes great care to debunk this formulation. On the one hand, Socrates argues, those who rule others often must perform actions they do not will in order to benefit the state of which they are in charge. In this sense then, apparently powerful tyrants are often unable to act as they will, and true power is shown to consist of something other than ruling over others. At the same time, those who repeatedly satisfy their desires do not possess real power because this gratification further fuels rather than extinguishes the appetites. A person capable of always satisfying desire is in constant need of more satisfaction, and as such possesses no true power. This point is illustrated in 493b by the metaphor of the leaky jar.
Instead, Socrates argues that true power comes with the control and order of one's body and soul—the discipline to act justly, live virtuously, and not need anything. This treatment of power becomes all the more significant in light of the events surrounding Socrates's actual trial and death. The philosopher was accused of corrupting through false instruction and treason, and convicted and executed because of his refusal to admit having acted wrongly. In light of this event and its close proximity to *Gorgias*' creation, then, the nature of power for

Plato takes on crucial importance in that he must prove his teacher died in strength rather than weakness.

Quiz

6th Session: Plato ***(427- 347*** B.C.E.)

The transcript

Plato

Narrator:
"That no one who is ignorant of geometry enter here." This was the sign above the entrance to Plato's Academy. Of all the earlier philosophers, Pythagoras is nearest to Plato, in spirit. He also shared the views of Parmenides and Zeno on the unreliability of the senses.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
Plato unlike Aristotle who does quote and refer to earlier philosophers, Plato doesn't as it were start from earlier philosophers. He just mentions them incidentally, but clearly he was familiar with them. Particular ones influenced him in particular ways. Socrates was his greatest influence. Plato associated with Socrates when Plato was a young man. He was one of a group of young men who went around with Socrates and engaged in discussions and disputes with them to the annoyance of the rest of Athenian society. So he was very strongly influenced by Socrates, and he really sought in his philosophy to make sense of what he saw to be implicit in Socratic profession of philosophy. In other ways, Plato was perhaps negatively influenced by the earlier philosophers. He, as it were, had turned away from them so as to correct what he saw was wrong in them.

Narrator:
Plato believed that people were too ready to accept things at their face value. One cannot say whether a person's actions are good or bad until one defines the good. Laws cannot be called just or unjust until one defines justice. This led Plato to formulate a theory of forms and ideas. Plato like Pythagoras believed in man's immortal soul. He set out his theories of the soul in his book Phaeton. In it, he records Socrates last day on earth. Socrates is asked how we acquire knowledge. Don't you think that the person who is likely to succeed in this attempt most perfectly, is the one who approaches each object as far as possible with the unaided intellect without taking account of any sense of sight in his thinking, or dragging any other sense into his reckoning? Plato held that at birth the soul forgot its knowledge of such absolutes as the good and beautiful. Education was a means of helping the soul to remember them. Plato often crossed swords with the Sophists. They taught a form of moral relativism. A thing could be either good or bad, depending upon the circumstances. Plato believed the good was absolute. He also had revolutionary ideas on creation. The Earth, he believed, had been made by the All Creator, who embodies both good and reason. The Creator, like the forms, is uncreated, unchanging and real. Plato was also a political philosopher. His Republic explores the structure of the city- state and the citizens' role within it. Once again using Socrates as his main character, Plato expounds his view of the ideal state.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
We all of us want to live a good life. We'd rather live well than badly, whatever we mean by living well. Well, what do we mean? What is it to live well? What is the good life? To be sure of living the good life, you need to know the answer to that question. You need a certain form of insight, knowledge and understanding, and Plato argued that only philosophy can deliver that understanding. So only the philosopher has the right to be sure that the life which he's embarking on and prescribing for others, if he's in control, only that life is the good life.

And only the philosopher is justified in that conviction. So, give the philosophers control and you'll live a good life.

Narrator:
During Plato's long life, the power of Athens as a city- state began to wane as a result of the Peloponnesian War. Democracy collapsed and power passed into the hands of a few Aristocrats known as The Thirty. Plato left the city and traveled to Egypt, Syracuse and Southern Italy. It was during this later period that he wrote The Laws. Hence, are epidemics of youthful irreligion, as though there were no gods as such as the law enjoinses to believe in. He acknowledges the influence of Socrates on his beliefs, but towards the end of his life, he began to have doubts on his earlier theories on forms. Today, Plato's views on the State seem too authoritarian with no opportunity for social mobility and education restricted to the selected few. Perhaps this is time's revenge, for Plato always considered time to be life's great enemy.

Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

Evil. The question of evil comprises an important theme for Plato. Evil takes root in wrongful acts—those which by nature involve shame and/or pain. Not only is this position argued in *Gorgias* by Socrates, but the other participants in the conversation agree with him as well. This aspect of evil exists as one of the text's few uncontroversial claims.
Dissention enters instead with the discussion of what is the greatest evil, or which is "worse": to suffer or to inflict wrong (e.g. 473a). On the one hand, Socrates's opponents (mainly Polus and Callicles on this issue) state that suffering wrongdoing is worse, since it places the sufferer in a position of pain and subjugation to the inflictor. On the other, Socrates maintains that committing wrong is worse, since it is more shameful and therefore painful and evil. He goes on further to declare it worse still to inflict wrong without being punished, since retribution for an evil act at least helps to right the wrong.
Such considerations are integral to Plato's purpose within the dialogue, because wrong and evil relate directly to its other key topics: the inquiries of art, justice, politics, virtue, and temperance center around what is right and wrong conduct within each field of focus. The notion of evil also is important within the scheme of Plato's overall body of work. This is so at least in large part due to the death of his virtuous teacher at the hands of an apparently evil government. For Socrates not to have died in vain and supreme evil, nor to leave behind a legacy of error, such definitions of wrong must prove convincing. As a consequence of this fact alone (independent of his general and powerful interest in the philosophical character of right and wrong), the nature of evil constitutes a recurring theme of Plato's philosophy.

Virtue .Defining virtue and its attainment comprise what is arguably THE central theme of both *Gorgias* and Plato's lifelong philosophical quest. Somewhat surprisingly, though, Socrates does not define this notion independently within the dialogue, but instead frames its nature by reference to other qualities he has worked to establish. In this light, virtue may be viewed as a composition of crucial topics: power, justice, temperance—all of which are associated with the good. Put differently, virtue is itself the 'good life', which results from proper practice of these various principles and behavioral methods. Considered from this perspective, then, the range of individual arenas of inquiry and subsequent discoveries about them here undertaken by Socrates melt into this more overarching, abstract notion.

This extrapolation towards virtue should not seem surprising, however, when placed in the context of Plato's life. To start, the war, corruption, and (wrongful) execution of Socrates for which Plato's government is responsible must have heavily influenced the thinker's search for virtue. The correlation between these historical aspects of Athens and the time of the dialogue's writing simply is too tight to deny. Moreover, each of Plato's dialogues almost without exception questions various aspects of proper living and what constitutes a good life. When taken together, Plato's entire body of creation looks to comprise an extremely comprehensive, long-term inquiry into the nature of virtuous living. Just as an understanding of abstract virtue gradually emerges from more specific sub-topics within *Gorgias,* so too does a general treatise on a complete life of virtue embody a unity among all Platonic dialogues.

anamnesis. Recollection (Greek). Plato argued that some knowledge could have been acquired only by our immortal souls' acquaintance with the Forms before our birth and not through sense-experience. 'Learning' is therefore anamnesis. In *Meno*, Socrates elicits geometrical knowledge from a slave-boy, while in *Phaedo* he argues that knowledge of concepts like equality, which are always imperfectly instantiated in this world, could come only from anamnesis.

cave, analogy of. In Republic vii Plato represents the philosophically unenlightened as prisoners chained from birth in an underground cave, able to see nothing but moving shadows, which they take to be the whole of reality. The world outside the cave represents the Forms and the escape of the prisoners from the cave the process of philosophical enlightenment.

Quiz

7th Session: Aristotle ***(384 - 322** B.C.E.)*

The transcript

Aristotle

Narrator:
Aristotle joined Plato's Academy when he was 18 and stayed for 20 years. After the death of Plato, Aristotle left Athens and about 343 B.C. became tutor to the future Alexander the Great.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
What he probably would have learned from Aristotle is respect for the world around us, for empirical reality. Aristotle at that period of his life was very much interested in investigating the natural world, the world of biology. Also, Aristotle in his political theory, by contrast now with Plato, was very alert to the differences between different kinds of constitutional arrangement between say, tyrannies run by one person, democracies where large numbers of people are in control. Aristotle emphasized this variety and was prepared to find good things to be said for different forms of government, and perhaps that is a lesson to which Alexander may have absorbed usefully as he set off to trample all of the known world.

Narrator:
Later Aristotle returned to Athens and set up his own school of philosophy, The Lyceum. It was a peripatetic school. Aristotle would teach his students as they strolled together through the grove of The Lyceum. Aristotle believed we could find out all we needed to know about the person or object by analyzing its ten categories or Predicates.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
The ten Predicates, otherwise known as categories – we're now talking about Aristotle's Theory of Categories which is a very important element of Aristotle's thought, but quite a complex one. I think what Aristotle is doing is distinguishing 10, as he claims it to be, fundamentally distinct kinds of general concept. The word category links in with the word predicate and predicates are general, rather than names of particular individual things. So we're concerned with general concepts. And Aristotle maintains that general concepts come in 10 irreducibly distinct kinds. Substances, for example, are fundamentally different from qualities, places, times, and so on. And a lot of Aristotle's detailed philosophy is based upon that insight and those distinctions which enable him, for example, to say that amongst the different kinds of things which there are, substances occupy a primary and fundamental role. The other things aren't substances, they're not – and yet they're not nothing at all. So, it's a complicated, quite technical theory, but has very wide repercussions over Aristotle's theory. And in particular, you could say that Aristotle, if he asked the question, is being a thing, a single kind of thing, Aristotle would say "no, being is complex and ambiguous." And the theory of the 10 Predicates or categories provides a leading clue to the analysis of that complexity.

Narrator:
Aristotle believed that humankind grew in wisdom and knowledge and that this sprang from an inquiring mind. An eagerness to know how nature worked. Like Plato, Aristotle believed in a god. But Aristotle's god was not a creator, but a prime mover.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
Aristotle's god is a god of the philosophers, but it's also a god of religious theory. Aristotle's god, he describes it as a being whose nature is to think about his own thinking. That's sounds a very abstract and remote specification. But, Aristotle has detailed reasons for maintaining that that does express the true nature of god. And there are two distinct kinds of reasons for it. Firstly, he sees god as the ultimate cause or source of change in the Universe and for technical reasons which I won't go into, the only way in which something could be an ultimate cause of change is by being purely intelligible, by being an object of thought. So there's a rather remote technical and abstract philosophical reason for specifying the nature of god in this way. But there is another reason, and that's this. For Aristotle, thinking is the most valuable aspect of human life. It's what achieves for us the limited perfection which as human beings we can achieve. God, being by definition perfect, will possess this feature in degrees which we can't. So, god thinks in ways and with an intensity and endurance which we can't. God always thinks about the only thing worth thinking about namely himself. And so, Aristotle has, in fact, good reason coming both out of his theory of change and out of his theory of value for giving what is at first sight a very abstract and forbidding specification of the nature of god as a being which thinks about his own thought processes.

Narrator:
On the more practical level, Aristotle was interested in ethics and politics. He believed in the concept of the good, which he defined as that at which all things aim. The function of the good man could be equated with an activity of soul which follows a rational principle and is carried out in accordance with goodness or virtue. So happiness is an activity, not a state or disposition. In his ethics, Aristotle also advocates the mean, the middle cause that avoids extremes. The man who shuns and fears everything and can stand up to nothing becomes a coward. The man who is afraid of nothing at all that marches up to every danger is foolhardy. Humankind was not self sufficient. Male and female were united in the family. Families were integrated in the community and the community in the State. He also accepted slavery. Though slaves should be drawn from foreigners and barbarians. Like Plato's ideal Republic, Aristotle's had its own fixed hierarchy with no room for social mobility, but it was less authoritarian.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
Aristotle gives a much richer account of the ideal State, or rather, and this is the point, the ideal States. He finds goods things to say about many different kinds of constitutional arrangement, and correspondingly, there are many diverse ways in which the things can go wrong as well. Plato's ideal State says it's a situation where a philosopher is in control. So, clearly in some sense is ruled by an individual or at least by a very small coterie. Aristotle, on the other hand, recognizes that rule by a single individual or a small group can be well conducted, but of course, it can go horribly wrong. A despotic tyranny is rule by one person, which is thoroughly perverse. Or rule by a small clique, an oligarchy. On the other hand, Plato opposed democracy ruled by the many. Aristotle found some good things to say about democracy provided it was conducted in the right way. That he called that good constitution government, but it can equally go wrong if the masses, the many are ignorant and pursue bad goals, then we'll get a thoroughly bad form of democracy. So, there are complex arrangements. They can go well or badly. And that's the contrast between Aristotle who draws distinctions, and Plato who much more goes down a single track.

Narrator:

Aristotle believed that theatre played an important part in the life of the State. It was a communal act and also a therapeutic one. Witnessing the reenactment of tragic events produced a catharsis, or a purifying of the soul. Going to the theatre was considered such an important civic act that those on low incomes were paid to go.

Dr. David Evans, Queen's University, Belfast:
He was known for centuries as the philosopher and even though now we don't call him that, there is no philosopher, I think, anywhere in the world, through all the diverse forms that philosophy takes who wouldn't acknowledge Aristotle as probably the leading figure in his background. But let me be more specific. Aristotle historically led, particularly, into the natural theology of two major religions: Christianity and Islam. And of course, there's more to Christianity and Islam than Aristotle. There are the revealed elements in their respective sacred books. But both of them found in Aristotle a massively sophisticated and complex philosophical underpinning for the revelations in the sacred texts. And so Aristotle was influential throughout the learned and civilized world of the medieval world – both in Western Europe and in the Arab world for very many centuries. Now there was a downside to this. When finally people came to try to shake off the rather restrictive form of religious authority in the Renaissance, for example, then Aristotle got blamed for the bad bits of this authoritarian dogma, and came to be seen as an enemy of scientific advance. That was, of course, quite unfair, because it wasn't Aristotle who was opposing it, but the religion which had been yoked with Aristotle.

8th Session: Aristotle ***(384 - 322*** B.C.E.) Continued

Selected primary sources: Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics BooK VIII

1

AFTER what we have said, a discussion of friendship would naturally follow, since it is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions-'two going together'-for with friends men are more able both to think and to act. Again, parent seems by nature to feel it for offspring and offspring for parent, not only among men but among birds and among most animals; it is felt mutually by members of the same race, and especially by men, whence we praise lovers of their fellowmen. We may even in our travels how near and dear every man is to every other. Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.

But it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who love their friends, and it is thought to be a fine thing to have many friends; and again we think it is the same people that are good men and are friends.

Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some define it as a kind of likeness and say like people are friends, whence come the sayings 'like to like', 'birds of a feather flock together', and so on; others on the contrary say 'two of a trade never agree'. On this very question they inquire for deeper and more physical causes, Euripides saying that 'parched earth loves the rain, and stately heaven when filled with rain loves to fall to earth', and Heraclitus that 'it is what opposes that helps' and 'from different tones comes the fairest tune' and 'all things are produced through strife'; while Empedocles, as well as others, expresses the opposite view that like aims at like. The physical problems we may leave alone (for they do not belong to the present inquiry); let us examine those which are human and involve character and feeling, e.g. whether friendship can arise between any two people or people cannot be friends if they are wicked, and whether there is one species of friendship or more than one. Those who think there is only one because it admits of degrees have relied on an inadequate indication; for even things different in species admit of degree. We have discussed this matter previously.

2

The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the object of love. For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful; but it would seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced that is useful, so that it is the good and the useful that are lovable as ends. Do men love, then, the good, or what is good for them? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. Now it is thought that each loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves not what is good for him but what seems good. This however will make no difference; we shall just have to say that this is 'that which seems lovable'. Now there are three grounds on which people love; of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word 'friendship'; for it is

not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself); but to a friend we say we ought to wish what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship. Or must we add 'when it is recognized'? For many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judge to be good or useful; and one of these might return this feeling. These people seem to bear goodwill to each other; but how could one call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings? To be friends, then, the must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons.

9th Session: Aristotle ***(384 - 322*** B.C.E.) Continued

Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

accident. The term ‘accident’ in philosophy has two main uses, both stemming from Aristotle. In the first an accident is a quality which is not essential to the kind of thing (or in later philosophers, to the individual) in question. ‘Being musical’ is accidental to Socrates, ‘being rational’ and ‘being an animal’ are not. Which qualities, if any, are essential or non-accidental is a controversial matter in contemporary philosophy. In the second main use, the term ‘accident’ is a way of allowing chance and causality to coexist: digging for truffles I turn up some treasure. The digging was not an accident, and since the treasure was there all along, my finding it if I dug there was determined; none the less, my finding of it was accidental, since my digging was a digging for truffles, not for treasure. Typically, events which are accidental under one description are determined under another. In non-philosophical contexts the term often connotes *harmful* accidents.

character. A person’s moral nature. Moral philosophy after the rejection of Aristotelianism concentrated on discrete acts, not on the character of moral agents. Since the recent revival of interest in the virtues by Anscombe and others, character has re-emerged. Cultivation of good character is seen as pivotal to moral life, and an understanding of character provides a standpoint for ethical criticism of oneself and others. Some have said that such understanding comes more from novels than philosophy. Aristotle, however, has much to say about virtuous and vicious character and personality. The virtues of character are stable dispositions to feel and to act at the right time, towards the right people, etc. (this is Aristotle’s ‘doctrine of the mean‘). A virtuous character develops out of the reflective performance of virtuous acts.

citizenship. Within political philosophy, citizenship refers not only to a legal status, but also to a normative ideal—that the governed should be full and equal participants in the political process. As such, it is a distinctively democratic ideal. People who are governed by monarchs or military dictators are subjects, not citizens. In Aristotle, citizenship was viewed primarily in terms of duties— citizens were legally obliged to take their turn in public office, and sacrificed part of their private life to do so. In the modern world, influenced by liberalism, citizenship is increasingly viewed as a matter of rights—citizens have the right to participate in public life, but also the right to place private commitments ahead of political involvement. Republican philosophers, following Rousseau, worry that contemporary democracies have focused too much on rights, and not enough on civic duties.

civil society. From Aristotle’s koinōnia politikē down to Locke’s ‘political or civil society’ and Ferguson’s ‘civil society’, this term indicated civilized, political society in contrast to barbarism, paternal authority, and the state of nature. It was translated into German as bürgerliche Gesellschaft, which also suggests ‘bourgeois society’, and thus came, in Hegel, to indicate economic and social arrangements in contrast to both the state and the family. Civil society in this sense did not become apparent before the emergence of an economy transcending the household and of centralized monarchical or revolutionary states clearly distinct from the social and economic life of their subjects. For Hegel civil society was an inevitable and valuable aspect of modern life. Marx disparaged it as benefiting primarily the bourgeoisie and operating outside conscious, i.e. political, control. For liberals, a thriving civil society is an obstacle to ‘totalitarian’ attempts to absorb all social life into the political realm and provides a training ground for democratic politics. Radical liberals such as Hayek

contrast the free interactions of civil society with the coercion of the state, and advocate the minimization of the state's sphere of activity.

concrete universal. One standard meaning for 'concrete' is 'particular', and in a tradition based on Aristotle, only particulars can be genuine subjects, while only universals can be predicated of subjects, and universals cannot themselves be subjects of predication. 'Socrates is wise' would predicate the universal, wisdom, of the particular, Socrates, and 'Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates' would be a grammatically misleading way of predicating that same universal of that same particular, while 'Wisdom is a primary virtue' would be a grammatically misleading way of saying that any person having wisdom has a primary virtue. In that system of usage, 'concrete universal' would be an inconsistent phrase. However, in the philosophy of Plato, universals can themselves be genuine subjects of predication, just as much as any particular (and in fact are regarded as *superior* subjects).

Aristotle regarded universals as grasped by a mental process of abstraction, so that, at least as grasped by us, universals are abstract entities (another difference from Plato, who regards universals as more clearly mind-independent). Since another use of 'concrete' is as an opposite to ' abstract', this would be another source of tension in the phrase, from an Aristotelian, but not a Platonic, viewpoint. Locke's version of universals was 'abstract general ideas'—which tends toward the Aristotelian side, but he also held that 'Everything that exists is particular'. This would make possible another reading (besides the Platonic one) of 'concrete universal' which would make it consistent, namely, 'particular abstract general idea'. So the two meanings for 'concrete', namely 'particular' and 'non-abstract', should not be run together.

The deliberate use of the idea of a concrete universal is due to Hegel, for whom the 'I', the 'now', the 'spirit of a free people', etc. are either both concrete and universal or in some sort of transition in between. Hegel would not have minded a reading of 'concrete' and of 'universal' which would make the phrase combine logically conflicting ideas. This would be part of his theme of the dialectical combining of opposites.

Quiz

10th Session: Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430)
The transcript

St. Augustine of Hippo

Commentator
With the coming of Christianity, philosophy took second place to theology. It tended to look backwards to the golden age of Plato.

Dr. Richard Cross, Oriel College, Oxford:
Plato, in a way was the most important person for philosophy and theology. In the ancient world, he was known as The Philosopher. And Christians, although they are initially reluctant to engage in philosophy, found that they had to partly because they were under intellectual attack from philosophers, and partly just because they are interested in making converts and apologetics and to do that particularly if you were interested in converting or conversing with intelligent people involves dealing with philosophy, and Plato, of course, was the main philosopher in the period. I think Christians found Plato quite appealing because a lot of Plato's thought and a thought of his followers has something in common with Christianity, for example, Plato thinks that the world was created, and that there was a Creator God, obviously recognizable Christian beliefs, as well. He believes that there is an immaterial soul, very sympathetic for Christians. Some of his followers, particularly Platonists and neo-Platonists, think that there is a trinity of god-like, or divine persons or entities, the top one being "the one" from whom proceeds intellect, from whom proceeds soul, and Christians were quick to spot the with despair some resemblance to their doctrine of the Trinity. So it may just be that part of the reason why Plato was so appealing, apart from his overall pervasiveness, is that Christians found that they can actually learn something from him. We certainly know from Augustine, that part of his conversion to Christianity and the root that he went through, involved reading the Platonists and learning from them, and from them, seeing how Christianity was, as it were, the perfect form of really a pagan philosophy.

Narrator:
Augustine of Hippo lived from 354 to 430 A.D. and came from a Christian family. He accepted Plato's ideas on the forms which he said were thoughts in the mind of God. All human knowledge was a product of illumination by God. Human happiness is being at one with God. Augustine believed God existed in eternity and created the world from nothing. Creation is an absolute. How then can there be change?

Dr. Richard Cross, Oriel College, Oxford:
Augustine thinks that God himself is timeless and immutable in line with normal neo-Platonic thought. And his view is that this timeless and immutable God creates the world of temporal and changing things so that there's a very strong contrast between the two. Change itself is explained by Augustine in a somewhat unexpected way. Augustine thinks again following certain neo-Platonists, particularly Platonists that as it were intrinsic in things is a kind of capacity for change such that "if you like" earlier stages of the Universe have the wherewithal to develop into later stages of the University has a very evolutionary theory, but unlike the neo-Platonists, he doesn't think this evolutionary process is unsupported. He thinks that God is active right the way through, sustaining this developmental process and the world of changing things.

Narrator:

He thought that State existed to further the well-being of the individual in a well ordered environment. Then in 410 A.D. the Visigoths sacked Rome. Two years later, he began writing the City of God. Unlike Plato's Republic, or Aristotle's Politics, this is not a treatise on the ideal earthly city. In Augustine's work, the City of God is contrasted with the city of Babylon.

Quiz

11th Session: Thomas Aquinas (1225 –1274)

The transcript

Thomas Aquinas

Narrator:
It was Alburtis who introduced Aquinas to the works of Aristotle. Like the Greek philosopher, Aquinas believed the truth could be arrived at by logic and reason. Aquinas followed Aristotle's theories about the movement of the spheres that bore the heavenly bodies, but Aquinas believed that angels were the causes of this movement.

Dr. Richard Cross, Oriel College, Oxford:
The fundamental feature of angels for Aquinas is that they lacked matter. The reason for this is that matter is that principle which allows something to be destroyed by some natural agent, and Aquinas thinks that angels are indestructible by any agent other than God. The lack of matter has a rather disconcerting consequence which is that each angel is a different species. Michael, the Archangel, is as different from Gabriel, the Archangel, as a dog is from a cat, perhaps. The reason for this is that Aquinas thinks that material substances like you and me are distinguished from each other by the effect of you being different lumps of matter. Angels don't have matter, so they must be distinguished from each other in some other way, and the way in which Aquinas feels they are distinguished is by being different kinds of thing. But its lack of matter also means that it can't exist in the Universe in the same way as material beings do, and Aquinas believes that for an angel to be present in the Universe is just for an angel to be causing an effect somewhere in the Universe, and that's all there is to it.

Narrator:
Aquinas taught that men as political animals needed the State to further the ends of its citizens. But human law was subordinate to both natural and Divine Law. The Church existed to further men's union with God.

Dr. Richard Cross, Oriel College, Oxford:
Although Aristotle was very usual for the medieval theologians, there were certain difficulties that were raised and kept on cropping up throughout the 13th Century. Fundamentally Aristotle's world view is very naturalistic. There's not really a place in it for a Creator, God for example. Aristotle thinks that the world is everlasting, it doesn't have a beginning, and his god is something rather different from the Christians Creator. Matters reach something of a crisis in the 1270s, culminating in 1277 with the condemnation of a large number of Aristotelian claims taken from really Christian writers through the 1260s and 1270s, including Thomas Aquinas who was recently dead by then. The Archbishop of Paris took exception, fundamentally, to what theologians perceived to be the necessitarianism of Aristotelian thought. That is to say, everything happens as a matter of necessity, including not only the actions of creature, but also the creative act of God, and this was felt to be inconsistent with Christianity in quite a big way.

Selected primary sources: Of God As He Is In Himself By Aquinas; Summa Contra Gentiles PP.1-2
Based on the translation by Joseph Rickaby, with minor emendations by Daniel Kolak.
1.1 That it is an advantage for the Truths of God, known by Natural Reason, to be proposed to men to be believed on faith

If a truth of this nature were left to the sole inquiry of reason, three disadvantages would follow. One is that the knowledge of God would be confined to few. The discovery of truth is the fruit of studious inquiry. From this very many are hindered. Some are hindered by a constitutional unfitness, their natures being ill-disposed to the acquisition of knowledge. They could never arrive by study to the highest grade of human knowledge, which consists in the knowledge of God. Others are hindered by the needs of business and the ties of the management of property. There must be in human society some people devoted to temporal affairs. These could not possibly spend time enough in the learned lessons of speculative inquiry to arrive at the highest point of human inquiry, the knowledge of God. Some again are hindered by sloth. The knowledge of the truths that reason can investigate concerning God presupposes much previous knowledge. Indeed, almost the entire study of philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God. Hence, of all parts of philosophy, that part stands over to be learned last, which consists of metaphysics dealing with points of divinity. Thus, only with great labor of study is it possible to arrive at the searching out of the aforesaid truth; and this labor few are willing to undergo for sheer love of knowledge. Another disadvantage is that such as did arrive at the knowledge or discovery of the aforesaid truth would take a long time over it, on account of the profundity of such truth, and the many prerequisites to the study, and also because in youth and early manhood, the soul, tossed to and fro on the waves of passion, is not fit for the study of such high truth: only in settled age does the soul become prudent and scientific, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] says. Thus, if the only way open to the knowledge of God were the way of reason, the human race would dwell long in thick darkness of ignorance: as the knowledge of God, the best instrument for making people perfect and good, would accrue only to a few, and to those few after a considerable lapse of time.

A third disadvantage is that, owing to the infirmity of our Judgment and the perturbing force of imagination, there is some admixture of error in most of the investigations of human reason. This would be a reason to many for continuing to doubt even of the most accurate demonstrations, not perceiving the force of the demonstration, and seeing the diverse judgments of diverse persons who have the name of being wise. Besides, in the midst of much demonstrated truth there is sometimes an element of error, not demonstrated but asserted on the strength of some plausible and sophistic reasoning that is taken for a demonstration. And therefore it was necessary for the real truth concerning divine things to be presented to people with fixed certainty by way of faith. Wholesome therefore is the arrangement of divine clemency, whereby things even that reason can investigate are commanded to be held on faith, so that all might easily be partakers of the knowledge of God, and that without doubt and error. Hence it is said: *Now ye walk not as the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their own notions, having the understanding darkened* (Eph. iv, 17, 18); and, *I will make all thy sons taught of the Lord* (Isa. liv, 1, 5).

1.2 Of the Author’s Purpose

Of all human pursuits, the pursuit of wisdom is the more perfect, the more sublime, the more useful, and the more agreeable. The more perfect, because in so far as a person gives himself up to the pursuit of wisdom, to that extent he enjoys already some portion of true happiness. *Blessed is the man that shall dwell in wisdom* (Ecclus xiv, 22). The more sublime, because thereby people come closest to the likeness of God, who *hath made all things in wisdom* (Ps. ciii, 24). The more useful, because by this same wisdom we arrive at the realm of immortality. *The desire of wisdom shall lead to an everlasting kingdom* (Wisd. vi, 21). The more agreeable, because *her conversation has no bitterness, nor her company any weariness, but gladness and joy* (Wisd. viii, 16).

But on two accounts it is difficult to proceed against each particular error: first, because the sacrilegious utterances of our various erring opponents are not so well known to us as to

enable us to find reasons, drawn from their own words, for the confutation of their errors: for such was the method of the ancient doctors in confuting the errors of the Gentiles, whose tenets they were readily able to know, having either been Gentiles themselves, or at least having lived among Gentiles and been instructed in their doctrines. Secondly, because some of them, as Mohammedans and Pagans, do not agree with us in recognizing the authority of any scripture, available for their conviction, as we can argue against the Jews from the Old Testament, and against heretics from the New. But these receive neither: hence it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, which all are obliged to assent to. But in the things of God natural reason is often at a loss.

12^{h} Session: Thomas Hobbes ***(1588-1679)***

The transcript

Thomas Hobbes

Narrator:
No arts, no letters, no society. And which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death. And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. In 1640, Thomas Hobbes had fled to France. There, for a time he became tutor to the future Charles(the second) II. Hobbes ideal ruler was, like the Stuarts, an absolute Monarch, whose function was to keep the peace and preserve order. Two years later, King Charles(the first) I and his Parliament went to war. This conflict was to shape Hobbes' political thinking and in 1651, he penned his greatest work – Leviathan.

Dr. Jimmy Doyle, University of Bristol:
The experience of the English Civil War, and also the study of Thucydides history of the Peloponnesian War which Hobbes translated, shaped Hobbes thinking about politics to the extent that it brought hymn to him in a way that few political thinkers really have it in the forefront of their minds. The stakes in political thinking and political practice are very high. And if things go politically very wrong, then the consequences are like extreme misery for virtually everybody.

Narrator:
There were other influences. Hobbes idea of the social contract between the ruler and the citizen owes much too Machiavelli, Richard Hooker and Hugo Grozias. Hobbes followed Grozias' idea that there was a natural law which was based on man's nature as a social animal. Hobbes was also fascinated by why men go to war, and what inclines them to peace. Every man has the right to use his own power. Liberty is the absence of obstacles to achieving this. But in times of emergency, the citizen should relinquish his rights to the ruler in the National interest. So political obligation rests upon a moral obligation. Hobbes later added a further obligation upon all citizens. A simple obedience in all things wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the Laws of God.

Selected primary source: The Elements of Law Natural and Politic by Thomas Hobbes 1640
Part I
Human Nature
Chapter 2
The Cause of Sense
1. Having declared what I mean by the word conception, and other words equivalent thereunto, I come to the conceptions themselves, to show their difference, their causes, and the manner of their production as far as is necessary for this place.
2. Originally all conceptions proceed from the actions of the thing itself, whereof it is the conception. Now when the action is present, the conception it produceth is called SENSE, and the thing by whose action the same is produced is called the OBJECT of sense.
3. By our several organs we have several conceptions of several qualities in the objects; for by sight we have a conception or image composed of colour or figure, which is all the notice and knowledge the object imparteth to us of its nature by the eye. By hearing we have a

conception called sound, which is all the knowledge we have of the quality of the object from the ear. And so the rest of the senses also are conceptions of several qualities, or natures of their objects.

4. Because the image in vision consisting in colour and shape is the knowledge we have of the qualities of the object of that sense; it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion, that the same colour and shape are the very qualities themselves; and for the same cause, that sound and noise are the qualities of the bell, or of the air. And this opinion hath been so long received, that the contrary must needs appear a great paradox; and yet the introduction of species visible and intelligible (which is necessary for the maintenance of that opinion) passing to and fro from the object, is worse than any paradox, as being a plain impossibility. I shall therefore endeavour to make plain these four points:

(1) That the subject wherein colour and image are inherent, is not the object or thing seen.

(2) That that is nothing without us really which we call an image or colour.

(3) That the said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of that motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain or spirits, or some internal substance of the head.

(4) That as in conception by vision, so also in the conceptions that arise from other senses, the subject of their inherence is not the object, but the sentient.

5. Every man hath so much experience as to have seen the sun and other visible objects by reJection in the water and in glasses, and this alone is sufficient for this conclusion: that colour and image may be there where the thing seen is not. But because it may be said that notwithstanding the image in the water be not in the object, but a thing merely phantastical, yet there may be colour really in the thing itself; I will urge further this experience: that divers times men see directly the same object double, as two candles for one, which may happen by distemper, or otherwise without distemper if a man will, the organs being either in their right temper, or equally distempered. The colours and figures in two such images of the same thing cannot be inherent both therein, because the thing seen cannot be in two places: one of these images thereof is not inherent in the object. But seeing the organs of sight are then in equal temper or equal distemper, the one of them is no more inherent than the other, and consequently neither of them both are in the object; which is the first proposition mentioned in the precedent section.

6. Secondly, that the image of any thing seen by rejection in glass or water or the like, is not any thing in or behind the glass, or in or under the water, every man may prove to himself; which is the second proposition.
7. For the third, we are to consider first, that upon every great agitation or concussion of the brain, as it happeneth from a stroke, especially if the stroke be upon the eye, whereby the optic nerve suffereth any great violence, there appeareth before the eyes a certain light, which light is nothing without, but an apparition only, all that is real being the concussion or motion of the parts of that nerve. From which experience we may conclude, that apparition of light without, is really nothing but motion within. If therefore from lucid bodies there can be derived motion, so as to affect the optic nerve in such manner as is proper thereunto, there will follow an image of light somewhere in that line by which the motion was last derived unto the eye; that is to say, in the object, if we look directly on it, and in the glass or water, when we look upon it in the line of reJection, which in effect is the third proposition, namely, That image and colour is but an apparition unto us of that motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance in the head.
8. But that from all lucid, shining and illuminated bodies, there is a motion produced to the eye, and, through the eye, to the optic nerve, and so into the brain, by which that apparition of light or colour is effected, is not hard to prove. And first, it is evident that the fire, the only lucid body here on earth, worketh by motion equally every way; insomuch as the motion thereof stopped or inclosed, it is presently extinguished, and no more fire. And farther, that that motion, whereby the fire worketh, is dilatation, and contraction of itself alternately, commonly called scintillation or glowing, is manifest also by experience. From such motion in the fire must needs arise a rejection or casting from itself of that part of the medium which is contiguous to it, whereby that part also rejecteth the next, and so successively one part beateth back the other to the very eye; and in the same manner the exterior part of the eye (the laws of refraction still observed) presseth the interior. Now the interior coat of the eye is nothing else but a piece of the optic nerve, and therefore the motion is still continued thereby into the brain, and by resistance or reaction of the brain, is also a rebound in the optic nerve again, which we not conceiving as motion or rebound from within, think it is without, and call it light; as hath been already shewed by the experience of a stroke. We have no reason to doubt, that the fountain of light, the sun, worketh any other wise than the fire, at least in this matter, and thus all vision hath its original from such motion as is here described. For where there is no light, there is no sight; and therefore colour also must be the same thing with light, as being the effect of lucid bodies: their difference being only this, that when the light cometh directly from the fountain to the eye, or indirectly by reflection from clean and polite bodies, and such as have no particular motion internal to alter it, we call it light. But when it cometh to the eyes by reflection from uneven, rough, and coarse bodies, or such as are affected with internal motion of their own, that may alter it, then we call it colour; colour and light differing only in this, that the one is pure, the other a perturbed light. By that which hath been said, not only the truth of the third proposition, but also the whole manner of producing light and colour, is apparent.
9. As colour is not inherent in the object, but an effect thereof upon us, caused by such motion in the object, as hath been described: so neither is sound in the thing we hear, but in ourselves. One manifest sign thereof is: that as a man may see, so also he may hear double or treble, by multiplication of echoes, which echoes are sounds as well as the original; and not being in one and the same place, cannot be inherent in the body that maketh them. Nothing

can make any thing in itself: the clapper hath not sound in it, but motion, and maketh motion in the internal parts of the bell so the bell hath motion, and not sound. That imparteth motion to the air; and the air hath motion, but not sound. The air imparteth motion by the ear and nerves to the brain; and the brain hath motion but not sound. From the brain it reboundeth back into the nerves outward, and thence it becometh an apparition without, which we call sound. And to proceed to the rest of the senses, it is apparent enough, that the smell and taste of the same thing, are not the same to every man, and therefore are not in the thing smelt or tasted, but in the men. So likewise the heat we feel from the fire is manifestly in us, and is quite different from the heat that is in the fire. For our heat is pleasure or pain, according as it is extreme or moderate; but in the coal there is no such thing. By this the fourth and last of the propositions is proved (viz.) That as in conception by vision, so also in the conceptions that arise from other senses, the subject of their inherence is not the object, but the sentient.

10. And from thence also it followeth, that whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings and apparitions only. The things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by which these seemings are caused. And this is the great deception of sense, which also is by sense to be corrected. For as sense telleth me, when I see directly, that the colour seemeth to be in the object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by reflection, that colour is not in the object.

Quiz

14th Session: Rene Descartes (1596-1650)

The transcript

Rene Descartes

Narrator:
Cogito, ergo, sum. I think, therefore I am. Most people are familiar with Descartes famous dictum. He arrived at this by a policy of doubting things in general. His discourse on method set out four rules that all pursuit of knowledge should follow. I am, I exist is necessarily true whenever I utter it or conceive it in my mind. But, Descartes arrives at his conclusions by a process of rigorous self examination. His system depends upon what is evident to the individual. An idea is whatever is in our mind when we conceive a thing. Pierre Gassendi raised many objections to Descartes meditations.

Dr. Katherine Morris, Mansfield College, Oxford:
Gasendi's objections, the fifth objections really are an extraordinary document. In a way, they are the most interesting objections precisely because they are the objections of a philosopher who is coming from a point that was entirely different from Descartes.

Narrator:
It would be wrong to think of Descartes as a genuine skeptic. He was the first of the Rationalists, and claimed he employed hyperbolic doubt.

Dr. Katherine Morris, Mansfield College, Oxford:
Hyperbolic means something like beyond any ordinary reason for doubt. It is beyond any ordinary reason for doubt precisely because it is calling into doubt what's morally certain. What's morally certain, by definition, is beyond all reasonable doubt. It is an unreasonable doubt.

Narrator:
For Descartes to perceive to seem to see or hear something is really to think. Since we know clearly and distinctly about external objects through the intuition of the intellect, then the intellect can know itself even more clearly and distinctly. Descartes uses the example of a piece of wax. The intellect perceives it as having certain physical properties. When the wax melts, these properties disappear, yet it is still wax, even though it is now, as he says, something extended, flexible and moveable. Extension is the key factor.

Dr. Jimmy Doyle, University of Bristol:
The case of the mutability of the wax, that famous passage towards the end of the second meditation, one of the things that that illustrates for Descartes is that what we call the secondary, or sensory properties of physical objects on his few fundamentally confused properties. They are not properties that can be fully grasped by the intellect, and so if we were empiricists and believed that our knowledge of external objects comes entirely through their sensory properties, for Descartes that would be like a council of despair, because it would amount to admitting that we can't actually have a proper intellectual grasp of objects in the world around us. But, rather than advocate such a council, Descartes, by focusing on extension as being of the essence of physical objects, gives an account of our knowledge of physical objects that conforms to his conception of what the intellect does, because the

properties associated with extension, as James said, are susceptible of a geometrical and more generally more mathematical analysis, and these are properties which in Descartes' view, and in a way that is also amenable to common sense, are sort of proper objects of the understanding in a way that sensory properties like colours and smells and tastes and so forth are not.

Narrator:
In Mediations, Descartes gives two proofs for the existence of God. In Descartes' view, we must show that God is the cause of the idea we have of him. This idea is not something that we have made up ourselves.

Dr. Jimmy Doyle, University of Bristol:
Descartes presents in the Mediations, three arguments for the existence of God. Some people think there are only two. I think there are three. Two of them are what are called cosmological arguments based on conceptions of causation in the third mediation, and in those arguments, Descartes claims that only God is a sufficiently powerful being to have caused the idea of God in our minds, and also the second argument is that only God is sufficiently powerful to have caused the existence of our minds, given that our minds contain the idea of God. These arguments are based on somewhat obscure scholastic terminology, in particular, distinction between formal and objective reality. And for these and other reasons, they are not really taken seriously as candidates for establishing the existence of God by philosophers these days. The story with his third argument for the existence of God, the ontological argument in the fifth Mediation is rather different because in that argument, he argues that God must exist on the basis of the nature of the concept of God alone. That is, it's part of the real nature of God that he must have all perfections and existence is a perfection, he must therefore exist, just as it's part of the nature of a triangle to have interior angles adding up to two right angles.

Narrator:
For Descartes, the existence of God was linked to the knowledge of science. Extension is the essential nature of matter. Knowledge of it comes from geometry. This gives us knowledge of the objective properties of things. All science depends upon the knowledge alone of the true God. By the sixth Meditation, Descartes still didn't believe that he had proved that material things exist. He knew they could exist, insofar as they were considered as objects of geometrical proof. Also, our imagination persuades us that material things exist. God can produce anything we can conceive exactly as we conceive it. Descartes then moved on to try and answer the question, "what am I?" It is certain that I am entirely and truly distinct from my body and can exist apart from it.

Dr. Katherine Morris, Mansfield College, Oxford:
The point really about saying that mind and body are really distinct is that it follows that God could keep the mind, that is to say, the rational soul – the soul in existence after the body dies, and consequently, the possibility of the immortality of the soul is actually demonstrated by showing that mind and body are really distinct. It's not that it's shown that the soul is immortal, but it is at least showing that it is possible that the soul is immortal. We can make sense of that possibility. That's what's important to him about the real distinction between mind and body. An interesting point to note there is that the faculties of sense, perception and imagination, are tied, in a way, to the body, although they are modes of thinking, and hence belong to the mind. They belong only to embodied minds. And if we then try to even conceive of what it would be like, so to speak, to be the rational soul after the death of the

body, well, it’s no longer going to have sense, perception and imagination. All it’s got is pure intellect. And in a sense, all it’s got to think about is objects of the pure intellect, which roughly speaking, correspond to geometry, arithmetic, metaphysics, logic and God. So it’s going to be - the existence of the soul after the body dies – is going to be a very different existence from it’s existence now, but as he I said, the point of saying that mind and body are really distinct is to make the point that the soul can survive the death of the body.

Narrator:
Descartes did not think that everything was a function of his own mind, but his approach tends to be in that direction. His views were to influence such people as Isaac Newton, but he had his critics. Another prominent critic was Blaise Pascal, remembered for his famous wager. God is or he is not. But to which side shall we incline. Let us weigh the gains and loss in wagering what God is. Let us estimate the two chances. If you gain, you gain all. If you lose, you lose nothing. Wager then without hesitation that He is.

15th Session: Rene Descartes (1596-1650) Continued
Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

attribute(-)Attribute is an ontological concept and refers to the essential characteristics of a substance, without which such a substance cannot exit. In case of Descartes, the attribute of matter which is a substance is extension, to extend or to occupy a certain place, while the attribute of mind is thinking or an activity of consciousness. Descartes did not commit himself to whether or not God has more than one attribute (Spinoza said that at least two knowable to the human-being) but he showed several indication that God, being infinite, perfect, is spiritual, and can not be material (otherwise God is identical with the infinite space, but according to the traditional theological understanding, God as creator must transcendent from His own creatures (=universe and entities in the universe).Unlike Aristotle who considered that God is the primary cause or uncaused cause of the universe in the sense of formal and efficient cause, Christian philosophers in Western philosophy including Descartes considers that God is a Mind, an infinite, perfect spiritual Substance, which fulfills best the meaning of substance (since the substance as God does not depend on anything else than Himself, it signifies the absolute independence of all things).

clear and distinct ideas. Rationalists make use of the notion in formulating theories of cognitive error, establishing standards of evidence, characterizing some mental life, and identifying and describing the principal axioms of their systems, among much else. Clear ideas, for Descartes, are perceptions present and manifest to an attentive mind, cognitive analogues to objects strongly and clearly presented in vision. Distinct ideas are perceptions delineated from all others, containing nothing but that which is clear. For Descartes, we avoid error by assenting only to those things which we clearly and distinctly perceive.

Cogito ergo sum. Perhaps the most celebrated philosophical dictum of all time, Descartes's 'I am thinking, therefore I exist' is the starting-point of his system of knowledge. In his Discourse on the Method (1637) Descartes observes that the proposition je pense, donc je suis is 'so firm and sure that the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics [are] incapable of shaking it'. The dictum, in its better-known Latin version, also occurs in the Principles of Philosophy (1644). In the Meditations (1641), the canonical phrase does not occur, but Descartes argues instead that 'I am, I exist is certain as often as it is put forward or conceived in the mind.' Descartes later observed that the meditator's indubitable awareness of his own existence was 'recognized as self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind'. There is a partial anticipation of Descartes's Cogito in Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 11. 26.

certainty. A proposition is said to be certain when it is indubitable. A person is certain of a proposition when he or she cannot doubt it. It is thus possible that someone may be certain of something (or feel certain of it) when it can in fact be doubted. In his First Meditation, Descartes suggested that much that we normally take to be certain is in fact dubitable, and he held the controversial view that skepticism will be defeated only if genuine certainty is available.

Ontological Argument for God's Existence - An ontological argument for God's existence is an argument that argues for the conclusion that God exists by claiming that existence belongs to the very idea of God. Though Descartes makes an argument of this sort, he is far from the first to do so—the medieval philosopher St. Anselm made the most famous formulation of the ontological argument. Even Plato seems to make an argument of this type in the *Phaedo.*

The popularity of ontological arguments decreased dramatically when Immanuel Kant showed that they involve a fatal logical fallacy; they treat the existential verb (to be) as a property like other properties—a property that something can either have or not have. In fact, existence is quite unique as a property, since if something does not exist it does not "have" or "not have" anything. It just *is* not.

Formal Reality - Formal reality is simply the reality something has in virtue of existing. It is garden variety, normal reality. Formal reality comes in three grades: finite, infinite, and mode. Only God has infinite reality. All substances have finite reality. All qualities have modal reality. The concept of formal reality is crucial to Descartes' causal argument for the existence of God.

Objective Reality - Something has objective reality in virtue of representing something else. Descartes applies objective reality only to ideas and does not say whether other representational entities, such as paintings, have objective reality. The amount of objective reality an idea has is determined solely on the basis of the amount of formal reality contained in the thing being represented. An idea of God has infinite objective reality; an idea of your cousin, assuming you have one, has finite objective reality; and idea of red has modal objective reality. The concept of objective reality is crucial to Descartes' causal argument for the existence of God.

Primary Qualities - Qualities such as size, shape, and motion. According to Descartes these qualities really exist out in the world in a way that roughly corresponds to how we perceive them.

Secondary Qualities - Secondary qualities include the qualities of color, odor, smell, taste, heat, cold, pain, pleasure. According to Descartes, there is nothing in the world corresponding to our ideas of these qualities. What we see as "red", for instance, is really just a colorless arrangement of corpuscles, which, by their particular size, shape, and motion, have the power to produce in us the sensation of redness.

Quiz

16th Session: Bendict de Spinoza (1632-1677)

The transcript

Bendict de Spinoza
I have striven not to laugh at human actions, not to weep at them, nor to hate them, but to understand them. Spinoza was a Dutch Jew. His parents had fled the Inquisition in Portugal and settled in Amsterdam where Spinoza was born in 1632. He was brought up as an Orthodox Jew, but soon grew skeptical. He was excommunicated for his beliefs and left Amsterdam in 1660. He took a keen interest in science corresponding regularly with members of the Royal Society in London. Strangely, it is the lapsed Jew Spinoza rather than the devout Catholic Descartes whose writing contains the more religious element. Like Aristotle and Plato, Spinoza was concerned with how human beings can attain the good.

Dr. Bill Mander, Harris Manchester College, Oxford:
Well, the good for Spinoza or the state which he describes as human blessedness is something to be achieved through knowledge - through knowledge of ourselves, knowledge of the world, and knowledge of our relationship to the world. Spinoza thinks that knowledge is something that comes in different degrees or levels. So at the lowest kind of level, there is the knowledge we gain in everyday experience, from the things we read, from the people we talk to. This kind of knowledge, Spinoza admits it's very useful. He thinks that nonetheless it's pretty unreliable. However, he thinks it's possible through the use of our human reason to free ourselves from its errors and illusions and to arise to a higher kind of knowledge - the kind of knowledge that you would find, for instance, in philosophy and science. But, moreover, he thinks it's possible to continue this process of rational refinement and finally to arrive at a state of knowledge in which we have an immediate and intuitive vision of the connected whole that is the Universe. And this state which Spinoza calls the intellectual love of God is he thinks the highest state possible for a human beings. It's our supreme goal.

Narrator:
For Spinoza, the main function of God is to be the first cause, by which he means something like rationale. In truth, there can be conceived only one substance which is absolutely independent and that is God. Except God, no substance can be granted or conceived. All things are in God, and God is the immanent cause of all things. God necessarily exists. Spinoza allows the existence of only one infinite substance - the cause of everything else. The human mind is simply part of the infinite intellect of God. Mind and body are essentially connected.

Dr. Bill Mander, Harris Manchester College, Oxford:
Well, Spinoza hoped to cut through all of the problems that had beset his predecessor, Descartes, concerning the relationship between the mind and the body through very simple but bold course of declaring them to be identical. The very same thing. Not two but one. They were, you might say, two different ways of looking at the same thing. The way something appears from the outside, as it were, and the way in which it is like to be that thing. Although that said, he needs to remember that that's not quite right, because to talk of one reality, which could be taken or could be understood in two ways suggests that perhaps it isn't really either of them, and for Spinoza reality is very definitely something which can be understood in both of these ways.

Narrator:
In the third part of ethics, Spinoza deals with the nature of emotions. Freedom comes from an understanding of oneself and one's emotions. The greater That the understanding, the greater one's understanding of God. Freedom becomes the acceptance of absolute determinism. We are all modifications of God or nature. Spinoza died in 1667 of consumption. Most of his works were published posthumously. At first they were greeted with incomprehension. It was only later that his contribution to philosophy was fully appreciated.
Dr. Bill Mander, Harris Manchester College, Oxford:
The poet Novalis pseudonym describes Spinoza as God-intoxicated, and he has always appealed to those of religious, spiritual, even mystical orientation. On the other hand, he's also been very popular with people who emphasize human reason and who are unhappy within the notion of the supernatural, because there's a very clear consequence of Spinoza's philosophy that nothing can ever interfere with the system from outside. There are no miracles. So perhaps Spinoza's greatest contribution to philosophy is to suggest a way in which these two seemingly opposing views of the world can somehow be reconciled together. Because if he is a mystical philosopher, he nonetheless a thoroughly rational mystic.
Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

anomalous monism.The view that the mental and the physical are two irreducibly different ways of describing and explaining the same objects and events. The position, like that of Spinoza, combines ontological monism with conceptual dualism. It holds that mental concepts, though supervenient on physical concepts, cannot be fully analysed or defined in physical terms, and claims that there are no strict psychophysical laws.

double aspect theory. The view, derived from Spinoza, that certain states of living creatures have both mental and physical aspects. Perception and thought, for example, are processes in the brain, but not just physical processes, because some brain processes have experiential or cognitive aspects which are inseparable from their neurophysiological character. Double aspect theory therefore attempts to identify the mental and the physical without analysing either in terms of the other, thus avoiding both dualism and materialism. If true, it would explain how the causes of our actions can be simultaneously physical and mental. However, it is obscure how such apparently different things could really be aspects of one thing. A related modern view is Donald Davidson's ' anomalous monism', according to which every mental event is identical to a physical event, but mental properties cannot be analysed in physical terms.

17th Session: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ***(1646-1716)***

The transcript

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

Narrator:
There is nothing without a reason. Philosophy was in Leibniz' blood. His father was a moral philosopher in Leipzig. Much of his life was spent in the service of House of Brunswick and he was commissioned to write its history. Surprisingly, he published only one book of philosophy in his lifetime - The *Theodicy*, a work on natural theology. But he wrote many unpublished works. The most important of which was the Discourse on Metaphysics.

Dr. Bill Mander, Harris Manchester College, Oxford:
Apart from one book and an occasional article, the vast bulk of Leibniz's material was unpublished during his lifetime, and it is vast. The catalogue contains some 57,000 items. Most of it consists in drafts and notes and sketches. He seems to be one of these kinds of philosophers who thought things out on paper, but a great deal of it consists in correspondence, and much of what he wrote was prepared for the many individual scholars that he entered into correspondence with. This isn't perhaps so unusual in its time, but of course the loss to modern scholarship is that there is no one place that we can go to for any kind of full or systematic account of his views.

Narrator:
Leibniz wanted to produce a universal, logical and mathematical language. This would have made possible the solution of a whole range of problems.

Dr. James Ladyman, University of Bristol:
The problems that would have been solved if such a goal was attainable mostly to do with avoiding the sorts of errors that one runs into when one's language is ambiguous or where the meaning of words is not clear, is imprecise., and so on.

Dr. Bill Mander, Harris Manchester College, Oxford:
According to this plan, all knowledge would be fundamentally a matter of definition and therefore it would be possible to settle any dispute by consultation to some kind of universal encyclopedia or dictionary. It needs to be remembered that this project belongs really to the earliest phase of Leibniz' career, and as his thought progressed it was either abandoned or at least relegated to a back seat. But it remains important because the vision of knowledge as an interconnected whole, as well as a certain amount of the logical apparatus that was developed for the scheme. These things continued to influence his philosophy throughout his career.

Narrator:
Leibniz believed that the world consists of substances he called monads. He developed his theory in a work entitled Monadology. Although Leibniz was a rationalist, his theories also made allowance for the use of common sense. He agreed with Aristotle that substances were the basic things that made up the Universe, but he believed that these substances must be absolutly simple. Leibniz believed that this world was just one of an infinite set of worlds God could have created. Leibniz describes these worlds as compossible, meaning that their components must fit together. The world God chooses to create is the best compossible one. God had so created the world that everything that was true of substance was necessarily true

of it, because it followed from its individual essence. Leibniz also believed in the principle that he called the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Dr. Bill Mander, Harris Manchester College, Oxford:
The Principle of Sufficient Reason says that for every truth there must be a reason why it's so and not otherwise. Or what Leibniz takes to be equivalent, that everything has a cause. What it rules out is the possibility that certain things might just happen or be for no reason whatsoever. Now, we may not know what that reason or cause is, says Leibniz, but nonetheless we can be assured that there must be one. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a very controversial principle, but has and indeed continues to divide philosophers.

Narrator:
Antoine Arnauld attacked Leibniz' theory. If God had programmed Adam to fall, there was no room for freedom. Leibniz argued that freedom, causal determinism and logical determinism were all different. After 40 years of faithful service with the House of Brunswick, Leibniz fell out of favour with his master, England's future King George I. He died in Hanover in 1716.
A Philosophical Concepts
apperception. Leibniz's term for inner awareness or self-consciousness. Leibniz held that it was possible to perceive without thereby being conscious, and that it is the exercise of apperception which marks the difference between conscious awareness and unconscious perception. Kant draws a distinction between inner sense, or empirical apperception, and what he calls 'the transcendental unity of apperception'. Where the former involves the actual exercise of introspection, the latter is the inter-connectedness of all thought which is, according to Kant, the formal pre-condition of any thought or experience of an objective world, and also of empirical apperception itself.

18th Session: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ***(1646-1716)- Continued***

Selected primary sources: Discourse on Metaphysics, Pp.2-8

I: Concerning the divine perfection and that God does everything in the most desirable way.

The conception of God which is the most common and the most full of meaning is expressed well enough in the words: God is an absolutely perfect being. The implications, however, of these words fail to receive sufficient consideration. For instance, there are many different kinds of perfection, all of which God possesses, and each one of them pertains to him in the highest degree.

We must also know what perfection is. One thing which can surely be affirmed about it is that those forms or natures which are not susceptible of it to the highest degree, say the nature of numbers or of figures, do not permit of perfection. This is because the number which is the greatest of all (that is, the sum of all the numbers), and likewise the greatest of all figures, imply contradictions. The greatest knowledge, however, and omnipotence contain no impossibility. Consequently power and knowledge do admit of perfection, and in so far as they pertain to God they have no limits.

Whence it follows that God who possesses supreme and infinite wisdom acts in the most perfect manner not only metaphysically, but also from the moral standpoint. And with respect to ourselves it can be said that the more we are enlightened and informed in regard to the works of God the more will we be disposed to find them excellent and conforming entirely to that which we might desire.

II: Against those who hold that there is in the works of God no goodness, or that the principles of goodness and beauty are arbitrary.

Therefore I am far removed from the opinion of those who maintain that there are no principles of goodness or perfection in the nature of things, or in the ideas which God has about them, and who say that the works of God are good only through the formal reason that God has made them. If this position were true, God, knowing that he is the author of things, would not have to regard them afterwards and find them good, as the Holy Scripture witnesses. Such anthropological expressions are used only to let us know that excellence is recognized in regarding the works themselves, even if we do not consider their evident dependence on their author. This is confirmed by the fact that it is in reflecting upon the works that we are able to discover the one who wrought. They must therefore bear in themselves his character.

I confess that the contrary opinion seems to me extremely dangerous and closely approaches that of recent innovators who hold that the beauty of the universe and the goodness which we attribute to the works of God are chimeras of human beings who think of God in human terms. In saying, therefore, that things are not good according to any standard of goodness, but simply by the will of God, it seems to me that one destroys, without realizing it, all the love of God and all his glory; for why praise him for what he has done, if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary? Where will be his justice and his wisdom if he has only a certain despotic power, if arbitrary will takes the place of reasonableness, and if in accord with the definition of tyrants, justice consists in that which is pleasing to the most powerful? Besides it seems that every act of willing supposes some reason for the willing and this reason, of course, must precede the act. This is why, accordingly, I find so strange those expressions of certain philosophers who say that the eternal truths of metaphysics and Geometry, and consequently the principles of goodness, of justice, and of perfection, are effects only of the will of God. To me it seems that all these follow from his understanding, which does not depend upon his will any more than does his essence.

III: Against those who think that God might have made things better than he has.
No more am I able to approve of the opinion of certain modern writers who boldly maintain that that which God has made is not perfect in the highest degree, and that he might have done better. It seems to me that the consequences of such an opinion are wholly inconsistent with the glory of God. *Uti minus malum habet rationem boni, ita minus bonum habet rationem mali* [As a lesser evil is relatively good, so a lesser good is relatively evil.] I think that one acts imperfectly if he acts with less perfection than he is capable of. To show that an architect could have done better is to find fault with his work. Furthermore this opinion is contrary to the Holy Scriptures when they assure us of the goodness of God's work. For if comparative perfection were sufficient, then in whatever way God had accomplished his work, since there is an infinitude of possible imperfections, it would always have been good in comparison with the less perfect; but a thing is little praiseworthy when it can be praised only in this way.
I believe that a great many passages from the divine writings and from the holy fathers will be found favoring my position, while hardly any will be found in favor of that of these modern thinkers. Their opinion is, in my judgment, unknown to the writers of antiquity and is a deduction based upon the too slight acquaintance which we have with the general harmony of the universe and with the hidden reasons for God's conduct. In our ignorance, therefore, we are tempted to decide audaciously that many things might have been done better.

These modern thinkers insist upon certain hardly tenable subtleties, for they imagine that nothing is so perfect that there might not have been something more perfect. This is an error. They think, indeed, that they are thus safeguarding the liberty of God. As if it were not the highest liberty to act in perfection according to the sovereign reason.
For to think that God acts in anything without having any reason for his willing, even if we overlook the fact that such action seems impossible, is an opinion which conforms little to God's glory. For example, let us suppose that God chooses between A and B, and that he takes A without any reason for preferring it to B. I say that this action on the part of God is at least not praiseworthy, for all praise ought to be founded upon reason which *ex hypothesi* is not present here. My opinion is that God does nothing for which he does not deserve to be glorified.

IV: That love for God demands on our part complete satisfaction with and acquiescence in that which he has done.
The general knowledge of this great truth that God acts always in the most perfect and most desirable manner possible, is in my opinion the basis of the love which we owe to God in all things; for he who loves seeks his satisfaction in the felicity or perfection of the object loved and in the perfection of his actions. *Idem velle et idem nolle vera amicitia est* ["Desiring the same things and disliking the same things, that is what true friendship is" (Catalina Sallustius).] I believe that it is difficult to love God truly when one, having the power to change his disposition, is not disposed to wish for that which God desires. In fact those who are not satisfied with what God does seem to me like dissatisfied subjects whose attitude is not very different from that of rebels. I hold therefore, that on these principles, to act conformably to the love of God it is not sufficient to force oneself to be patient; we must be really satisfied with all that comes to us according to his will. I mean this acquiescence in regard to the past; for as regards the future one should not be a quietist with the arms folded, open to ridicule, awaiting that which God will do; according to the sophism which the ancients called [. . .], the lazy reason. It is necessary to act conformably to the presumptive will of God as far as we are able to judge of it, trying with all our might to contribute to the

general welfare and particularly to the ornamentation and the perfection of that which touches us, or of that which is nigh and so to speak at our hand. For if the future shall perhaps show that God has not wished our good intention to have its way, it does not follow that he has not wished us to act as we have; on the contrary, since he is the best of all masters, he ever demands only the right intentions, and it is for him to know the hour and the proper place to let good designs succeed.

19th Session: John Locke (1632-1704)

The transcript

John Locke

Narrator:
John Locke was the son of a West Country lawyer who had supported Parliament during the Civil War. Locke was part of a movement which came to be called British Empiricism. He entered the service of the first Earl of Shaftsbury. In 1683, when his master seemed in danger of being impeached for treason, Locke went with him to the Netherlands. Locke spent six years there. Once William of Orange had replaced James II on the English throne, he felt it safe to return. It was during his self-imposed exile that Locke wrote his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke tried to define what he means by the term "idea." That term, which I think, serves to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. In Book I of the Essay, Locke attacks the view that there are innate principles such as identity and contradiction, and principles of morals. Many people believed in such principles, because they believed they were universally assented to. Locke denies this. He believed only that there might be innate capacities. In Book II, Locke has a simple answer to the question, "where do ideas come from?" In one word, from experience. Experience does this in two ways, through sensation and through reflection.

Dr. James Ladyman, University of Bristol:
We form ideas from sensation and reflection by a combination of noticing the resemblance among the ideas we get from our senses and by abstracting and recombining ideas to form more complex ones. So it's possible to form the idea of an animal that you have never seen, like a unicorn, by putting together ideas that are directly derived from things that you have seen like that of horses and horns.

Narrator:
Locke also distinguishes between simple and complex ideas. He takes it for granted that his reader will know what a simple idea is. Later philosophers, such as Wittgenstein showed that there were no such things as simple ideas in the sense that Locke taught. Yet it was a concept at the very centre of empiricism itself. Locke classified complex ideas in terms of their objects, substances, modes and relations.

Dr. James Ladyman, University of Bristol:
Substances for Locke are basically things that exist in the world, material objects and he thought that the best guess as to what the ultimate substance was that it was extended stuff, matter, but atoms – made up of atoms. Modes are just what we would now call properties. They are ways in which substances can be and relations are other involving properties, such as being to the left of, or being heavier than.

Narrator:
When he published his fourth edition of the Essay in 1700, Locke offered a different basis for classifying ideas. Locke made an important distinction between primary and secondary qualities when dealing with the simple ideas of sense.

Dr. James Ladyman, University of Bristol:

Locke famously made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, but he wasn't the first to make this distinction. It's made by Galileo. It's also made by the ancient Greek Atomists .The idea is roughly to distinguish between the properties of things which they really have, and the properties which they only appear to have. So, for example, imagine three bowls of water, one of which is cold, one of which is lukewarm, one of which is hot. If you put your hand in the hot bowl, and then in the lukewarm one, the lukewarm one feels cold. If you put your hand in the cold one and then the lukewarm, the lukewarm one feels hot. Hence, it is argued that the "hotness" of the water is not a property it has in reality, but merely a property that it has insofar as it appears to you.

Narrator:
It seems that Locke often failed to heed his own advice as laid down in Book IV. Locke also wrote two treaties on civil government. The principles laid down in the second of these were to influence the drafting of the American Constitution. Man being by nature all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent. But, everyone has the right to punish everyone for the evil he has done. Everyone has the executive power of the law of nature. Locke's view of the state of nature differs sharply from Hobbes. All men have an obligation to the other members of society. In Locke's ideal state, there is no absolute sovereign. Land and animals are common to all men, but become an individual's private property when he uses them. The purpose of his Treaty on Civil Government was to defend the glorious revolution of 1688, and many of his ideas are not always practical. Yet, his ideas can be said to have laid the foundations for Western Democracy.

20th Session: John Locke (1632-1704)- Continued

Selected primary sources An Essay Concerning Human Understanding By Locke Book II - Chapter II Of Simple Ideas. Pp.57-58

Uncompounded appearances. The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are simple and some complex. Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed. For, though the sight and touch often take in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas;- as a man sees at once motion and color; the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax: yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses. The coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily; or as the taste of sugar, and smell of a rose. And there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas; which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.

The mind can neither make nor destroy them. These simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there. The dominion of man, in this little world of his own understanding being much what the same as it is in the great world of visible things; wherein his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being. The same inability will every one find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his understanding one simple idea, not received in by his senses from external objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt: and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colors, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds.

Only the qualities that affect the senses are imaginable. This is the reason why- though we cannot believe it impossible to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has given to man- yet I think it is not possible for any man to imagine any other qualities in bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made but with four senses, the qualities then which are the objects of the fifth sense had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a sixth, seventh, or eighth sense can possibly be;- which, whether yet some other creatures, in some other parts of this vast and stupendous universe, may not have, will be a great presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things, but will consider the immensity of

this fabric, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think that, in other mansions of it, there may be other and different intelligent beings, of whose faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehension as a worm shut up in one
drawer of a cabinet hath of the senses or understanding of a man; such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the Maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man’s having but five senses; though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more;- but either supposition serves equally to my present purpose.

Quiz

*21th Session: Bishop George Berkeley **(1685-1753)***

The transcript

Bishop George Berkeley

Narrator:
Truth is the cry of all, but the game of the few. George Berkeley was born in Kilkenny, and became Bishop of Cloyne. He is perhaps best remembered for his theory that material objects exist only as ideas in the mind. To be, is to be perceived. Dr. Johnson famously ridiculed this by kicking a stone. I refute it, thus. Berkeley's theories are based around immediate perception that we first perceive the proper objects of the senses, such as light, sound, smell and taste. He assumes that these sensations are ideas. This idea is similar to that of Aristotle. As Berkeley made clear, not all ideas are sensations, but all sensations are ideas. He often uses the terms interchangeably. Locke had asserted that the secondary qualities of an object were subjective. For instance, when we are near a fire, we may feel pain. Is it the idea of warmth produced by the fire, although the pain is within us? This fails to distinguish between warmth and feelings of warmth. Berkeley accepted Locke's argument but said that similar considerations applied to primary qualities, as well. Berkeley's first work, Theory of Vision, is a work on optics. He also included in it extracts from Descartes Dioptrics. Berkeley believed that the retina of the eye was a two dimensional surface. It was impossible for the third dimensions to be projected onto it. A man named Molinuevo had once raised the question, if a man born blind were to gain his sight, would he immediately perceive things as at a distance. Berkeley's answer was no. He said the man would need experience to connect the ideas of sight to the ideas of touch. Berkeley saw himself as a man of common sense. He seems to be unruffled by the ridicule of men such as Swift and Johnson. He held God to be the author of nature, whose existence is evident in the ideas he produces.

Dr. Jimmy Doyle, University of Bristol:
Berkeley's conception of God places him quite squarely in the tradition of Descartes and Malebranche in the sense that, well ultimately Plato, in the sense that for Berkeley God is the supreme grand of being and of intelligibility, and of perceptibility. So Berkeley thinks that the role of God is to really to sustain everything in existence, and because Berkeley thinks that to be is to be perceived he believes that to sustain that, well, to be is to be perceived or to perceive. So where ideas are concerned, i.e., entities whose being consists in their being perceived. If God is sustaining them in existence, he's doing so by ensuring that they are continuously perceptible. And that's why for Berkeley, objects in the external world, and he does think there is such a thing as an external world, he just thinks that it's composed of ideas rather than material substances. Objects in the external world do continue to exist even when we are not perceiving them, but only by courtesy of their being continuously perceived by God.

Selected primary sources A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge By Berkeley, Introduction,Pp.1-3

1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with

doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming skeptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavoring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn skepticism.

2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said the faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the support and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of infinity not to be comprehended by that which is finite.

3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of providence which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, does usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves— that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.

4. My purpose therefore is to try if I can discover what those principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dullness and limitation of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the first principles of human knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties which stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from false principles which have been insisted on and might have been avoided.

5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like designs, yet I am not without some hopes — upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes.

23rd Session: David Hume ***(1711-1776)***

The transcript

David Hume

Narrator:
David Hume was born into a family of poor landed gentry in Edinburgh in 1711. One of Hume's major concerns was the relationship between cause and effect – causality. It was, and still is, important, not only to Hume, but to philosophy generally, because without an understanding of it, the Universe consists of random unconnected events. Understanding causality not only means making sense of the world we live in, but our place in it, as well, and our experiences. Hume started with attempts to prove the existence of God and the self. Hume claimed that we must have observational evidence in experience of God and the self, but we have no direct experience of God. We cannot hear, see, touch, or experience God in any tangible way. Feeling that God must somehow exist is not enough.

Dr. Christine Battersby, University of Warwick:
Hume is a skeptic as far as religion is concerned because the mind operates through custom and there is this kind of cement through habit and association. It can only work on material that has been received through the senses. Because there is no impression of God or anything beyond this world, we can't appropriately extend the abstract ideas that we think we have, but are just these bundles to the realm of the religious. So there is an attack on religion which is very strong and really one of the things that he argues is that all priests are necessarily hypocrites because they have to disguise to themselves their unbelief and he doesn't go as far as to deny that God exists, but through the mouth of various characters, he undermines belief in a first cause, in God as a substance, in the soul as a unity, and in immortality of the soul.

Narrator:
Hume concludes that in order for us to have any knowledge of a Supreme Being is to witness an action that transgresses the laws of natures, as it is only through the world that God as an infinite being can express his nature and make his self felt. So God makes His presence known through miracles. Hume claimed that like God and the self we cannot observe causal connection.

Dr. Christine Battersby, University of Warwick:
For Hume, causality is just a succession of ideas, a contiguity of ideas which are then linked together by the mind and you can't actually find the necessity in nature. It's something that the mind adds in on top.

Narrator:
This holds true even with things that seem certain like night following day. Day is not the cause of night. Night is brought on by the rotation of the Earth on its axis as it travels around the Sun. We cannot observe this rotation so how can we be completely sure that night will follow day. Can we get beyond conjunction of events to actually observing their causes? Can we distinguish between events that are causally connected to those that are not? If we

cannot, how can we make any general statements about the world? Where does this leave science?

Dr. Christine Battersby, University of Warwick:
He's not attacking science. As I've said, he thinks of himself as a Newton of the mind. It's just that science and the connections in science have to be explained psychologically instead of in terms of logical and philosophical relations.

Narrator:
Hume had answer to this seemingly bleak scenario. Although he advises we should hold our opinions with a healthy dose of skepticism, Hume was realistic about what drives human beings and the role played by the emotions. If we did live our lives querying everything we saw and stubbornly refusing to go about our daily lives because we do not know anything for certain, we would all curl up and die. It is better to be proved wrong sometimes in our assumptions than to abstain from doing anything at all.

Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

cement of the universe. Hume's description of resemblance, contiguity, and causation—the three relations which induce people to associate ideas, and hence to build up their picture of the world. 'As it is by means of thought only that any thing operates upon our passions, and as these are the only ties of our thoughts, they are really to us the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, in a great measure, depend on them' (An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature).The Cement of the Universe, J. L. Mackie's fine study of causation, takes its title from Hume, as well as sharing his empiricist perspective and his general conviction that causal necessity is 'upon the whole … something, that exists in the mind, not in objects' (Treatise, i. iii. 14).

constant conjunction. Term used by Hume to describe the relation between two events one of which invariably accompanies the other. If catching influenza is always followed by fever, these events are 'constantly conjoined'; if there is no smoke without fire, there is a constant conjunction between the production of smoke and burning. Hume regarded our experience of constant conjunctions as the principal source of our idea of causality. Many interpreters have held that he also proposed an *analysis* of causality in terms of constant conjunction.
experienceExperience is an epistemological concept and it has been considered the way of knowing through sensory givenness in the history of Western philosophy. Experience became the dominant epistemological concept, when the British empiricists (Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume) tried to understand the nature of knowledge and learning by means of the origin of knowledge. Empiricists maintained that all knowledge derives from experience, and experience ultimately derives from sense perception. While sense perception refers to a particular, concrete individual impression though senses, experience is normally understood wider and refers to knowledge obtained by many sensory perceptions in general. However, since phenomenology entered the stage of philosophical inquiry, experience obtained a different meaning. It is no longer signifying knowledge obtained from sense perception, but experience has been used to indicate an immediate knowledge against knowledge obtained mediately through inference or generalization. It imply means intuition, which is directly given to the act of knowing. Thus, there are a priori intuition and a posteriori intuition. The latter signifies the knowledge derives from sense perception,while the former does not depend upon sense perception.

24th Session: David Hume ***(1711-1776)-Continued***

Selected primary sources: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding By Hume: Section I. Of the Different Species of Philosophy, Pp.1-6

Edited, with minor emendations, corrections, and changes from English to American usage and spelling, by Daniel Kolak.

Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners, each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment, pursuing one object and avoiding another according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colors, borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life, place opposite characters in a proper contrast, and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue, they excite and regulate our sentiments, and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honor, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labors.

The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavor to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of speculation, and with a narrow scrutiny examine it in order to find those principles which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behavior. They think it a reproach to all literature that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism, and should for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task they are deterred by no difficulties, but proceeding from particular instances to general principles they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise, and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labor of their whole lives if they can discover some hidden truths which may contribute to the instruction of posterity.

It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life, moulds the heart and affections, and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade and comes into open day, nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behavior. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections dissipate all its conclusions and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.

This also must be confessed, that the most durable as well as justest fame has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings—-and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion by its unusual appearance or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher who purposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colors, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but, renewing his appeal to common sense and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of Cicero flourishes at present, but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas and still maintains his reputation, but the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation and to his own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure when Locke shall be entirely forgotten.

Quiz

25th Session: Immanuel Kant ***(1724-1804)***

The transcript

Immanuel Kant

Narrator:
So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or that of any other. In every case there's an end withal, never as means only. Immanuel Kant is the giant of 18th Century philosophy. Many would argue that he was the greatest philosopher ever. In 1781 he published his Critique of Pure Reason. He followed this with two further critiques on Practical Reason and Judgment. He also wrote on religion, politics and psychology. Though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. Kant did not even accept the empiricists' theory that all ideas arose out of experience.

Dr. Adrian Moore, St. Hugh's College, Oxford:
Well, he agreed with the empiricists in that he thought that all our knowledge, all our substantive knowledge about the world must ultimately relate to experience, which is a basic empiricist theme, and he was sure that they were right about that. He was as reluctant as they were to continence the idea of conclusions about things that actually transcended our experience. For example, he had no patience at all with attempts to prove the existence of a transcendent God or with speculations about an afterlife, for example, what might happen to us after our deaths. When these were understood as attempts to come again as substantive knowledge. I mean he didn't hold that we could have knowledge about these things at all. He was sympathetic to attempts to think in those terms and to speculate about those things, but he was of a mind with the empiricists in denying that we could know anything about those realities beyond our experience. So, in that sense, he was very much in line as against the rationalists. He agreed that all our knowledge must ultimately relate to experience and be grounded in experience, but he didn't think that it was all simply read off from experience. He thought that when we derived knowledge of the world through the deliverances of experience, it was because we, ourselves, were appropriately receptive to what was out there. And being appropriately receptive meant having certain faculties in terms of which we interpreted what was out there. Said faculties that enabled us to make sense of what was out there. And an analogy that is often used in this connection it's not Kant's own analogy, but it's quite a useful analogy is that it's as if we were operating with a pair of spectacles, epistemological spectacles through which we interpret what the world throws at us, as it were. But these spectacles are unlike ordinary spectacles in that we can never take them off. I mean everything that we know, we know through this basic framework. They provide a kind of structure for what we know, a framework, as I say, through which we interpret things. That is where the element of idealism lies because we ourselves are making a contribution to the shape of our experiences. The reason why Kant wanted to call it transcendental idealism saw it as a special kind of idealism was that we could never take our spectacles off. There was no such thing as taking our specs off and stepping back and looking at this process as it was in itself. We were always constrained to see things through this basic framework, and that's why he felt that it was appropriate to distance himself, for example, from Berkeley, whose view, obviously, was also an idealist view, but who felt that the idealistic processes that were giving us knowledge, were themselves things that we could reflect on and come to know about.

Narrator:
Kant later attempted to justify the various principles according to which objective experience must be organized. In the section of the Critique of Pure Reason called The Dialectic, Kant explores his own theories of ideas which are pure concepts of reason. Because we have reason, we naturally have these ideas. Kant also dealt with ethics and morals. Nothing in the world, indeed, nothing even beyond the world can possibly be conceived which can be called good without qualification, except a good will.

Dr. Adrian Moore, St. Hugh's College, Oxford:
What Kant means by a good will is a will that's exercised in complete accord with its own freedom, that's to say in a world that is, in the popular phrase that's often used in this connection, a will that is a law unto itself. It's following its own principles, its own rules, its own laws, and those laws Kant believes, he has all sorts of interesting arguments to substantiate this belief - those laws are the laws of morality. A good will is a will that acts on principle, purely for the sake of principle doing what it does simply because that's the right and proper thing to do. That's the law governed thing to do, and doing that in turn simply because it's acting in accord with its own laws. That is to say, it's acting in a way that's completely autonomous and free. So, a good will is a will that, if you like, obeying the laws of its own freedom, and that has important resonances for Kant, because that, in turn, is a will that is completely moral in its determination, in its behaviour, in the behaviour that it causes.

Narrator:
In the critique of Judgment, Kant explores how our aesthetic judgments depend upon the interplay of imagination and understanding. Kant lived for 80 years but never married. During that time, he never strayed far from his native Keuringsbureau, but his philosophy was to influence the whole world.

Dr. James Ladyman, University of Bristol:
In modern philosophy, Kant's influence is only second to that of Descartes. So if the defining moment of the beginning of modern philosophy is Descartes' Mediations, then the defining moment of later modern philosophy is Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and Kant's influence is in the 19th Century, he spawns a whole idealistic romantic movement in philosophy, unintentionally. In the 20th Century, he's very influential in ethics, but also in political theory.

Dr. Adrian Moore, St. Hugh's College, Oxford:
I mean he's had an absolutely immense influence, in general, and specifically on subsequent philosophers. His general influence has to do with the various enlightenment ideals that he championed. He's a major figure in the enlightenment and we all know what kind of an influence that in turn had. He helped to put reason back on the map. He was able to champion reason and to give a compelling account of how much reason is able to achieve, how much human beings are able to achieve through the use of reason, through being purely rational, which is obviously is a very important enlightenment theme, and in particular in his views about moral philosophy, he was able to give again a very compelling account of how far we are able to get in distinguishing between right and wrong simply by using our own natural rational resources without having to appeal to authority, and in particular without having to appeal to the authority of religion. So that's a huge enlightenment impact that he's had, but also, specifically on philosophers. I mean there's virtually no philosophy that has

come since in the 200 years since Kant died that is not in some way been influenced by Kant. Very few people nowadays are straightforward Kantians. It's not that kind of influence, and people that see things in a very non-Kantian way, still recognize the force of his argument and the strength of his position and see it as something that they have to respond to. So he has pretty much shaped the whole nature of subsequent philosophical discussion, set the parameters, determined what it is that people feel that they have to discuss, what the main issues are, what the main questions are that that need to be addressed.

Narrator:
As 19th Century dawned, and the Industrial Revolution changed the nature of society forever, philosophical thinking would begin to take a new turn. Established beliefs would be challenged.

Part 3

Narrator:
As science advanced during the 18th and 19th Centuries, the Industrial Revolution changed the way people worked and organized their lives. It also changed the way they looked at the world.

Narrator:
A new generation of philosophers soon began to challenge Kant's theories. Whilst they accepted the idealism, they were dissatisfied with the limits he put on understanding and reason, and so sought to transform his idealism.

26th Session: Immanuel Kant ***(1724-1804)- Continued***
Selected primary sources: Critique of Pure Reason, by Kant: Book II; The Transcendental Procedure of Pure Reason.Pp.157-168. Part I

It may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being presented and intuited in a Possible experience. But we should express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we said that we can have no knowledge of an object, which perfectly corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical conception thereof.
Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical premises, and by means of which we conclude from something that we do know, to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an unavoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are very well entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of reason, but are necessitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the Wisest cannot free himself. After long labor he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.

Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corresponding to the number of the ideas which their conclusions present. In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject contains no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I cannot in this manner attain to a conception. This dialectical argument I shall call the transcendental paralogism. The second class of sophistical arguments is occupied with the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given phenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-contradictory conception of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of reason in these dialectical arguments, I shall term the antinomy of pure reason. Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I conclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can be given, the absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general; that is, from things which I do not know in their mere transcendental conception, I conclude a being of all beings which I know still less by means of a transcendental conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity I can form no conception whatever. This dialectical argument I shall call the ideal of pure reason.

CHAPTER I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.

The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexceptionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble, mental illusion.
We now come to a conception which was not inserted in the general list of transcendental conceptions. and yet must be reckoned with them, but at the same time without in the least altering, or indicating a deficiency in that table. This is the conception, or, if the term is preferred, the Judgment, "I think." But it is readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions also, and that it is therefore regarded as a transcendental conception, although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness. At the same time, pure as this conception is from empirical content (impressions of the senses), it enables us to distinguish two different kinds of objects. "I," as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called body. Thus the expression, "I," as a thinking being, designates the object-matter of psychology, which may be called "the rational doctrine of the soul," inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of the soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me in concreto), may be concluded from this conception "I," in so far as it appears in all thought.

Now, the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of this kind. For if the smallest empirical element of thought, if any particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a rational, but an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before us a pretended science, raised upon the single proposition, "I think," whose foundation or want of foundation we may very properly, and agreeably with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here examine. It ought not to be objected that in this proposition, which expresses the perception of one’s self, an internal experience is asserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon it, is not pure, but partly founded upon an empirical principle. For this internal

perception is nothing more than the mere apperception, "I think," which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible, in which we say, "I think substance, cause, etc." For internal experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general, and its relation to other perceptions, unless some particular distinction or determination thereof is empirically given, cannot be regarded as empirical cognition, but as cognition of the empirical, and belongs to the investigation of the possibility of every experience, which is certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience (for example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the general representation of self-consciousness, would immediately change the rational into an empirical psychology.

"I think" is therefore the only text of rational psychology, from which it must develop its whole system. It is manifest that this thought, when applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but transcendental predicates thereof; because the least empirical predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence of all experience.

28th Session: Immanuel Kant ***(1724-1804)- Continued***

Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

a priori and a posteriori. These are terms primarily used to describe two species of propositional knowledge but also, derivatively, two classes of propositions or truths, namely, those that are knowable a priori and a posteriori respectively. Knowledge is said to be a priori when it does not depend for its authority upon the evidence of experience, and a posteriori when it does so depend.

Whether knowledge is a priori is quite a different question from whether it is innate. Mathematics provides the most often cited examples of a priori knowledge, but most of our mathematical knowledge is no doubt *acquired* through experience even though it is *justifiable* independently of experience. Kant and others have held that a priori knowledge concerns only necessary truths while a posteriori knowledge concerns only contingent truths, but Kripke has challenged this assumption.

architectonic. Architectonic studies the systematic structure of our knowledge. For Kant, 'Human reason is by nature architectonic' because 'it regards all our knowledge as belonging to a possible system'. Many Kantian philosophers, such as Peirce, insist that we shall only know how philosophical knowledge is possible when we can understand its place within a unified system of knowledge.

Noumenon Noumenon is Kant's philosophical terminology. It is sometimes called thing in itself. It refers to the reality which behind phenomenon. Phenomenon is only knowable to us, while as the ground of phenomenon, noumenon is unknown to us, in particular because the human-being does not possess intellectual intuition, but sensory intuition and formal intuitions which are space and time. The latter is related to senses and yet it is in itself a priori , the condition of possibility of sense experience. In the world of thing itself or noumenon, being known to us, this reality is the reality of morality, in which freedom of will is basic.
Phenomenon Phenomenon is something which appears. There are three kinds of phenomenon. 1) Phenomenon means an appearance in the sense that something itself does not appear, but reveals itself as an appearance. Kant's use of phenomenon is used in this sense. That which apears is called thing in itself or noumenon. 2) Phenomenon is something unsubstantial and yet experienced as an appearance, like mirage or some kind of the illusory or hallucinatory. It is far from what we consider real and yet it is not quite nothing. 3)

Phenomenon is what we understand a phenomenon in the phenomenological sense. From the phemenological point of view, a phenomenon is real in itself and nothing "stands behind" any phenomenon. Phenomenology thus intends to approach reality (phenomenon) as it reveals itself as it is.
transcendental) Kant's terminology. According to Kant, knowledge is called transcendental that is not the mere direct knowledge of an object, but is related to the way of knowing, as long as it is a priori. This means that it is transcendental knowledge that is concerned about the a priori conditions of possibility of knowledge, whereby this possibility is presupposed. It is an answer to the question of how a priori knowledge of nature is possible at all. Kant asserted that we do not possess the direct access to this transcendental knowledge, in other words, we do not have intellectual intuition, but the transcendental knowledge must be logically inferred from the existence and possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge as its foundation. Fichte used transcendental to signify the philosophical discipline which deals with the foundation of everything, I.e., the ontological as well as epistemological foundation. Thus , transcendental is considered by Fichte the ethical inquiry. 2) Husserl adopted the basic meaning of Kant's transcendental and yet he did not consider mere formal elements of the condition for knowledge to be possible, but also transcendental knowledge is grasped by intuition. This intuition is not empirical, but a prior and is called phenomenological intuition.
redundant
Quiz

29th Session: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, (1770-1831)

The transcript

Georg Hegel

Narrator:
What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born in Stuttgart in 1770 and studied at the University of Tubingen. Much of his writing is complicated and is difficult both to understand and to expound. He published his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in 1817 and further expanded editions followed in 1827 and 1830. The Encyclopedia is a hugely ambitions work. Its aim is to take in the whole of reality, history and knowledge in a systematic form.

Professor Robert Stern, University of Sheffield:
In fact, he published in 1830, that edition comes in three parts, three books: first called The Logic, and then The Philosophy of Nature, The Philosophy of Mind/Spirit, and the idea all along is to develop a system, a way of thinking that will resolve problems in the natural world in the way science treats the world, and in the human world politically, emphatically and so on, by using the cash grids that he set out in The Logic.

Narrator:
There is much in the Encyclopedia that is influenced by Aristotle. Hegel was both a rationalist and a romantic. He had a keen sense of how the past affects the present. He claimed to have produced a complete map of all possible knowledge and reality. Hegel saw Medieval Christianity as a prime example of what he called the "unhappy consciousness." Judaism emphasized the separation between man and God. Christianity sought to unite man and God through the incarnation. Yet there is still a gap between the changing nature of the world and the unchanging nature of God.

Professor Robert Stern, University of Sheffield:
He wants to integrate religion within philosophy, and the way he does it, is to argue that basically the insights of religion are the same as the insights of philosophy, but just expressed or understood in religious terms. So he characterized it as "picture thinking." Thinking in terms of images or representations, so religion will talk about God, and will talk about incarnation, and will talk about creation, and so on and he thinks that they are all the legitimate ways of thinking about the world in a pictorial story form, and philosophy is able to recast those ideas in more philosophical forms. So, for example, religion talks about the incarnation, religion talks about creation – God creating the world. Well what does that mean philosophically? Well it means there's a sort of rational structure inherent in things, and when we talk about God creating the world, we just mean [?], Einstein, God doesn't play dice. So what does that mean, well we just mean that the world has a rational order, it's no accident in some sense, that things broadly speaking, are as they are - we can understand why things have to be a certain way. And that relates to the religious idea of God's creation. So Hegel hoped that he could satisfy or give a place for religion in that way within a philosophical framework.

Narrator:
Hegel goes on to deal with reason and what he calls spirit while contrasting the ancient world with the modern world.

Professor Robert Stern, University of Sheffield:
What he means by spirit is the particular way in which consciousness, a conscious of the people or community or period is then at home in the world. So he talks, for example, about the Greeks as ever present spirit, and the reason he talks about the Greeks there is that he has a picture of the Greeks as having an integrated view of the world, at home in the world such that they didn't seem to suffer from the various problems and tensions from the modern world, so spirit, what he calls spirit was realized in some sense with the Greeks was apparent in the Greeks, because they have this kind of unity with the world. Hegel's view is that for a variety of reasons that at-homeness, that spiritedness, that period was lost. And that's really because he tends to treat the Greeks as a kind of childhood of human consciousness, so much as a child has a certain kind of happy relationship to the world can supposedly before all the anxieties of adolescence set in. So the Greeks had a sort of simple, straightforward, but rather naïve view of the world. They saw it as rational. They saw themselves as integrative within their communities, and so on. We don't have that any more. Ours is a more anxious time, we have all these tensions. We're not so convinced that the world is a hospital place in which we can be at home. But then he hoped that the rest of the world would return. Again this kind of integrated picture would return when these problems of modern consciousness could be resolved.

Narrator:
In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel deals with social ethics and the State. His claim that the rational is the actual has let critics to claim that the wrote the book as an apology for the authoritarian Prussian state in which he lived, and that as a result he should be seen as an influence on Nazism.

Professor Robert Stern, University of Sheffield:
It's not clear, again it's not obvious that Hegel was a reactionary figure, but in historical terms, but I think also we could think of the question philosophically. Again, Hegel as usual is trying to strike a balance, so he does want, as I said, the individual to feel integrated within the State. It's not that he wants to get rid of any notion of individuality, but obviously that means that it can seem as if he nonetheless, because he wants to integrate the individual, he wants to still place some limits on the ways in which the individual can criticize the State or step outside the State. Now even here, it's not clear that Hegel is saying that the individual should always obey the State, or should always feel at home with the State, should always accept the decisions the State should make because, again, he draws a contrast between the rational State, the State where there are proper mechanisms for dealing with individual interests and balancing them off against each other, and the non-rational State. So he does talk about figures in history such as Socrates and Christ and so on, who were, in a sense, rebelling against the State in their time, and he sees that as perfectly legitimate because they are not living within the rational State. So it's only if the political conditions are ripe, as it were, that Hegel thinks the individual should, by and large, go along with the decisions the States are making.

Narrator:
No philosopher since Hegel has laid claim to the same kind of comprehensiveness and universality of thought.

Professor Robert Stern, University of Sheffield:

Up until maybe 20 years ago or so, Hegel was a very marginal figure. People tended to read Kant, study up to Kant and then they would simply leap from Kant to Ferege or something else. Hegel would just be this sort of dark period where all became obscure and difficult and bizarre, and nobody thought it should be taken particularly seriously. And it's more like as if somebody read Plato without reading Aristotle. If you read Kant, and don't bother to read Hegel, you're missing out on a whole range of important developments. And not just Hegel, there are other post-Kantian idealists like Schelling and Fichte as well. You're missing out on a whole range of developments that can appear very obscure and difficult and peculiar when you first look at them, but actually tap into rather deep and interesting issues that we're only now, I think, within the [?] beginning to rediscover.

30th Session: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, (1770-1831) Continued

Selected primary sources The Philosophy Of History (Introduction) By G. W. F. Hegel, Pp.1-7, Part I

Translated by J. Sibree

Introduction
The subject of this course of Lectures is the Philosophical History of the World. And by this must be understood, not a collection of general observations respecting it, suggested by the study of its records, and proposed to be illustrated by its facts, but Universal History itself.1 To gain a clear idea at the outset, of the nature of our task, it seems necessary to begin with an examination of the other methods of treating History. The various methods may be ranged under three heads:
I. Original History.
II. Reflective History.
III. Philosophical History.

I. Of the first kind, the mention of one or two distinguished names will furnish a definite type. To this category belong Herodotus, Thucydides, and other historians of the same order, whose descriptions are for the most part limited to deeds, events, and states of society, which they had before their eyes, and whose spirit they shared. They simply transferred what was passing in the world around them, to the realm of representative intellect. An external phenomenon is thus translated into an internal conception. In the same way the poet operates upon the material supplied him by his emotions, projecting it into an image for the conceptive faculty. These original historians did, it is true, find statements and narratives of other men ready to hand. One person cannot be an eye and ear witness of everything. But they make use of such aids only as the poet does of that heritage of an already-formed language, to which he owes so much; merely as an ingredient. Historiographers bind together the fleeting elements of story, and treasure them up for immortality in the Temple of Mnemosyne. Legends, Ballad-stories, Traditions must be excluded from such original history. These are but dim and hazy forms of historical apprehension, and therefore belong to nations whose intelligence is but half awakened. Here, on the contrary, we have to do with people fully conscious of what they were and what they were about. The domain of reality - actually seen, or capable of being so - affords a very different basis in point of firmness from that fugitive and shadowy element, in which were engendered those legends and poetic dreams whose historical prestige vanishes, as soon as nations have attained a mature individuality.

I cannot mention any work that will serve as a compendium of the course, but I may remark that in my "Outlines of the Philosophy of Law," §§. 341-360, I have already given a definition of such a Universal History as it is proposed to develop, and a syllabus of the chief elements or periods into which it naturally divides itself. Such original historians, then, change the events, the deeds and the states of society with which they are conversant, into an object for the conceptive faculty. The narratives they leave us cannot, therefore, be very comprehensive in their range. Herodotus, Thucydides, Guieciardini, may be taken as fair samples of the class in this respect. What is present and living in their environment, is their proper material. The influences that have formed the writer are identical with those which have moulded the events that constitute the matter of his story. The author's spirit, and that of the actions he narrates, is one and the same. He describes scenes in which he himself has been an actor, or at any rate an interested spectator. It is short periods of time, individual

shapes of persons and occurrences, single unreflected traits, of which he makes his picture. And his aim is nothing more than the presentation to posterity of an image of events as clear as that which he himself possessed in virtue of personal observation, or life-like descriptions. Reflections are none of his business, for he lives in the spirit of his subject; he has not attained an elevation above it. If, as in Caesar's case, he belongs to the exalted rank of generals or statesmen, it is the prosecution of his own aims that constitutes the history.

Such speeches as we find in Thucydides (for example) of which we can positively assert that they are not bona fide reports, would seem to make against our statement that a historian of his class presents us no reflected picture; that persons and people appear in his works in propria persona. Speeches, it must be allowed, are veritable transactions in the human commonwealth; in fact, very gravely influential transactions. It is, indeed, often said, "Such and such things are only talk"; by way of demonstrating their harmlessness. That for which this excuse is brought, may be mere "talk"; and talk enjoys the important privilege of being harmless. But addresses of peoples to peoples, or orations directed to nations and to princes, are integrant constituents of history. Granted such orations as those of Pericles - the most profoundly accomplished, genuine, noble statesman - were elaborated by Thucydides; it must yet be maintained that they were not foreign to the character of the speaker. In the oration in question, these men proclaim the maxims adopted by their countrymen, and which formed their own character; they record their views of their political relations, and of their moral and spiritual nature; and the principle of their designs and conduct. What the historian puts into their mouths is no supposititious system of ideas, but an uncorrupted transcript of their intellectual and moral habitudes.

Of these historians, whom we must make thoroughly our own, with whom we must linger long, if we would live with their respective nations, and enter deeply into their spirit: of these historians, to whose pages we may turn not for the purpose of erudition merely, but with a view to deep and genuine enjoyment, there are fewer than might be imagined. Herodotus the Father, i.e. the Founder of History and Thucydides have been already mentioned. Xenophon's Retreat of the Ten Thousand is a work equally original. Caesar's Commentaries are the simple masterpiece of a mighty spirit. Among the ancients, these annalists were necessarily great captains and statesmen. In the Middle Ages, if we except the Bishops, who were placed in the very centre of the political world, the Monks monopolize this category as naive chroniclers who were as decidedly isolatedfrom active life as those elder annalists had been connected with it. In modern times the relations are entirely altered. Our culture is essentially comprehensive and immediately changes all events into historical representations. Belonging to the class in question, we have vivid, simple, clear narrations - especially of military transactions - which might fairly take their place with those of Caesar. In richness of matter and fulness of detail as regards strategic appliances, and attendant circumstances, they are even more instructive. The French "Memoires" also fall under this category. In many cases these are written by men of mark, though relating to affairs of little note. They not unfrequently contain a large proportion of anecdotical matter, so that the ground they occupy is narrow and trivial. Yet they are often veritable masterpieces in history; as those of Cardinal Retz, which in fact trench on a larger historical field. In Germany such masters are rare. Frederick the Great ("Histoire de mon temps") is an illustrious exception. Writers of this order must occupy an elevated position. Only from such a position is it possible to take an extensive view of affairs - to see everything. This is out of the question for him, who from below merely gets a glimpse of the great world through a miserable cranny.

31st Session: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, (1770-1831) Continued
Selected primary sources The Philosophy Of History (Introduction) By G. W. F. Hegel, Pp.1-7, Part II

II. The second kind of history we may call the reflective. It is history whose mode of representation is not really confined by the limits of the time to which it relates, but whose spirit transcends the present. In this second order strongly marked variety of species may be distinguished.

1. It is the aim of the investigator to gain a view of the entire history of a people or a country, or of the world, in short, what we call Universal History. In this case the working up of the historical material is the main point. The workman approaches his task with his own spirit; a spirit distinct from that of the element he is to manipulate. Here a very important consideration will be the principles to which the author refers, the bearing and motives of the actions and events which he describes, and those which determine the form of his narrative. Among us Germans this reflective treatment and the display of ingenuity which it occasions, assume a manifold variety of phases. Every writer of history proposes to himself an original method. The English and French confess to general principles of historical composition. Their standpoint is more that of cosmopolitan or of national culture. Among us each labours to invent a purely individual point of view. Instead of writing history, we are always beating our brains to discover how history ought to be written. This first kind of Reflective History is most nearly akin to the preceding, when it has no farther aim than to present the annals of a country complete. Such compilations (among which may be reckoned the works of Livy, Diodorus Siculus, Johannes von Müller’s History of Switzerland) are, if well performed, highly meritorious. Among the best of the kind may be reckoned such annalist as approach those of the first class; who give so vivid a transcript of events that the reader may well fancy himself listening to contemporaries and eyewitnesses. But it often happens that the individuality of tone which must characterize a writer belonging to a different culture, is not modified in accordance with the periods such a record must traverse. The spirit of the writer is quite other than that of the times of which he treats. Thus Livy puts into the mouths of the old Roman kings, consuls, and generals, such orations as would be delivered by an accomplished advocate of the Livian era, and which strikingly contrast with the genuine traditions of Roman antiquity (e.g. the fable of Menenius Agrippa). In the same way he gives us descriptions of battles, as if he bad been an actual spectator; but whose features would serve well enough for battles in any period, and whose distinctness contrasts on the other hand with the want of connexion and the inconsistency that prevail elsewhere, even in his treatment of chief points of interest. The difference between such a compiler and an original historian may be best seen by comparing Polybius himself with the style in which Livy uses, expands, and abridges his annals in those period; of which Polybius’s account has been preserved. Johann von Müller has given a stiff, formal, pedantic aspect of history, in the endeavour to remain faithful in his portraiture to the times he describes. We much prefer the narratives we find in old Tschudy. All is more naive and natural than it appears in the garb of a fictitious and affected archaism.

A history which aspires to traverse long periods of time, or to be universal, must indeed forego the attempt to give individual representations of the past as it actually existed. It must foreshorten its pictures by abstractions; and this includes not merely the omission of events and deeds, but whatever is involved in the fact that Thought is, after all, the most trenchant epitomist. A battle, a great victory, a siege, no longer maintains its original proportions, but is put off with a bare mention. When Livy e.g. tells us of the wars with the Volsci, we sometimes have the brief announcement: "This year war was carried on with the Volsci."

2. A second species of Reflective History is what we may call the Pragmatical. When we have to deal with the Past, and occupy ourselves with a remote world a Present rises into being for the mind - produced by its own activity, as the reward of its labour. The occurrences are, indeed, various; but the idea which pervades them - their deeper import and connexion - is one. This takes the occurrence out of the category of the Past and makes it virtually Present. Pragmatical (didactic) reflections, though in their nature decidedly abstract, are truly and indefeasibly of the Present, and quicken the annals of the dead Past with the life of today. Whether, indeed such reflections are truly interesting and enlivening, depends on the writer's own spirit. Moral reflections must here be specially noticed, - the moral teaching expected from history; which latter has not unfrequently been treated with a direct view to the former. It may be allowed that examples of virtue elevate the soul, and are applicable in the moral instructions of children for impressing excellence upon their minds. But the destinies of peoples and states, their interests, relations, and the complicated issue of their affairs, present quite another field. Rulers, Statesmen, Nations, are wont to be emphatically commended to the teaching which experience offers in history. But what experience and history teach is this, - that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it. Each period is involved in such peculiar circumstances, exhibits a condition of things so strictly idiosyncratic, that its conduct must be regulated by considerations connected with itself, and itself alone. Amid the pressure of great events, a general principle gives no help. It is useless to revert to similar circumstances in the Past. The pallid shades of memory struggle in vain with the life and freedom of the Present. Looked at in this light, nothing can be shallower than the oft-repeated appeal to Greek and Roman examples during the French Revolution. Nothing is more diverse than the genius of those nations and that of our times. Johannes v. Müller, in his Universal History as also in his History of Switzerland, had such moral aims in view. He designed to prepare a body of political doctrines for the instruction of princes, governments and peoples (he formed a special collection of doctrines and reflections, - frequently giving us in his correspondence the exact number of apophthegms which he had compiled in a week); but he cannot reckon this part of his labour as among the best that he accomplished. It is only a thorough, liberal, comprehensive view of historical relations (such e.g. as we find in Montesquieu's "Esprit des Loix"), that can give truth and interest to reflections of this order. One Reflective History therefore supersedes another. The materials are patent to every writer: each is likely enough to believe himself capable of arranging and manipulating them; and we may expect that each will insist upon his own spirit as that of the age in question. Disgusted by such reflective histories readers have often returned to a with pleasure to a narrative adopting no particular point of view. These certainly have their value; but for the most part they offer only material for history. We Germans are not content with such. The French, on the other hand, display great genius in reanimating bygone times, and in bringing the past to bear upon the present conditions of things.

Quiz

32nd Session: Friedrich Nietzsche ***<u>(1844-1900)</u>***

The transcript

Friedrich Nietzsche

Narrator:
Born in Prussia in 1844, Nietzsche studied classical theology at Bonn and Leipzig Universities. At the age of 24, he was awarded a professorship at the University of Basel ,something very unusual for the time. His life was, however, plagued by illness, and in 1889, Nietzsche suffered a mental breakdown, and spent the last 11 years of his life being cared for by his sister. One of Nietzsche's main assertions was that the traditional Judaeo-Christian values had lost their meaning for many people. They were formed long ago by societies much different to our own. He recognized that religion was playing a far less important role that it used to. He was convinced that traditional values represented a slave morality. That is a morality created by weak people who encouraged kindness and similar traits because such behaviour served their interests. Once we break down our existing morality, Nietzsche claims, we can pursue our own destiny untroubled and realize our true potential. Nietzsche often refers to this unleashing of possibilities as daring to be imaginative, innovative, courageous, and so on. This unleashing of one's potential was coined by Nietzsche as the will to power. And as there is no afterlife, no God, no reason to restrain our capacities or talents, and that we are masters of our own destinies, Nietzsche claimed we should live ourselves for our own sakes, as if lives are works of art, as it were. For this reason, he has a kind of aesthetic understanding of life, although his vision of life is far from picturesque.

Dr. Christine Battersby, University of Warwick:
The life affirming and in a sense the notion of health is really important to him, but health is not stasis. It's not a kind of stable state. It's a kind of warding off of disease, and because for Nietzsche even the self isn't a unity, it's a kind of potential difference within what we think of the unified self. The self is only a unity, insofar as, all the different forces within you, and energies within you, might tend temporarily in the same direction. So, the will to power is not power over another, it's a will to a kind of energic will where all the energies are directed towards the same end, and he says things like, "whatever doesn't kill me makes me stronger." And, the will to power is used to explain digestion, an eating, reproduction and the will to find truth. Now he's not offering the will to powers of truth. The will to power is yet another interpretation of the world. It's that it's a more life affirming one.

Narrator:
During his lifetime, Nietzsche produced an influential body of work. Both Mussolini and Hitler read Nietzsche extensively. The Nazis extracted quotes from Nietzsche's work to use in their propaganda, and for some years after their demise, their link with the philosopher's work overshadowed his impressive contribution to philosophy. Nietzsche was not a Nazi, but his work reverberated throughout the artistic and cultural world inspiring playwrights, poets and composers.

Dr. Christine Battersby, University of Warwick:
When Nietzsche went mad towards the end of his life, Nietzsche's sister, Elizabeth, refers to Nietzsche who was married to one of the most celebrated anti-Semite in Germany took Nietzsche and sort of made a sort of fetish of him almost. He was there, people would come and visit him, and she also took his unpublished notebooks, the so called Will to Power, and

edited them, and his other works as well, in a way that made him look like an anti-Semite, and it was possible to do this because Nietzsche writes metaphorically. He's also not writing for the common man. He's writing for the man who's out of his time, who knows his work, who will not read him literally. So there is a certain responsibility in terms of the way that Nietzsche wrote. He knew he could be read anti-Semitically. He said it made him sick. He said it made him laugh. He said it was a gross distortion of his work, but at the same time he still wrote in a way where it was possible to read him like that, but really it's to do with his sister primarily, I think, that his work was given such an extraordinary weight by the Nazis, and the Nazis weighted Wagner and Nietzsche almost together.

33rd Session: Friedrich Nietzsche ***(1844-1900) Continued***

Selected primary sources, The Challenge of Every Great Philosophy by Friedrich Nietzsche

Source: Schopenhauer as Teacher, from *Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre* edited by Walter Kaufman. short excerpt.

A traveller who had seen many countries and peoples and several continents was asked what human traits he had found everywhere; and he answered: men are inclined to laziness. Some will feel that he might have said with greater justice: they are all timorous. They hide behind customs and opinions. At bottom, every human being knows very well that he is in this world just once, as something unique, and that no accident, however strange, will throw together a second time into a unity such a curious and diffuse plurality: he knows it, but hides it like a bad conscience why? From fear of his neighbour who insists on convention and veils himself with it. But what is it that compels the individual human being to fear his neighbour, to think and act herd-fashion, and not to be glad of himself? A sense of shame, perhaps, in a few rare cases. In the vast majority it is the desire for comfort, inertia - in short, that inclination to laziness of which the traveller spoke. He is right: men are even lazier than they are timorous, and what they fear most is the troubles with which any unconditional honesty and nudity would burden them. Only artists hate this slovenly life in borrowed manners and loosely fitting opinions and unveil the secret, everybody's bad conscience, the principle that every human being is a unique wonder; they dare to show us the human being as he is, down to the last muscle, himself and himself alone even more, that in this rigorous consistency of his uniqueness he is beautiful and worth contemplating, as novel and incredible as every work of nature, and by no means dull. When a great thinker despises men, it is their laziness that he despises: for it is un account of this that they have the appearance of factory products and seem indifferent and unworthy of companionship or instruction. The human being who does not wish to belong to the mass must merely cease being comfortable with himself; let him follow his conscience which shouts at him: "Be yourself! What you are at present doing, opining, and desiring, that is not really you."...

I care for a philosopher only to the extent that he is able to be an example.... Kant clung to the university, subjected himself to governments, remained within the appearance of religious faith, and endured colleagues and students: it is small wonder that his example produced in the main university professors and professors' philosophy. Schopenhauer has no consideration for the scholars' caste, stands apart, strives for independence of .state and society - this is his example, his model, to begin with the most external features.... He was an out and out solitary; there was not one really congenial friend to comfort him - and between one and none there gapes, as always between something and nothing, an infinity. No one who has true friends can know what true solitude means, even if the whole world surrounding him should consist of adversaries. Alas, I can see that you do not know what it means to be alone. Wherever there have been powerful societies, governments, religions, or public opinions - in short, wherever there was any kind of tyranny, it has hated the lonely philosopher; for philosophy opens up a refuge for man where no tyranny can reach: the cave of inwardness, the labyrinth of the breast; and that annoys all tyrants. That is where the lonely hide; but there too they encounter their greatest danger. . . .

This was the first danger that overshadowed Schopenhauer's development: isolation. The second danger is to despair of truth. This danger confronts every thinker who begins from Kant's philosophy, assuming that he is a vigorous and whole human being in his suffering and aspiration and not merely a clacking thinking- or calculating-machine.... As soon as Kant would begin to exert a popular influence, we should find it reflected in the form of a gnawing and crumbling scepticism and relativism; and only among the most active and noble spirits, who have never been able to endure doubt, you would find in its place that upheaval and despair of all truth which Heinrich von Kleist, for example, experienced as an effect of Kant's philosophy. "Not long ago," he once writes in his moving manner, "I became acquainted with Kant's philosophy; and now I must tell you of a thought in it, inasmuch as I cannot fear that it will upset you as profoundly and painfully as me. We cannot decide whether that which we call truth is really truth or whether it merely appears that way to us. If the latter is right, then the truth we gather here comes to nothing after our death; and every aspiration to acquire a possession which will follow us even into the grave is futile. If the point of this idea does not penetrate your heart, do not smile at another human being who feels wounded by it in his holiest depths. My only, my highest aim has sunk, and I have none left." When will human beings again have the natural feelings of a Kleist? When will they learn again to measure the meaning of a philosophy by their "holiest depths"?

This, however, is necessary to estimate what, after Kant, Schopenhauer might mean to us. He can be the guide to lead us out of the cave of sceptical irritation or critical resignation up to the height of a tragic view, with the starry nocturnal sky stretching endlessly over us; and he was the first to lead himself this way. His greatness was that he confronted the image of life as a whole in order to interpret it as a whole, while the subtlest minds cannot be freed from the error that one can come closer to such an interpretation if ono examines painstakingly the colours with which this image has been painted and the material underneath. . . .

The whole future of all the sciences is staked on an attempt to understand this canvas and these colours, but not the image. It could be said that only a man who has a firm grasp of the over-all picture of life and existence can use the individual science without harming himself; for without such a regulative total image they are strings that reach no end anywhere and merely make our lives still more confused and labyrinthine. In this, as I have said, lies Schopenhauer's greatness: that he pursues this image as Hamlet pursues the ghost, without permitting himself to be distracted, as the scholars do, and without letting himself be caught in the webs of a conceptual scholasticism, as happens to the unrestrained dialectician. The study of all quarter-philosophers is attractive only insofar as we see how they immediately make for those spots in the edifice of a great philosophy where the scholarly pro and con, and reflection, doubt, and contradiction are permitted; and thus they avoid the challenge of every great philosophy which, when taken as a whole, always says only: this is the image of all life, and from this learn the meaning of your life! And conversely: Read only your own life, and from this understand the hieroglyphs of universal life!

This is how Schopenhauer's philosophy, too, should always be interpreted first of all: individually, by the single human being alone for himself, to gain some insight into his own misery and need, into his own limitation. . . He teaches us to distinguish between real and apparent promotions of human happiness: how neither riches, nor honours, nor scholarship can raise the individual out of his discouragement over the worthlessness of his existence, and how the striving for these goals can receive meaning only from a high and transfiguring over-all aim: to gain power to help nature and to correct a little its follies and blunders. To begin with, for oneself; but eventually through oneself for all. That is, to be sure, an

aspiration which leads us profoundly and heartily to resignation: for what, and how much, can after all be improved in the individual or in general? . . .

34th Session: Karl Marx ***(1818-1883)***

The transcript

Karl Marx

Narrator:
Marx was born in Prussia in 1818, and initially studied Law. He soon turned his attention to philosophy, and for a time edited a newspaper in Cologne. It was when he moved to Paris that he met Friedrich Engels and in 1848 they wrote the Communist Manifesto. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries unite. In his youth, Marx belonged to a radical political group called the Young Hegelians, but later became disenchanted with Hegel's philosophy.

Professor Robert Stern, University of Sheffield:
In a sense Marx doesn't disagree with Hegel's project that … the aim is to create a society of … a kind of harmonious society where people are integrated, feel part of the community and so on. But Marx thinks that Hegel is rather naïve and optimistic in how Hegel thinks that's going to be brought about. So, for example, Hegel treats the bureaucracy as what Hegel calls a universal clock so that the bureaucracy is meant to have this rather worthy concern with the well-being of the community as a whole, and that's the role of the bureaucracy within the community that they are sort of there to make sure that everyone's interests are treated equally and fairly, and so on. And Marx is just contentious about this, and just sees the bureaucracy as a rather corrupt institution which is in the service of the Monarch or whatever, and certainly isn't this rather benign idealized part of the community that Hegel thought of.

Narrator:
Today, Marxism is unfashionable. Capitalism has conquered the globe, yet his contribution to political philosophy can't be ignored.

Professor Robert Stern, University of Sheffield:
One influence, I think in terms of his theory of justice as we might call it now, because again it's a contentious issue within Marx whether he had a theory of justice, whether Marx is just a social scientist, just trying to understand why society has changed and developed and perhaps where they are going to go, but he wasn't interested in making judgments about whether one society is better than another, or more just than another. And you can certainly find passages where he's critical of those notions. They shouldn't be of concern to good Communist thinkers, who shouldn't be going around judging societies in that way.

Selected primary sources, Karl Marx. The German Ideology. 1845 Part I: Feuerbach. Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlook A. Idealism and Materialism

Ideology in General, German Ideology in Particular
German criticism has, right up to its latest efforts, never quitted the realm of philosophy. Far from examining its general philosophic premises, the whole body of its inquiries has actually sprung from the soil of a definite philosophical system, that of Hegel. Not only in their answers but in their very questions there was a mystification. This dependence on Hegel is the reason why not one of these modern critics has even attempted a comprehensive criticism of the Hegelian system, however much each professes to have advanced beyond Hegel. Their

polemics against Hegel and against one another are confined to this – each extracts one side of the Hegelian system and turns this against the whole system as well as against the sides extracted by the others. To begin with they extracted pure unfalsified Hegelian categories such as "substance" and "self-consciousness," later they desecrated these categories with more secular names such as species "the Unique," "Man," etc.

The entire body of German philosophical criticism from Strauss to Stirner is confined to criticism of religious conceptions. [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] claiming to be the absolute redeemer of the world from all evil. Religion was continually regarded and treated as the arch-enemy, as the ultimate cause of all relations repugnant to these philosophers. } The critics started from real religion and actual theology. What religious consciousness and a religious conception really meant was determined variously as they went along. Their advance consisted in subsuming the allegedly dominant metaphysical, political, juridical, moral and other conceptions under the class of religious or theological conceptions; and similarly in pronouncing political, juridical, moral consciousness as religious or theological, and the political, juridical, moral man – "man" in the last resort – as religious. The dominance of religion was taken for granted. Gradually every dominant relationship was pronounced a religious relationship and transformed into a cult, a cult of law, a cult of the State, etc. On all sides it was only a question of dogmas and belief in dogmas. The world was sanctified to an ever-increasing extent till at last our venerable Saint Max was able to canonise it *en bloc* and thus dispose of it once for all.

The Old Hegelians had comprehended everything as soon as it was reduced to an Hegelian logical category. The Young Hegelians criticised everything by attributing to it religious conceptions or by pronouncing it a theological matter. The Young Hegelians are in agreement with the Old Hegelians in their belief in the rule of religion, of concepts, of a universal principle in the existing world. Only, the one party attacks this dominion as usurpation. while the other extols it as legitimate.

35th Session: Karl Marx ***(1818-1883) - Continued***
Selected primary sources, Karl Marx. The German Ideology. 1845 Part I: Feuerbach. Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlook A. Idealism and Materialism

Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it by means of another interpretation. The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly "world-shattering" statements, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against "phrases." They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world. The only results which this philosophic criticism could achieve were a few (and at that thoroughly one-sided) elucidations of Christianity from the point of view of religious history; all the rest of their assertions are only further embellishments of their claim to have furnished, in these unimportant elucidations, discoveries of universal importance.
It has not occurred to any one of these philosophers to inquire into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, the relation of their criticism to their own material surroundings.
Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

alienation. A psychological or social evil, characterized by one or another type of harmful separation, disruption or fragmentation, which sunders things that belong together. People are alienated from the political process when they feel separated from it and powerless in relation to it; this is alienation because in a democratic society you belong in the political process, and as a citizen it ought to belong to you. Reflection on your beliefs, values, or social order can also alienate you from them. It can undermine your attachment to them, cause you to feel separated from them, no longer identified with them, yet without furnishing anything to take their place; they are yours, *faute de mieux*, but no longer truly yours: they are yours, but you are alienated from them.

The term 'alienation' gained currency through Marxian theory, and is used with special prominence in Marx's manuscripts of 1844 (which were first published in 1930). Marx derived the terms *Entäusserung* and *Entfremdung* from Hegel, who used them to portray the 'unhappy consciousness' of the Roman world and the Christian Middle Ages, when individuals under the Roman Empire, deprived of the harmonious social and political life prevailing in pagan antiquity, turned inward and directed their aspirations toward a transcendent Deity and his other-worldly kingdom. For Hegel, the unhappy consciousness is divided against itself, separated from its 'essence', which it has placed in a 'beyond'.

Marx used essentially the same notion to portray the situation of modern individuals—especially modern wage labourers—who are deprived of a fulfilling mode of life because their life-activity as socially productive agents is devoid of any sense of communal action or

satisfaction and gives them no ownership over their own lives or their products. In modern society, individuals are alienated in so far as their common human essence, the actual co-operative activity which naturally unites them, is power-less in their lives, which are subject to an inhuman power—created by them, but separating and dominating them instead of being subject to their united will. This is the power of the market, which is 'free' only in the sense that it is beyond the control of its human creators, enslaving them by separating them from one another, from their activity, and from its products.

base and superstructure. According to the historical materialism of Marx and Engels, the social 'base' is the ensemble of social relations or the economic structure of society; politics, law, morality, religion, and art constitute the social 'superstructure'. In some writings, the term 'superstructure' is used to refer solely to people's thoughts about their social relations (' ideology'), while in others it refers also to non-economic social institutions. The primary relation asserted in Marxian theory between the base and the superstructure is one of explanatory dependence: 'superstructural' phenomena are to be explained materialistically through their dependence on the economic base. According to Marx, phenomena in the base can be understood with scientific precision, whereas superstructural phenomena are comparatively contingent, and admit of rigorous treatment only to the degree that they exhibit dependence on the economic base. There is no coherent history of politics, law, religion, or art as such; people's real history is economic.

The reasoning behind these Marxian claims, and even their meaning, has been a matter of dispute among Marxian scholars and Marxian theorists. One reading, usually proposed by critics rather than proponents of Marxism, takes what is 'superstructural' to be 'epiphenomenal'; that is, superstructural phenomena exhibit causal dependence on economic facts, but exercise no causal influence on the economic realm. This implausible interpretation of historical materialism was rejected by Engels, who insisted that although the dependent spheres of life 'react' on the economic realm, it is always the economic 'driving forces' which are determining 'in the last instance'. But this leaves unexplained why economic forces should be thought always to be decisively determining in causal interactions which are admittedly reciprocal.

The Marxian theory is perhaps best understood if we take the primacy of the economic to be an assertion not about causal influences but about historical tendencies. The Marxian theory holds that human history makes the most sense if we understand it in terms of certain fundamental tendencies, operating at the economic level: the tendency of productive powers to grow over time and of the economic structure of society to adjust so as to facilitate new productive powers. The claim that forces of production are primary amounts to the claim that history makes most sense if we proceed from a pattern of explanation proceeding from the tendency to growth in productive forces; the explanations in question are functional or teleological, not causal, in form, though they do involve causal mechanisms through which the basic tendencies operate: the tendency of productive forces to grow and the tendency of production relations (and, along with them, superstructural phenomena) to adjust to that growth.

The mechanism of such adjustments is the class struggle; that class is victorious whose ascendancy is most conducive to the employment and further development of the growing powers of production. Superstructural phenomena are then to be explained functionally by the way in which they serve the prevailing economic structure, or the interests of contending classes. Clearly they could not serve this function or these interests without exercising some

influence on the economic realm, and so they cannot be merely 'epiphenomenal'. Their historical development, however, is best understood in relation to the fundamental tendencies of human society, which are economic.

determinism, historical. A conception of human affairs according to which the historical process conforms to developmental patterns or laws that render its constitutive events necessary or inevitable. Doctrines affirming such a position exhibit wide variations. While those of an earlier vintage frequently involved providential or teleological assumptions, ones of later date have tended instead to presuppose the causal principle that whatever occurs in history is explicable as a law-governed consequence of empirically specifiable antecedent conditions. Views of the latter kind are sometimes endorsed on the grounds that they reflect a presumption fundamental to history conceived as an essentially explanatory form of inquiry. Against this, however, it has been maintained that a theoretical commitment to determinism is hard to reconcile with the practice of historians, libertarian convictions about human agency being integral to the historical studies as actually pursued.

bourgeoisie and proletariat. In Marxian theory, the two most historically influential social classes in modern capitalist society, which is fundamentally characterized by the class struggle. The bourgeoisie are those who privately own the means of production and live from the profits and interest on capital; the proletariat is the class of wage-labourers hired and exploited by capital. Marx credits the bourgeoisie with creating the productive forces which are the foundation of modern society; but he thinks the potential of these forces to serve humanity will be actualized only after the social order has been revolutionized by the proletariat.
dialectic. In ancient Greece, dialectic was a form of reasoning that proceeded by question and answer, used by Plato. In later antiquity and the Middle Ages, the term was often used to mean simply logic, but Kant applied it to arguments showing that principles of science have contradictory aspects. Hegel thought that all logic and world history itself followed a dialectical path, in which internal contradictions were transcended, but gave rise to new contradictions that themselves required resolution. Marx and Engels gave Hegel's idea of dialectic a material basis; hence dialectical materialism.

36th Session: Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813- 1855)

The transcript

Soren Kierkegaard

Narrator:
Only the truth that edifies is the truth for you. Soren Kierkegaard is generally seen as the founder of existentialism. In 1840, he was about to marry, but broke off his engagement feeling it was incompatible with his calling as a philosopher. He was an intensely religious man, and felt the Danish Church distorted Christ's message.

Dr. Christine Battersby, University of Warwick:
One of the things that the Church does is disguise to people the paradoxicality. The Church makes Christianity sound too easy, too comfortable, too ethical. So, for example, in Fear and Trembling, he is writing about Abraham as the father of faith, and he takes the story from Genesis where God commands Abraham to take Isaac, his son, up Mount Mariah and kill him. And Abraham doesn't know that at the last moment that God will provide a lamb or a ram as a sacrifice instead of his son. And he says that we might go to Church and hear a preacher talking about how we should honour Abraham as the father of faith, etc. without focusing on the fact that this was a would-be murderer. If a preacher told the story of Abraham in the Church, then Kierkegaard indicates that the preacher would also be horrified if any member of the congregation went home and on the basis of a message from God, actually went out and murdered his son.

Narrator:
The dominant theme of Kierkegaard's work is man's relationship with God, and here he disagreed sharply with Hegel.

Dr. Christine Battersby, University of Warwick:
For Kierkegaard there is no synthesis. There are different modes and ways of life, and we have to choose between the different modes, and it's not that religion or faith involves a synthesis of other previous stages, it's a different mode. And it is irreconcilably different. Hegel also thinks of the State in terms of Christianity, so he's in favour of sort of State forms of Christianity. He thinks that Christianity is tied to reason, and he thinks about this gradual progression of the spirit, and Hegel is different from Kierkegaard in respect to all these things.

Narrator:
In Either/Or, Kierkegaard argues that we have a choice between two ways of living – the aesthetic and the ethical.

Dr. Christine Battersby, University of Warwick:
Kierkegaard is concerned with, so to speak, seducing the reader. So presenting the reader with choices in such a way that the reader has to choose what sort of self to become. Whether to become an aesthetic and ethical or religious type self, and it's almost as if there are parallel possibilities, parallel universes almost, and that at any moment in time there are these different possible paths or routes that one might follow, and through choice turn oneself into a different kind of self. But it's not that we know in advance what sort of self we are so

that the choices are made freely, but on the other hand Kierkegaard is developing a notion of self in which the self only ever exists in relation to another. And so it's not a completely autonomous self, it's a self that's guided, and because the reader has to make their own choice, so to speak, Kierkegaard is very concerned with indirect communication, not giving the answer himself, but linking the reader to the point at which they can see what the choices are.

Narrator:
Kierkegaard's Christianity is a very Protestant one. His key notion is that of angst or dread resulting from a life given over to the senses. Kierkegaard believed in subjective thinking. The source for truth is personal. A person's choices and decisions are between him and God. It was this emphasis on individual choice that was to influence individual philosophers.

37th Session: Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813- 1855)- Continued

Selected primary sources: The Concept of Dread by Kierkegaard, Introduction

The concept of sin does not properly belong in any science; only the second ethics can deal with its apparition but not with its origin. If any other science were to discuss it, the concept would be confused. For example, coming closer to our theme, if psychology were to do so.

What psychology has to deal with must be something in repose, something which abides in a mobile state of quiet, not with an unquiet thing which constantly reproduces itself or is repressed. But the abiding state, that out of which sin constantly becomes (comes into being), not by necessity, for a becoming by necessity is simply a state of being (as is for example the entire history of the plant), but by freedom — in this abiding state, I say, which is the predisposing assumption, the real possibility of sin, we have a subject for the interest of psychology. What can properly concern psychology, that for which it can concern itself, is the question how sin can come into existence, not the fact that it exists. In its interest in its object psychology carries the thing so far that it is as if sin were there; but the next thing, the fact that it is there, is qualitatively different from this. To show then that this presupposition for the careful observation of psychology turns out to be more and more comprehensive is the interest of psychology; yea, psychology is willing to abandon itself to the illusion that hereby sin is really posited. But this last illusion betrays the impotence of psychology and shows that it has served its turn.

That human nature must be such that it makes sin possible, is, psychologically speaking, perfectly true; but to want to let this possibility of sin become its reality is shocking to ethics and sounds to dogmatics like blasphemy; for freedom is always possible, as soon as it is it is actual, in the same sense in which it has been said by an earlier philosophy that when God's existence is possible it is necessary.

As soon as sin is really posited, ethics is on the spot and follows every step it takes. How it came into being does not concern ethics, except in so far as it is certain that sin came into the world as sin. But still less than with the genesis of sin is ethics concerned with the still life of its possibility.

If one would ask more particularly in what sense and to what extent psychology pursues the object of its investigation, it is clear from the foregoing and in itself that every observation of the reality of sin as an object of thought is irrelevant to it, nor as the object of observation does it belong to ethics either, for ethics never acts as observer, but accuses, condemns, acts. In the next place, it follows from the foregoing and is evident in itself that psychology has nothing to do with the details of empirical actuality, except in so far as they are outside of sin. As a science, psychology can never have anything to do with the detail which underlies it, and yet this detail may receive its scientific representation in proportion as psychology becomes more and more concrete. In our age this science, which above all others has leave to intoxicate itself, one might almost say, with the foaming multifariousness of life, has become as spare in its diet and as ascetic as any anchorite. This is not the fault of the science but of its devotees. In relation to sin, on the other hand, this whole content of reality is properly denied to it, only the possibility of it still belongs to it. To ethics of course the possibility of sin never presents itself, and ethics never lets itself be fooled into wasting its time upon such reflections. Psychology, on the other hand, loves them; it sits sketching the contours and measuring the angles of possibility, and no more would let itself be disturbed than would Archimedes.

But while psychology thus delves into the possibility of sin, it is without knowing it in the service of another science, which is only waiting for it to be finished in order to begin for its part and help psychology to an explanation. This other science is not ethics, for ethics has nothing whatsoever to do with this possibility. No, it is dogmatics, and here in turn the problem of original sin emerges. While psychology is fathoming the real possibility of sin,

dogmatics explains original sin, which is the ideal possibility of sin. On the other hand, the second ethics has nothing to do with the possibility of sin nor with original sin. The first ethics ignores sin, the second ethics has the reality of sin in its province, and here only by a misunderstanding can psychology intrude.

If what has been here expounded is correct, one will easily see with what justification I have called this book a psychological deliberation, and will see also how this deliberation, in so far as it brings to consciousness its relation to science in general, properly belongs to psychology and leads in turn to dogmatics. Psychology has been called the doctrine of the subjective spirit. If one will pursue this science a little more precisely, one will see how, when it comes to the problem of sin, it must change suddenly into the doctrine of the Absolute Spirit. Here is the place of dogmatics. The first ethics presupposes metaphysics, and the second dogmatics; but it also completes it in such a way that here as everywhere the presupposition comes to evidence.

This was the task of the introduction. The introduction may be correct -while the deliberation itself dealing with the concept of dread may be entirely incorrect. That remains to be seen.

38th Session: Pragmatism

The transcript

Pragmatism

Narrator:
There is no worse lie than a truth misunderstood by those who hear it. Pragmatism was a reaction amongst American philosophers against idealism. The leading lights of the movement were William James and C. S. Perce.

Professor Chris Hookway, University of Sheffield:
Pragmatism was a philosophical movement that emerged in the United States predominantly around Harvard in the 1860s, 1870s and the years following. I think it originated in a metaphysical club as Perce called it that he and James belonged to in Harvard in the early 1870s. It contained them, some other philosophers and significantly, I think, some lawyers.

Narrator:
It was Perce who emphasized the practical bearing we concede the object of our conception to have. This idea, which Perce called pragmatism, was taken over by James.

Professor Chris Hookway, University of Sheffield:
For Perce, pragmatism was a kind of tool for clarifying the contents of our ideas and hypotheses and things we are interested in. And I suppose one thing that he hoped that he would get from it was a demonstration that lots of ideas and hypotheses were actually empty. They didn't need to be dealt with. And in particular, a lot of the traditional questions of philosophy could be dismissed by showing to be meaningless.

Narrator:
James, however, applied the idea to truth itself. James believed consciousness to be like a river and invented the term "stream of thought." In his Principles of Psychology, he puts forward five principles concerning consciousness.

Professor Chris Hookway, University of Sheffield:
The first of these was that our thoughts tend to cluster into personal consciousnesses, which roughly means is that if it's a thought, it's my thought, or it's your thought, and lots of thoughts are connected just through being in the same mind, through being mine, or through being yours. His second claim was that within any consciousness, thought is always changing as a kind of a continual process of one thought following another giving a way to another. And I guess you don't find periods of sort of stasis where nothing much is going on. The third thing is that thought is continuous. So I suppose that means that there is not just one thought followed by another thought followed by another thought. There's a kind of continuous process whereby thoughts evolve and develop. The fourth claim, again pretty plausible, is that most of our thoughts present themselves as about external things. You know, so that James might have been thinking about Harvard University, or about his friend Charles Peirce, and so to begin to understand how thought works, we have to understand how they can be about these independently existing things. But, finally, James emphasized, in our thought, when we are thinking about things, we are always attending to, or focusing on particular features of them. So I am not just thinking about Harvard University. I might be

thinking of Memorial Hall, or thinking about the green at the centre of the university, or something of that kind. So we need to understand how thought can be selective in the way in which it attends to things.

Narrator:
Meanwhile in France, Henri-Louis Bergson was a great influence on William James. He is perhaps best known for coining the phrase “the vital spirit.”

Professor Chris Hookway, University of Sheffield:
Bergson was a philosopher who took evolution very seriously. I think he’d probably been influenced by Darwin’s writing, but he rejected the sort of mechanistic basis for evolution that Darwin offered. Indeed, he wanted to think that evolution did involve some kind of progress that through time things were getting better, whereas the Darwinian story doesn’t allow for that possibility, at all. So he claimed that evolution was in a way driven by a sort of creative urge or a vital spirit, which was a kind of explanatory principle, I suppose, which would have no place in mechanistic, physical accounts of how the world works. I think that he thought that the same process was actually present to us in our consciousness in the way in which we make decisions, because we’re aware of the ways in which our choices are influence by memories, influenced by the past. But we are also aware, he thought, that they are not determined by the memories, that we are actually free to choose, and indeed, free to make things better. So either way, this reference to progress gives us a rather optimistic view of things. Optimism about what we can do, and also optimism about the way things are going. But it’s interesting that it carries with it a commitment to a sort of vital spirit, an explanatory principle that has no place in the physical sciences or anything of that sort. So comes with it the thought that explaining living things in biology and in psychology, we have to appeal to a doctrine that is often called vitalism. The thought that there is this vital spirit there’s an additional explanatory mechanism.

Narrator:
In creative evolution, Bergson says the whole Universe must be seen in historical terms. Every stage is a development of what has gone before. The present contains nothing more than the past, and what is found in the effect was already in the cause.
39th Session: Pragmatism - Continued
Selected primary sources How to Make Our Ideas Clear By Charles Sanders Peirce

I

Whoever has looked into a modern treatise on logic of the common sort, will doubtless remember the two distinctions between clear and obscure conceptions, and between distinct and confused conceptions. They have lain in the books now for nigh two centuries, unimproved and unmodified, and are generally reckoned by logicians as among the gems of their doctrine.

A clear idea is defined as one which is so apprehended that it will be recognized wherever it is met with, and so that no other will be mistaken for it. If it fails of this clearness, it is said to be obscure.
This is rather a neat bit of philosophical terminology; yet, since it is clearness that they were defining, I wish the logicians had made their definition a little more plain. Never to fail to recognize an idea, and under no circumstances to mistake another for it, let it come in how recondite a form it may, would indeed imply such prodigious force and clearness of intellect

as is seldom met with in this world. On the other hand, merely to have such an acquaintance with the idea as to have become familiar with it, and to have lost all hesitancy in recognizing it in ordinary cases, hardly seems to deserve the name of clearness of apprehension, since after all it only amounts to a subjective feeling of mastery which may be entirely mistaken. I take it, however, that when the logicians speak of "clearness," they mean nothing more than such a familiarity with an idea, since they regard the quality as but a small merit, which needs to be supplemented by another, which they call distinctness.

A distinct idea is defined as one which contains nothing which is not clear. This is technical language; by the contents of an idea logicians understand whatever is contained in its definition. So that an idea is distinctly apprehended, according to them, when we can give a precise definition of it, in abstract terms. Here the professional logicians leave the subject; and I would not have troubled the reader with what they have to say, if it were not such a striking example of how they have been slumbering through ages of intellectual activity, listlessly disregarding the enginery of modern thought, and never dreaming of applying its lessons to the improvement of logic. It is easy to show that the doctrine that familiar use and abstract distinctness make the perfection of apprehension has its only true place in philosophies which have long been extinct; and it is now time to formulate the method of attaining to a more perfect clearness of thought, such as we see and admire in the thinkers of our own time.

When Descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy, his first step was to (theoretically) permit skepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen of looking to authority as the ultimate source of truth. That done, he sought a more natural fountain of true principles, and thought he found it in the human mind; thus passing, in the directest way, from the method of authority to that of apriority, as described in my first paper. Self-consciousness was to furnish us with our fundamental truths, and to decide what was agreeable to reason. But since, evidently, not all ideas are true, he was led to note, as the first condition of infallibility, that they must be clear. The distinction between an idea seeming clear and really being so, never occurred to him. Trusting to introspection, as he did, even for a knowledge of external things, why should he question its testimony in respect to the contents of our own minds? But then, I suppose, seeing men, who seemed to be quite clear and positive, holding opposite opinions upon fundamental principles, he was further led to say that clearness of ideas is not sufficient, but that they need also to be distinct, i.e., to have nothing unclear about them. What he probably meant by this (for he did not explain himself with precision) was, that they must sustain the test of dialectical examination; that they must not only seem clear at the outset, but that discussion must never be able to bring to light points of obscurity connected with them.

Such was the distinction of Descartes, and one sees that it was precisely on the level of his philosophy. It was somewhat developed by Leibnitz. This great and singular genius was as remarkable for what he failed to see as for what he saw. That a piece of mechanism could not do work perpetually without being fed with power in some form, was a thing perfectly apparent to him; yet he did not understand that the machinery of the mind can only transform knowledge, but never originate it, unless it be fed with facts of observation. He thus missed the most essential point of the Cartesian philosophy, which is, that to accept propositions which seem perfectly evident to us is a thing which, whether it be logical or illogical, we cannot help doing. Instead of regarding the matter in this way, he sought to reduce the first principles of science to two classes, those which cannot be denied without self-contradiction, and those which result from the principle of sufficient reason (of which more anon), and was

apparently unaware of the great difference between his position and that of Descartes. So he reverted to the old trivialities of logic; and, above all, abstract definitions played a great part in his philosophy. It was quite natural, therefore, that on observing that the method of Descartes labored under the difficulty that we may seem to ourselves to have clear apprehensions of ideas which in truth are very hazy, no better remedy occurred to him than to require an abstract definition of every important term. Accordingly, in adopting the distinction of clear and distinct notions, he described the latter quality as the clear apprehension of everything contained in the definition; and the books have ever since copied his words. There is no danger that his chimerical scheme will ever again be over-valued. Nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing definitions. Nevertheless, our existing beliefs can be set in order by this process, and order is an essential element of intellectual economy, as of every other. It may be acknowledged, therefore, that the books are right in making familiarity with a notion the first step toward clearness of apprehension, and the defining of it the second. But in omitting all mention of any higher perspicuity of thought, they simply mirror a philosophy which was exploded a hundred years ago. That much-admired "ornament of logic" - the doctrine of clearness and distinctness — may be pretty enough, but it is high time to relegate to our cabinet of curiosities the antique bijou, and to wear about us something better adapted to modern uses.

40th Session: Pragmatism - Continued
Selected primary sources How to Make Our Ideas Clear By Charles Sanders Peirce

The very first lesson that we have a right to demand that logic shall teach us is, how to make our ideas clear; and a most important one it is, depreciated only by minds who stand in need of it. To know what we think, to be masters of our own meaning, will make a solid foundation for great and weighty thought. It is most easily learned by those whose ideas are meagre and restricted; and far happier they than such as wallow helplessly in a rich mud of conceptions. A nation, it is true, may, in the course of generations, overcome the disadvantage of an excessive wealth of language and its natural concomitant, a vast, unfathomable deep of ideas. We may see it in history, slowly perfecting its literary forms, sloughing at length its metaphysics, and, by virtue of the untirable patience which is often a compensation, attaining great excellence in every branch of mental acquirement. The page of history is not yet unrolled that is to tell us whether such a people will or will not in the long run prevail over one whose ideas (like the words of their language) are few, but which possesses a wonderful mastery over those which it has. For an individual, however, there can be no question that a few clear ideas are worth more than many confused ones. A young man would hardly be persuaded to sacrifice the greater part of his thoughts to save the rest; and the muddled head is the least apt to see the necessity of such a sacrifice. Him we can usually only commiserate, as a person with a congenital defect. Time will help him, but intellectual maturity with regard to clearness is apt to come rather late. This seems an unfortunate arrangement of Nature, inasmuch as clearness is of less use to a man settled in life, whose errors have in great measure had their effect, than it would be to one whose path lay before him. It is terrible to see how a single unclear idea, a single formula without meaning, lurking in a young man’s head, will sometimes act like an obstruction of inert matter in an artery, hindering the nutrition of the brain, and condemning its victim to pine away in the fullness of his intellectual vigor and in the midst of intellectual plenty. Many a man has cherished for years as his hobby some vague shadow of an idea, too meaningless to be positively false; he has, nevertheless, passionately loved it, has made it his companion by day and by night, and has given to it his strength and his life, leaving all other occupations for its sake, and in short has lived with it and for it, until it has become, as it were, flesh of his flesh and bone of his

bone; and then he has waked up some bright morning to find it gone, clean vanished away like the beautiful Melusina of the fable, and the essence of his life gone with it. I have myself known such a man; and who can tell how many histories of circle-squarers, metaphysicians, astrologers, and what not, may not be told in the old German story?

Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

abduction. Abductive reasoning accepts a conclusion on the grounds that it explains the available evidence. The term was introduced by Charles Peirce to describe an inference pattern sometimes called 'hypothesis' or ' inference to the best explanation'. He used the example of arriving at a Turkish seaport and observing a man on horseback surrounded by horsemen holding a canopy over his head. He inferred that this was the governor of the province since he could think of no other figure who would be so greatly honoured. In his later work, Peirce used the word more widely: the logic of abduction examines all of the norms which guide us in formulating new hypotheses and deciding which of them to take seriously. It addresses a wide range of issues concerning the 'logic of discovery' and the economics of research.

attention. As William James says, 'consciousness goes away from where it is not needed,' and it seems an everyday truth that one can selectively consider, concentrate, or focus on some aspect of the world or of one's inner life. Searle draws a distinction between the centre and the periphery within the field of consciousness, arguing that there are different levels of attention—from the full attention I pay to my feet when putting on my shoes to the marginal attention due to them the rest of the day. How attention stands *vis-à-vis* a clear conception of consciousness, though, is a matter of debate. It seems possible to be conscious of something without attending to it. One might be conscious of the background murmurings at a party, for example, while attending exclusively to the host's speech. Despite this, the term is often used as a synonym for 'consciousness' in what can only be incomplete functional, cognitive scientific, or psychological accounts of consciousness.

41st Session: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951): The Early Years

The transcript

Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Early Years

Narrator:
Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Vienna in 1889, but became a naturalized British citizen. He initially trained as an engineer, but from 1912 to 1913, he started mathematical logic under Russell. Like Russell, Wittgenstein was interested in language and its uses. The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

Dr. Adrian Moore, St. Hugh's College, Oxford:
What Wittgenstein is interested in is ordinary language, the kind of language that we use all the time, and not some ideal equivalent that philosophers may be able to set up.

Narrator:
In later life, Wittgenstein became disillusioned with some of the theories he had propounded in the Tractatus.

Dr. Adrian Moore, St. Hugh's College, Oxford:
You get the impression when you are reading the Tractatus that's as if he thinks that the only basic linguistic move that's of any concern is the move of saying what things are like, saying what is the case to go back to the very first sentence of the Tractatus. And of course, that is something that we often do. We give each other information. We pass on information to each other in all sorts of ways. And we can be right or wrong as the case may be. If you asked me for instructions to get to somewhere, I can give you directions and those directions may be correct or incorrect as the case may be. But he later began to realize that's by no means, all that we do with language. There are all sorts of other things that we do as well as just convey information. We greet one another. We thank one another. We praise each other, and blame each other for various things. A whole variety of different linguistic moves that we make that hadn't really been recognized in the earlier work, or so he later thought.

Narrator:
Wittgenstein's views began to change in later life. It is only since his death in 1951 that much of this has come to light. Many of his texts and lectures were published post-humously. These included the Blue and Brown books, typescript copies of lectures that he gave at Cambridge. Their influence was significant. In philosophical investigations, Wittgenstein deals with language and numbers. He begins with what he calls language games.

Dr. Adrian Moore, St. Hugh's College, Oxford:
When Wittgenstein in his later work talks about language games, really this is a metaphor for helping us to understand the variety of different things that we can do with language other than just talk about what is the case, or convey information to each other. So, when people greet each other in the streets and say "hi," "hello," or "how are you?" to Wittgenstein they're playing a kind of language game, they're making moves in a game which, and don't consist of conveying information when you are saying "hi" you're not conveying information to the other person, you're greeting them. And, the other example that I mentioned earlier

was thanking – somebody gives you something, you express your thanks. Again, that's not a way of conveying, that's a particular kind of move that we sometimes make in a very important language game that we sometimes play. The point is simply to remind us of the huge variety of different things that we can do with language.

Narrator:
He also deals with rules, the development of series, such as that of numbers.

Dr. Adrian Moore, St. Hugh's College, Oxford:
Wittgenstein was very interested in the whole question of rules and following rules in his later philosophy, although I think perhaps people have sometimes exaggerated his interest because they thought that what he was claiming was that language is always governed by precise rules which actually, it seems to me, in direct violation of the point that we were just making. It's not always governed in very precise ways in precise rules. And that there are plenty of linguistic games that develop in a rather unregulated way.

Narrator:
For a large class of cases, though not for all, in which we employ the word meaning, it can be defined thus – that the meaning of a word is its use in language. Perhaps the most controversial section of the book is that dealing with the naming of sensations. It has been seen as a revolt against the Cartesian framework.

Dr. Adrian Moore, St. Hugh's College, Oxford:
On the Cartesian view it's as if there is a little private theatre that we carry around with us, and that we are observing what's going on on that private stage. And Wittgenstein says that the reason that we think like that is that we're once again forgetting the huge variety of different ways in which language can function. So that to take one very simple example, think about the claim "I'm in pain." Suppose that you are asking me whether a part of my body hurts or not, and I say, "yes I am feeling some pain at the moment" or "yes, it does hurt", or whatever. We're inclined to think as Wittgenstein himself perhaps would have thought when he wrote the Tractatus, that what this is is a commentary on what the world is like. That it is a way of conveying information in the same way that I might tell you that there's a chair over there, that I'm now telling you that there's a pain in my leg. The question then arises, "okay, what's the nature of the information that I'm conveying?" What am I commenting on, what am I reporting on. And once you raise that question, it's then not very long before you are going to be starting to think about this in Cartesian terms. You think, well, the pain is something that only I have access to, so when I'm telling you I'm in pain, obviously that's something that I can know in a way that you can't. It must be because I am talking about this little private world that I carry around with me. And Wittgenstein says, "well no, we're forgetting that language does function in a huge variety of ways," and although "I'm in pain" is a little bit like "there's a chair over there," in other ways, it's very unlike that. And we can just as well think of it on the model of simply saying, "ouch" is another way, another linguistic way in which people react to pain. A much more simple, a much more primitive linguistic reaction to pain, but nevertheless that's part of the language that children have to learn and that's one of the ways in which when children are in pain they do react to their pain. So Wittgenstein says, well if we think of it more like that, we'll begin to resist some of those Cartesian temptations, we'll begin to wonder about whether it even makes sense to say I can know that I'm in pain in a way that you can't.

Narrator:

Wittgenstein believed it was necessary that language should be public, not private. This insistence on the public context is the most important point in Wittgenstein's theories. He did not believe, though, that theories should necessarily be statable in propositions. Other philosophers have backed Wittgenstein's opposition to Descartes.

Dr. Adrian Moore, St. Hugh's College, Oxford:
Even those philosophers may actually be making the same kind of mistake as Descartes, the same fundamental mistake as Descartes, if Wittgenstein is right, because they too may be saying that the sentence "I am in pain" reports a particular fact, it's a claim about what is the case and needs to be understood in those terms, and then what they're trying to do is to understand it in those terms and then what they're trying to do is to understand it in those term in trying to determine what kind of thing pain is, and because for one reason or another, they're dissatisfied with the traditional Cartesian picture, they come up with their own alternative account of what kind of thing pain is, but if Wittgenstein is right, those questions may be inappropriate in the first place. If we do think of the sentence, "I am in pain," more in terms of the exclamation "ouch", we are going to be much, much less interested in raising those questions in the first place, if indeed we think they're legitimate questions at all. We're not going to be asking what kind of thing must pain be like in order for us to make the claims about pain that we do. We're going to be focusing much more on how the language of pain actually works when you say things like "it hurts" and "I'm in pain" and what the conditions are for counting as correctly using that little bit of language so that modern day physicalists may be as guilty as the basic Cartesian error as Descartes himself was.

42nd Session: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)- Continued

Selected primary sources Lectures on Philosophy by Ludwig Wittgenstein

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Source: Wittgenstein's Lectures, 1932 - 35, Edited by Alice Ambrose, publ. Blackwell, 1979. The 1932-33 Lecture notes, pp2 - 4

[Due to the limitations of HTML, I have used the following characters to represent symbols of mathematical logic: » for "is a super set of", « for "is a subset of", ~ for "not", Œ for "there is", v for "or", . for "and"]
1 I am going to exclude from our discussion questions which are answered by experience. Philosophical problems are not solved by experience, for what we talk about in philosophy are not facts but things for which facts are useful. Philosophical trouble arises through seeing a system of rules and seeing that things do not fit it. It is like advancing and retreating from a tree stump and seeing different things. We go nearer, remember the rules, and feel satisfied, then retreat and feel dissatisfied.
2 Words and chess pieces are analogous; knowing how to use a word is like knowing how to move a chess piece. Now how do the rules enter into playing the game? What is the difference between playing the game and aimlessly moving the pieces? I do not deny there is a difference, but I want to say that knowing how a piece is to be used is not a particular state of mind which goes on while the game goes on. The meaning of a word is to be defined by the rules for its use, not by the feeling that attaches to the words.
"How is the word used?" and "What is the grammar of the word?" I shall take as being the same question.
The phrase, "bearer of the word", standing for what one points to in giving an ostensive definition, and "meaning of the word" have entirely different grammars; the two are not synonymous. To explain a word such as "red" by pointing to something gives but one rule for its use, and in cases where one cannot point, rules of a different sort are given. All the rules together give the meaning, and these are not fixed by giving an ostensive definition. The rules of grammar are entirely independent of one another. Two words have the same meaning if they have the same rules for their use.
Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

analytic philosophy began with the arrival of Wittgenstein in Cambridge in 1912 to study with Russell and, as it turned out, significantly to influence him. Between the wars, through the influence of Russell's writings and Wittgenstein's own *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922), analytic philosophy came to dominate British philosophy. In the 1930s the ideas of Russell and Wittgenstein were taken up and put forward more radically and systematically by the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle and Reichenbach's circle in Berlin. There were sympathetic groups in Poland and Scandinavia and some scattered but distinguished adherents in the United States (to which many of the European positivists fled from Hitler), such as Nagel and Quine. The very different ideas of the later Wittgenstein, who came back to Cambridge in 1929, closer to those of Russell's original ally G. E. Moore, became increasingly influential and, under the label ‘ linguistic philosophy', prevailed in most of the English-speaking world from 1945 until about 1960. In the post-positivist era from then until the present English-speaking philosophy has been mainly analytic in the older, pre-linguistic sense, but with large variations of method and doctrine.

Russell and Moore emerged as original thinkers in the first decade of the century when they broke demonstratively away from the kind of Bradleian idealism which they had been taught.

They argued against the view that reality is both an undissectable unity and spiritual in nature, that it is a plurality made up of an indefinite multiplicity of things, and that these things are of fundamentally different kinds—material and abstract as well as mental. They fatally undermined the idealist theory that all relations are internal or essential to the things they relate and, less persuasively, that the direct objects of perception are subjective contents of consciousness.

aspects. Ways of appearing; what appears in ways of appearing; in Wittgenstein's philosophy, what is seen in ' seeing as'. Wittgenstein distinguishes the 'continuous seeing' of an aspect from the 'dawning' of an aspect, suggests that the concept of an aspect is like the concept of a (re)presentation (*Vorstellung*), and says that 'aspect-blindness' is like the lack of a 'musical ear'. According to Wittgenstein, seeing aspects is 'subject to the will', but does not entail the existence of any 'private object'. In a change of aspect, paradoxically, there seems to be a new perception, yet what is presented remains unchanged. In German phenomenology, aspects are the phenomenological appearances known as *Abschattungen*, through which spatial items such as shapes and colours are given directly in perception. Husserl thinks physical objects are presented through *Abschattungen*, but that non-spatial items, notably mental processes, are not.

criterion. A standard by which to judge something; a feature of a thing by which it can be judged to be thus and so. In the writings of the later Wittgenstein it is used as a quasi-technical term. Typically, something counts as a criterion for another thing if it is necessarily good evidence for it. Unlike inductive evidence, criterial support is determined by convention and is partly constitutive of the meaning of the expression for whose application it is a criterion. Unlike entailment, criterial support is characteristically defeasible. Wittgenstein argued that behavioural expressions of the 'inner', e.g. groaning or crying out in pain, are neither inductive evidence for the mental (Cartesianism), nor do they entail the instantiation of the relevant mental term (behaviourism), but are defeasible criteria for its application.

43rd Session: Martin Heidegger (1889 –1976)
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The title designates the attempt at a reflection that persists in questioning. Questions are paths toward an answer. If the answer could be given it would consist in a transformation of thinking, not in a propositional statement about a matter at stake.

The following text belongs to a larger context. It is the attempt undertaken again and again ever since 1930 to shape the question of *Being and Time* in a more primordial fashion. This means to subject the point of departure of the question in *Being and Time* to an immanent criticism. Thus it must become clear to what extent the critical question, of what the matter of thinking is, necessarily and continually belongs to thinking. Accordingly, the name of the task of *Being and Time* will change.

3. We are asking:

1. What does it mean that philosophy in the present age has entered its final stage?
2. What task is reserved for thinking at the end of philosophy?

I. What does it mean that philosophy in the present age has entered its final stage?

4. Philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks beings as a whole— the world, man, God — with respect to Being, with respect to the belonging together of beings in Being. Metaphysics thinks beings as being in the manner of representational thinking that gives reasons. For since the beginning of philosophy and with that beginning, the Being of beings has showed itself as the ground (*arche, aition*, principle). The ground is that from which beings as such are what they are in their becoming, perishing, and persisting as something that can be known, handled, and worked upon. As the ground, Being brings beings to their actual presencing. The ground shows itself as presence. The present of presence consists in the fact that it brings what is present each in its own way to presence. In accordance with the actual kind of presence, the ground has the character of grounding as the ontic causation of the real, as the transcendental making possible of the objectivity of objects, as the dialectical mediation of the movement of the absolute Spirit and of the historical process of production, as the will to power positing values. What characterizes metaphysical thinking that grounds the ground for beings is the fact that metaphysical thinking, starting from what is present, represents it in its presence and thus exhibits it as grounded by its ground.

5. What is meant by the talk about the end of philosophy? We understand the end of something all too easily in the negative sense as a mere stopping, as the lack of continuation, perhaps even as decline and impotence. In contrast, what we say about the end of philosophy means the completion of metaphysics. However, completion does not mean perfection as a consequence of which philosophy would have to have attained the highest perfection at its end. Not only do we lack any criterion which would permit us to evaluate the perfection of an epoch of metaphysics as compared with any other epoch, the right to this kind of evaluation does not exist. Plato's thinking is no more perfect than Parmenides'. Hegel's philosophy is no more perfect than Kant's. Each epoch of philosophy has its own necessity. We simply have to acknowledge the fact that a philosophy is the way it is. It is not for us to prefer one to the other, as can be the case with regard to various world views.

6. The old meaning of the word "end" means the same as place:"from one end to the other" means from one place to the other. The end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its most extreme possibility. End as completion means this gathering.Throughout the whole history of philosophy, Plato's thinking remains decisive in changing forms. Metaphysics is Platonism. Nietzsche characterizes his philosophy as reversed Platonism. With the reversal of metaphysics which was already accomplished by Karl Marx, the most extreme possibility of philosophy is attained. It has entered its final stage. To the extent that philosophical thinking is still attempted, it manages only to attain an

epigonal renaissance and variations of that renaissance. Is not then the end of philosophy after all a cessation of its way of thinking? To conclude this would be premature.
7. As a completion, an end is the gathering into the most extreme possibilities. We think in too limited a fashion as long as we expect only a development of recent philosophies of the previous style. We forget that already in the age of Greek philosophy a decisive characteristic of philosophy appears: the development of sciences within the field which philosophy opened up. The development of the sciences is at the same time their separation from philosophy and the establishment of their independence. This process belongs to the completion of philosophy. Its development is in full swing today in all regions of beings. This development looks like themere dissolution of philosophy, and in truth is precisely its completion.
8. It suffices to refer to the independence of psychology, sociology, anthropology as cultural anthropology, to the role of logic as symbolic logic and semantics. Philosophy turns into the empirical science of man, of all of what can become for man the experiential object of his technology, the technology by which he establishes himself in the world by working on it in the manifold modes of making and shaping. All of this happens everywhere on the basis of and according to the criterion of the scientific discovery of the individual areas of beings.
9. No prophecy is necessary to recognize that the sciences now establishing themselves will soon be determined and steered by the new fundamental science which is called cybernetics.This science corresponds to the determination of man as an acting social being. For it is the theory of the steering of the possible planning and arrangement of human labor. Cybernetics transforms language into an exchange of news. The arts become regulated-regulating instruments of information.
10. The development of philosophy into the independent sciences which, however, interdependently communicate among themselves ever more markedly, is the legitimate completion of philosophy. Philosophy is ending in the present age. It has found its place in the scientific attitude of socially active humanity. But the fundamental characteristic of this scientific attitude is its cybernetic, that is, technological character. The need to ask about modern technology is presumably dying out to the same extent that technology more definitely characterizes and regulates the appearance of the totality of the world and the position of man in it.

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11. The sciences will interpret everything which in their structure is still reminiscent of the origin from philosophy in accordance with the rules of science, that is, technologically. Every science understands the categories upon which it remains dependent for the articulation and delineation of its area of investigation as working hypotheses. Their truth is measured not only in terms of the effect that their application brings about within the progress of research. Scientific truth is equated with the efficiency of these effects.

12. The sciences are now taking over as their own task what philosophy in the course of its history tried to present in certain places, and even there only inadequately, that is, the ontologies of the various regions of beings (nature, history, law, art). The interest of the sciences is directed toward the theory of the necessary structural concepts of the coordinated areas of investigation. "Theory" means now supposition of the categories, which are allowed only a cybernetic function, but denied any ontological meaning. The operational and model character of representational-calculative thinking becomes dominant.

13. However, the sciences still speak about the Being of beings in the unavoidable supposition of their regional categories. They just don't say so. They can deny their origin from philosophy, but never dispense with it. For in the scientific attitude of the sciences, the document of their birth from philosophy still speaks.The end of philosophy proves to be the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of a scientific-technological world and of the social order proper to this world. The end of philosophy means the beginning of the world civilization based upon Western European thinking.

14. But is the end of philosophy in the sense of its evolving into the sciences also already the complete actualization of all the possibilities in which the thinking of philosophy was posited? Or is there a first possibility for thinking apart from the last possibility which we characterized (the dissolution of philosophy in the technologized sciences), a possibility from which the thinking of philosophy would have to start, but which as philosophy it could nevertheless not experience and adopt?

15. If this were the case, then a task would still have to be reserved for thinking in a concealed way in the history of philosophy fromits beginning to its end, a task accessible neither to philosophy as metaphysics nor, and even less so, to the sciences stemming from philosophy. Therefore we ask:

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II. What task is reserved for thinking at the end of philosophy?

16. The mere thought of such a task of thinking must sound strange to us. A thinking that can be neither metaphysics nor science?A task which has concealed itself from philosophy since its very beginning, even in virtue of that beginning, and thus has withdrawn itself continually and increasingly in the times that followed?A task of thinking that — so it seems — includes the assertion that philosophy has not been up to the matter of thinking and has thus become a history of mere decline?Is there not an arrogance in these assertions which desires to put itself above the greatness of the thinkers of philosophy?

17. This suspicion obtrudes. But it can easily be quelled. For every attempt to gain insight into the supposed task of thinking finds itself moved to review the whole history of philosophy. Not only this, but it is even forced to think the historicity of that which grants a possible history to philosophy.Because of this, the thinking in question here necessarily falls short of the greatness of the philosophers. It is less than philosophy. Less also because the

direct or indirect effect of this thinking on the public in the industrial age, formed by technology and science, is decisively less possible for this thinking than it was for philosophy.
18. But above all, the thinking in question remains unassuming because its task is only of a preparatory, not of a founding character. It is content with awakening a readiness in man for a possibilitywhose contour remains obscure, whose coming remains uncertain. Thinking must first learn what remains reserved and in store for thinking to get involved in. It prepares its own transformation in this learning.
19. We are thinking of the possibility that the world civilization that is just now beginning might one day overcome the technological-scientific-industrial character as the sole criterion of man's world sojourn. This may happen not of and through itself, but in virtue of the readiness of man for a determination that, whether listened to or not, always speaks in the destiny of man, which has not yet been decided. It is just as uncertain whether world civilization will soon be abruptly destroyed or whether it will be stabilized for a long time — in a stabilization, however, that will not rest in something enduring, but rather establish itself in a sequence of changes, each of which presenting the latest fashion.
20. The preparatory thinking in question does not wish and is not able to predict the future. It only attempts to say something to the present which was already said a long time ago precisely at the beginning of philosophy and for that beginning, but has not been explicitly thought. For the time being, it must be sufficient to refer to this with the brevity required. We shall take a directive which philosophy offers as an aid in our undertaking.

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21. When we ask about the task of thinking, this means in the scope of philosophy to determine that which concerns thinking, which is still controversial for thinking, which is the controversy. This is what the word *Sache* [matter] means in the German language. It designates that with which thinking has to do in the case at hand, in Plato's language, *to pragma auto* (cf. "The Seventh Letter," 341c 7).
22. In recent times, philosophy has of its own accord expressly called thinking "to the things themselves." Let us mention two cases which receive particular attention today. We hear this call "to the things themselves" in the "Preface" which Hegel has placedbefore his work which was published in 1807, *System of Science, First Part: The Phenomenology of Spirit*. This preface is not the preface to the *Phenomenology*, but to the System of Science, to the whole of philosophy. The call "to the things themselves" refers ultimately — and that means according to the matter, primarily — to the Science of Logic.
23. In the call "to the things themselves," the emphasis lies on the "themselves." Heard superficially, the call has the sense of a rejection. The inadequate relations to the matter of philosophy are rejected. Mere talk about the purpose of philosophy belongs to these relations, but so does mere reporting about the results of philosophical thinking. Both are never the real totality of philosophy. The totality shows itself only in its becoming. This occurs in the developmental presentation of the matter. In the presentation, theme and method coincide. For Hegel, this identity is called the idea. With the idea, the matter of philosophy "itself" comes to appear. However, this matter is historically determined: subjectivity. With Descartes' *ego cogito*, says Hegel, philosophy steps on firm ground for the first time, where it can be at home. If the *fundamentum absolutum* is attained with the *ego cogito* as the distinctive *subjectum*, this means: the subject is the *hypokeimenon* transferred to consciousness, is what is truly present, which is unclearly enough called "substance" in traditional language.
24. When Hegel explains in the Preface (ed. Hoffmeister, p. 19)."The true (in philosophy) is to be understood and expressed not as substance, but just as much, as subject," then this means: the Being of beings, the presence of what is present, is manifest and thus complete presence only when it becomes present as such for itself in the absolute Idea. But since Descartes, idea means perceptio. Being's coming to itself occurs in speculative dialectic. Only the movement of the idea, the method, is the matter itself. The call "to the thing itself" requires a philosophical method appropriate to it.However, what the matter of philosophy should be is presumed to be decided from the outset. The matter of philosophy as metaphysics is the Being of beings, their presence in the form of substantiality and subjectivity.
25. A hundred years later, the call "to the thing itself" again is heard in Husserl's treatise *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*. It was published in the first volume of the journal *Logos* in 1910-11 (pp. 289 if.). Again, the call has at first the sense of a rejection. But here it aims in another direction than Hegel's. It concerns naturalistic psychology which claims to be the genuine scientific method of investigating consciousness. For this method blocks access to the phenomena of intentional consciousness from the very beginning. But the call "to the thing itself" is at the same time directed against historicism, which gets lost in treatises about the standpoints of philosophy and in the ordering of types of philosophical world views. About this Husserl says in italics (ibid., p. 340): "The stimulus for investigation must start not with philosophies, but with issues and problems."

26. And what is the matter at stake in philosophical investigation? In accordance with the same tradition, it is for Husserl as for Hegel the subjectivity of consciousness. For Husserl, the *Cartesian Meditations* were not only the topic of the Parisian lectures in February, 1920. Rather, since the time following the *Logical Investigations*, their spirit accompanied the impassioned course of his philosophical investigations to the end. In its negative and also in its positive sense, the call "to the thing itself" determines the securing and development of method. It also determines the procedure of philosophy by means of which the matter itself can be demonstrated as a datum. For Husserl, "the principle of all principles" is first of all not a principle of content but one of method.
27. In his work published in 1913, Ideas toward a *Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, Husserl devoted a special section (24) to the determination of "the principle of all principles." "No conceivable theory can upset this principle," says Husserl. "The principle of all principles" reads:
Every originarily giving intuition [is] a source of legitimation for knowledge; everything that presents itself to us in the 'Intuition' originarily (in its bodily actuality, so to speak) [is] simply to be accepted as it gives itself, but also only within the limits in which it gives itself there. . .
28. "The principle of all principles" contains the thesis of the precedence of method. This principle decides what matter alone can suffice for the method. "The principle of principles" requires absolute subjectivity as the matter of philosophy. The transcendental reduction to absolute subjectivity gives and secures the possibility of grounding the objectivity of all objects (the Being of these beings) in their valid structure and consistency, that is, in their constitution, in and through subjectivity. Thus transcendental subjectivity proves to be "the sole absolute being" (*Formal and Transcendental Logic*, 1929, p. 240). At the same time, transcendental reduction as the method of "universal science" of the constitution of the Being of beings has the same mode of being as this absolute being, that is, the manner of the matter most native to philosophy. The method is not only directed toward the matter of philosophy. It does not just belong to the matter as a key belongs to a lock. Rather, it belongs to the matter because it is "the matter itself." If one wished to ask: Where does "the principle of all principles" get its unshakable right? the answer would have to be: from transcendental subjectivity, which is already presupposed as the matter of philosophy.
29. We have chosen a discussion of the call "to the thing itself" as our directive. It was to bring us to the path which leads us to a determination of the task of thinking at the end of philosophy. Where are we now? We have arrived at the insight that for the call "to the thing itself" what concerns philosophy as its matter is established from the outset. From the perspective of Hegel and Husserl — and not only from their perspective — the matter of philosophy is subjectivity. It is not the matter as such that is controversial for the call, but rather its presentation by which the matter itself becomes present. Hegel's speculative dialectic is the movement in which the matter as such comes to itself, comes to its own presence [*Prasenz*] Husserl's method is supposed to bring the matter of philosophy to its ultimately originary givenness: that means to its own presence [*Prasenz*].The two methods are as different as they could possibly be. But the matter as such which they are to present is the same, although it is experienced in different ways.

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30. But of what help are these discoveries to us in our attempt to bring the task of thinking to view? They don't help us at all as long as we do not go beyond a mere discussion of the call. Rather, we must ask what remains unthought in the call "to the thing itself." Questioning in this way, we can become aware how something which it is no longer the matter of philosophy to think conceals itself precisely where philosophy has brought its matter to absolute knowledge and to ultimate evidence.
31. But what remains unthought in the matter of philosophy as well as in its method? Speculative dialectic is a mode in which the matter of philosophy comes to appear of itself and for itself, and thus becomes present [*Gegenwart*] Such appearance necessarily occurs in some light. Only by virtue of light, i.e., through brightness, can what shines show itself, that is, radiate. But brightness in its turn rests upon something open, something free, which might illuminate it here and there, now and then. Brightness plays in the open and wars there with darkness. Wherever a present being encounters another present being or even only lingers near it — but also where, as with Hegel, one being mirrors itself in another speculatively — there openness already rules, the free region is in play. Only this openness grants to the movement of speculative thinking the passage through what it thinks.
32. We call this openness that grants a possible letting-appear and show "opening." In the history of language the German word *Lichtung* is a translation derived from the French *clairiere* It is formed in accordance with the older words *Waldung* [foresting] and *Feldung* [fielding].
33. The forest clearing [or opening] is experienced in contrast to dense forest, called *Dickung* in our older language. The substantive *Lichtung* goes back to the verb *lichten*. The adjective *licht* is the same word as "open." To open something means to make it light, free and open, e.g., to make the forest free of trees at one place. The free space thus originating is the clearing. What is light in the sense of being free and open has nothing in common with the adjective "light" which means "bright," neither linguistically nor factually. This is to be observed for the difference between openness and light. Still, it is possible that a factual relation between the two exists. Light can stream into the clearing, into its openness, and let brightness play with darkness in it. But light never first creates openness. Rather, light presupposes openness. However, the clearing, the open region, is not only free for brightness and darkness but also for resonance and echo, for sound and the diminishing of sound. The clearing is the open region for everything that becomes present and absent.
34. It is necessary for thinking to become explicitly aware of the matter here called opening. We are not extracting mere notions from mere words, e.g., "opening," as it might easily appear on the surface. Rather, we must observe the unique matter which is named with the name "opening" in accordance with the matter. What the word designates in the connection we are now thinking, free openness, is a "primal phenomenon," to use a word of Goethe's. We would have to say a "primal matter" [*Ursache*]. Goethe notes (Maxims and Reflections, n. 993): "Look for nothing behind phenomena: they themselves are what is to be learned." This means the phenomenon itself, in the present case the opening, sets us the task of learning from it while questioning it, that is, of letting it say something to us.
35. Accordingly, we may suggest that the day will come when we will not shun the question whether the opening, the free open, may not be that within which alone pure space and ecstatic time and everything present and absent in them have the place which gathers and protects everything.In the same way as speculative dialectical thinking, originary intuition and its evidence remain dependent upon openness which already dominates, upon the

opening. What is evident is what can be immediately intuited. *Evidentia* is the word that Cicero uses to translate the Greek *enargeia*, that is, to transform it into the Roman. *Enargeia*, which has the same root as *argentum* (silver), means that which in itself and of itself radiates and brings itself to light. In the Greek language, one is not speaking about the action of seeing, about *videre*, but about that which gleams and radiates. But it can radiate only if openness has already been granted. The beam of light does not first create the opening, openness, it only traverses it. It is only such openness that grants to giving and receiving and to any evidence at all what is free, in which they can remain and must move.
36. All philosophical thinking that explicitly or inexplicitly follows the call "to the thing itself" is already admitted to the freespace of the opening in its movement and with its method. But philosophy knows nothing of the opening. Philosophy does speak about the light of reason, but does not heed the opening of Being. The l*umen naturale*, the light of reason, throws light only on openness. It does concern the opening, but so little does it form it that it needs it in order to be able to illuminate what is present in the opening. This is true not only of philosophy's method, but also and primarily of its matter, that is, of the presence of what is present. To what extent the *subjectum*, the *hypokeimenon*, that which already lies present, thus what is present in its presence is constantly thought also in subjectivity cannot be shown here in detail. (Refer to Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 2 (1961), pages 429 if.)
37. We are concerned now with something else. Whether or not what is present is experienced, comprehended or presented, presence as lingering in openness always remains dependent upon the prevalent opening. What is absent, too, cannot be as such unless it presences in the free space of the opening.All metaphysics, including its opponent, positivism, speaks the language of Plato. The basic word of its thinking, that is, of its presentation of the Being of beings, is *eidos*, *idea*: the outward appearance in which beings as such show themselves. Outward appearance, however, is a manner of presence. No outward appearance without light — Plato already knew this. But there is no light and no brightness without the opening. Even darkness needs it. How else could we happen into darkness and wander through it? Still, the opening as such as it prevails through Being, through presence, remains unthought in philosophy, although it is spoken about in philosophy's beginning. How does this occur and with which names?

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38. Answer: In Parmenides' thoughtful poem which, as far as we know, was the first to reflect explicitly upon the Being of beings, which still today, although unheard, speaks in the sciences into which philosophy dissolves, Parmenides listens to the claim:
. . but you should learn all:
the untrembling heart of un concealment, well-rounded, and also the opinions of mortals who lack the ability to trust what is unconcealed. [Fragment 1, 28 ff.]
Aletheia, unconcealment, is named here. It is called well-rounded because it is turned in the pure sphere of the circle in which beginning and end are everywhere the same. In this turning there is no possibility of twisting, distortion, and closure. The meditative man is to experience the untrembling heart of unconcealment. What does the phrase about the untrembling heart of unconcealment mean? It means unconcealment itself in what is most its own, means the place of stillness which gathers in itself what grants unconcealment to begin with. That is the opening of what is open. We ask: openness for what? We have already reflected upon the fact that the path of thinking, speculative and intuitive, needs the traversable opening. But in that opening rests possible radiance, that is, the possible presencing of presence itself.
39. 'What prior to everything else first grants unconcealment is the path on which thinking pursues one thing and perceives it: *hopos estin. . . einai:* that presencing presences. The opening grants first of all the possibility of the path to presence, and grants the possible presencing of that presence itself. We must think *aletheia*, unconcealment, as the opening which first grants Being and thinking and their presencing to and for each other. The quiet heart of the opening is the place of stillness from which alone the possibility of the belonging together of Being and thinking, that is, presence and apprehending, can arise at all.
40. The possible claim to a binding character or commitment of thinking is grounded in this bond. Without the preceding experience of *aletheia* as the opening, all talk about committed and noncommitted thinking remains without foundation. Whence does Plato's determination of presence as idea have its binding character? With regard to what is Aristotle's interpretation of presencing as *energeia* binding?Strangely enough, we cannot even ask these questions, always neglected in philosophy, as long as we have not experienced what Parmenides had to experience: *aletheia*, unconcealment. The path to it is distinguished from the street along which the opinion of mortals wander. *Aletheia* is nothing mortal, just as little as death itself.
41. It is not for the sake of etymology that I stubbornly translate the name *aletheia* as unconcealment, but for the sake of the matter which must be considered when we think adequately that which is called Being and thinking. Unconcealment is, so to speak, the element in which Being and thinking and their belonging together exist. *Aletheia* is named at the beginning of philosophy, but afterward it is not explicitly thought as such by philosophy. For since Aristotle it became the task of philosophy as metaphysics to think beings as such onto-theo-logically.
42. If this is so, we have no right to sit in judgment over philosophy, as though it left something unheeded, neglected it and was thus marred by some essential deficiency. The reference to what is unthought in philosophy is not a criticism of philosophy. If a criticism is necessary now, then it rather concerns the attempt, which is becoming more and more urgent ever since *Being and Time*, to ask about a possible task of thinking at the end of philosophy. For the question now arises, late enough: Why is *aletheia* not translated with the usual name, with the word "truth"? The answer must be:

43. Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional "natural" sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings, demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as the certainty of the knowledge of Being, *aletheia*, unconcealment in the sense of the opening, may not be equated with truth. Rather, *aletheia*, unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth itself, just as Being and thinking, can be what it is only in the element of the opening. Evidence, certainty in every degree, every kind of verification of *veritas* already move with that *veritas* in the realm of the prevalent opening.
44. *Aletheia*, unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not yet truth. Is *aletheia* then less than truth? Or is it more because it first grants truth as *adaequatio* and *certitudo*, because there can be no presence and presenting outside of the realm of the opening.This question we leave to thinking as a task. Thinking must consider whether it can even raise this question at all as long as it thinks philosophically, that is, in the strict sense of metaphysics which questions what is present only with regard to its presence.
45. In any case, one thing becomes clear: to raise the question of *aletheia*, of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth. For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading to call *aletheia* in the sense of opening, truth. The talk about the "truth of Being" has a justified meaning in Hegel's *Science of Logic*, because here truth means the certainty of absolute knowledge. But Hegel also, as little as Husserl, as little as all metaphysics, does not ask about Being as Being, that is, does not raise the question how there can be presence as such. There is presence only when opening is dominant. Opening is named with *aletheia*, unconcealment, but not thought as such.

48th Session: Martin Heidegger (1889 –1976) - Continued
Selected primary sources Martin Heidegger. The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking (1969) Part I

46. The natural concept of truth does not mean unconcealment, notin the philosophy of the Greeks either. It is often and justifiably pointed out that the word *alethes* is already used by Homer only in the *verba dicendi*, in statement and thus in the sense of correctness and reliability, not in the sense of unconcealment. But this reference means only that neither the poets nor everyday language usage, nor even philosophy see themselves confronted with the task of asking how truth, that is, the correctness of statements, is granted only in the element of the opening of presence.
47. In the scope of this question, we must acknowledge the fact that *aletheia*, unconcealment in the sense of the opening of presence, was originally experienced only as *orthotes*, as the correctness of representations and statements. But then the assertion about the essential transformation of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correctness, is also untenable. Instead we must say: *aletheia*, as opening of presence and presenting in thinking and saying, originally comes under the perspective of *homoiosis* and *adaequatio*, that is, the perspective of adequation in the sense of the correspondence of representing with what is present.
48. But this process inevitably provokes another question: How is it that *aletheia*, unconcealment, appears to man's natural experience and speaking only as correctness and dependability? Is it because man s ecstatic sojourn in the openness of presencing is turned only toward what is present and the presenting of what is present? But what else does this mean than that presence as such, and together with it the opening granting it, remain unheeded? Only what *aletheia* as opening grants is experienced and thought, not what it is as such.This remains concealed. Does this happen by chance? Does it happen only as a consequence of the carelessness of human thinking? Or does it happen because self-concealing, concealment, *lethe*, belongs to *a-letheia*, not just as an addition, not as shadow to

light, but rather as the heart of *aletheia*? And does not even a sheltering and preserving rule in this self-concealing of the opening of presence, from which unconcealment can be granted to begin with, so that what is present can appear in its presence? If this were so, then the opening would not be the mere opening of presence, but the opening of presence concealing itself, the opening of a self-concealing sheltering.If this were so, then with these questions we would reach the path to the task of thinking at the end of philosophy.
49. But isn't all this unfounded mysticism or even bad mythology, in any case a ruinous irrationalism, the denial of *ratio*?I ask in return: What does *ratio, nous, noein*, apprehending, mean? What do ground and principle and especially principle of all principles mean? Can this ever be sufficiently determined unless we experience *aletheia* in a Greek manner as unconcealment and then, above and beyond the Greek, think it as the opening of self-concealing? As long as *ratio* and the rational still remain questionable in what is their own, talk about irrationalism is unfounded. The technological scientific rationalization ruling the present age justifies itself every day more surprisingly by its immense results. But this says nothing about what first grants the possibility of the rational and the irrational. The effect proves the correctness of technological scientific rationalization. But is the manifest character of what is exhausted by what is demonstrable? Doesn't the insistence on what is demonstrable block the way to what is?
50. Perhaps there is a thinking which is more sober-minded than the incessant frenzy of rationalization and the intoxicating quality of cybernetics. One might aver that it is precisely this intoxication that is extremely irrational. Perhaps there is a thinking outside of the distinction of rational and irrational, more sober-minded still than scientific technology, more sober-minded and hence removed, without effect, yet having its own necessity. When we ask about the task of this thinking, then not only this thinking but also the question concerning it is first made questionable. In view of the whole philosophical tradition this means:
51. We all still need an education in thinking, and first of all, before that, knowledge of what being educated and uneducated in thinking means. In this respect Aristotle gives us a hint in Book IV of his *Metaphysics* (1006a if.): . . - "For it is uneducated not to have an eye for when it is necessary to look for a proof and when this is not necessary."This sentence demands careful reflection. For it is not yet decided in what way that which needs no proof in order to become accessible to thinking is to be experienced. Is it dialectical mediation or originarily giving intuition or neither of the two? Only the peculiar quality of what demands of us above all else to be admitted can decide about that. But how is this to make the decision possible for us when we have not yet admitted it? In what circle are we moving here, indeed, inevitably?
52. Is it the *eukukleos Aletheia*, well-rounded unconcealment itself, thought as the opening? Does the title for the task of thinking then read instead of *Being and Time*: Opening and Presence?
But where does the opening come from and how is it given? What speaks in the "There is / It gives"?
The task of thinking would then be the surrender of previous thinking to the determination of the matter for thinking.

49th Session: Martin Heidegger (1889 –1976)- Continued

Some Basic Philosophical Concepts
existenceExistence means the act of being, the concrete way of being, thus reality of being. In most positive sense and today dominantly, it refers to the existence of the human-being. Thus existence often is abbreviation of the human existence. In the human existence, the human-being is determined by the human essence, namely by what the humankind is, but it is discovered by itself as already existing there. By means of this being there (*Da* of *Dasein*), the human existence is in the (mundane) world and his being is called the being in the world. In this being, the being of the rest of the entities in the world reveals itself as implement, being ready at hand. This implementality or instrumentality is the being of an entity in the world and is given to the human-being as useful prior to the way in which being is understood as substantiality. In human existence, it is contended that its existence precedes its essence. In other words, a person cannot primarily defined by the humanity as such, but rather is determined how that person actually is. This is the basis of the existentialism.

existentialismExistentialism refers to Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy of existence. In English, we apply this term to many philosophical thoughts such as those of Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, etc., but no one would like to call oneself an existentialist except Sartre. Post World War II, many so-called pseudo-intellectuals in France gathered at café in Paris with long hair, talked about the meaningless of human existence, etc. , It was a mere fashion among French intellectuals (just like to be a communist) and disappeared rapidly in the late 60's.

existential philosophy Existential philosophy or philosophy of existence is a philosophical approach which centers in its inquiry the concrete human-being in its existence in Europe since the end of the 19th century. All the philosophy of existence contends that each human-being cannot be understood by its essence. On the contrary, existence precedes essence in the human-being. Only by means of one's existence, a human-being can become the theme and the object of genuine understanding. The distinction of authentic and unauthentic was introduced in terms of human existence. Kierkegaard, Dostoefsky, and Nietzsche are often considered forerunners of philosophy of existence. 1930S by his *opus, Being and Time*, Martin Heidegger made the concept of existence (as the human existence) in his fundamental ontology and initiated this movement. Jaspers followed him already before the second world war. After World War II, JeanPaul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Gabriel Marcel,Bollnow as well as Kafka and Camus,, etc. developed each unique philosophy of existence of their own and has been in contrast to logic, philosophy of science, philosophy of language in Anglo-American philosophies of the first half of the 20th century.

authenticity. The condition of those, according to Heidegger, who understand the existential structure of their lives. Heidegger held that each of us acquires an identity from our situation—our family, culture, etc. Usually we just absorb this identity uncritically, but to let one's values and goals remain fixed without critical reflection on them is 'inauthentic'. The 'authentic' individual, who has been aroused from everyday concerns by Angst, takes responsibility for their life and thereby 'chooses' their own identity. But Heidegger also holds that some degree of inauthenticity is unavoidable: the critical assessment of values presupposes an uncritical acceptance of them, and the practical necessities of life give a priority to unreflective action over critical deliberation. So, as Heidegger makes clear, authenticity is like Christian salvation: a state which 'fallen' individuals cannot guarantee by their own efforts.

Dasein. German compound from da ('there, here') and sein ('to be'), thus literally 'to be there' and, as a substantival infinitive, 'being there'. In Kant, Hegel, etc. it is 'determinate being', especially in space and time, but also the 'existence' of God. It often amounts to a person's 'life'. For Nicolai Hartmann it is the Dasssein of something ('the fact that it is, its existence'), in contrast to its Sosein ('essence, being thus'). Heidegger uses it for 'the entity which each of us himself is' and 'the being of man'. He does so for several reasons. Dasein is a neutral term: it does not commit us to viewing man as a biological entity, as consciousness (Bewusstsein, a formation parallel to Dasein), or as essentially rational. Dasein has no determinate essence; its being consists in its possibilities, in what it can make itself be: for Dasein, 'To be or not to be, that is the question'. It is 'there' in the world. But it is not confined to a particular place (or time); it 'transcends' and is 'there' alongside others or past events. It is the 'there' or locus of 'being': without Dasein there would be beings, but no being as such.

beingBeing is an ontological concept. Being has been ambiguously understood since Parmenides. In the one sense, being signifies that which is (*ens, Seiende*s). In this sense, being is synonymous with what is real. This is what Plato called ontós on. On the other hand, being is act of being (*esse, Sein*). This has been so deliberately. However, due to this ambiguity, as Heidegger calls it, the history of Western philosophy is the history of forgetting being (*Sein*). We have been dealt with entities instead of being itself. Heidegger raised the question about being (not entities), which he calls the fundamental ontology. The most familiar entity is the human-being and Heidegger stars with the understanding of being by the human-being, as it is his/her own being. Through his phenomenological analysis, the being of the human-being is being toward death. Existence is thus synonymous with being in the sense of the act of being or *Sein*.

Quiz

*50th Session: Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 –**1980**)*

The transcript

Jean Paul Sartre

Narrator:
Hell is other people. Jean Paul Sartre was a successful playwright and novelist, as well as a philosopher. The influence of Heidegger can be seen in his first book, Being and Nothingness, published in 1943. Sartre believed that because we are conscious beings we can make ourselves of our own free choice. The existence of free choice is a key element in Sartre's philosophy. In Part IV of Being and Nothingness, Sartre writes of the dangers of allowing one's freedom to be usurped by a supposedly stable world of things. The world of someone who does this is unstable and false.

Dr. Katherine Morris, Mansfield College, Oxford:
He says things at that stage that sound very like determinism. He says that every act has a cause, and the real difficulty is to understand how he can say that and still be somebody who's supporting a kind of radical freedom for human beings. The point about claiming a react has a cause is that he conceives that cause is very, very differently from the determinist. For him, this notion of nothingness, once again, plays a very important role. If, for example, I go to the shop to buy some milk, or something like that, the determinist is going to explain that action by saying that there are certain pre-existing objective facts, and subjective motives, namely the objective fact was that there was no milk in my fridge, and the subjective fact is that I want some milk. Right, and these two somehow interact and produce the action. Sartre says no, on contrary, what causes my action is something that doesn't exist, namely, its what he calls "an absence" and so consequently, what causes you to the shop in this case is not the simple fact that there isn't milk in the fridge, but that the milk is absent. It's entirely different. And, immediately, he has already got a conception of the cause of action which is entirely at odds with determinism, because determinism wants to say that actions are caused by pre-existing states of the world, and states of the person. Here we've got something being caused by something that doesn't exist, namely an absence.

Narrator:
One area of Sartre's philosophy that they have acknowledged as brilliant is his concept of bad faith. Bad faith is how Sartre describes an individual's denial of their own freedom.

Dr. Katherine Morris, Mansfield College, Oxford:
Modern versions of the attitude of bad faith, although this is a slightly controversial thing to say, might be thought to be the increasing medicalization of all kinds of things where people are inclined to say that everything from dyslexia to dyspraxia as we now call clumsiness, to the SAD syndrome (Seasonal Affected Depression), to things like, we're now told that caring too much for others is a kind of illness. Over and over again, every time you have a newspaper, you discover there's some new medical category, and really the point of the medical category is precisely to excuse the person from responsibility for his actions. Now I don't want to make any blanket claims about such medical categories, but in many cases, I think that it really is the point, and that Sartre would look at them and would say, you're actually in bad faith. You're actually responsible for your behaviour, just stop making excuses for yourself.

Narrator:
Later in life, Sartre turned to Marxism. He felt that existentialism could show the relevance of Marx's concepts by interiorizing them.

And what of the future, perhaps we should end where we began, with the words of Aristotle, "For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and first began to philosophize.
Some Basic Philosophical Concepts

abandonment. A rhetorical term used by existentialist philosophers such as Heidegger and Sartre to describe the absence of any sources of ethical authority external to oneself. It suggests that one might have expected to find such an authority, either in religion or from an understanding of the natural world, and that the discovery that there is none leads one to feel 'abandoned'. For existentialists such as Sartre, however, this sense of abandonment is only a prelude to the recognition that ethical values can be grounded from within a reflective understanding of the conditions under which individuals can attain authenticity in their lives. Thus the conception of abandonment is essentially an existentialist dramatization of Kant's rejection of heteronomous conceptions of value in favour of the autonomy of the good will.

bad faith. Sartre's conception of self-deception. According to Sartre, bad faith involves the deliberate creation in myself of the appearance of a belief which I in fact know to be false. Sartre claims that we are able to play this trick on ourselves because of ambiguities in our nature, because we are not 'in-ourselves' what we are 'for-ourselves', and so on. In his view, in bad faith we exploit these ambiguities in reflection upon ourselves to avoid facing up to painful facts about ourselves. Sartre imagines a homosexual denying his homosexuality on the ground that he is not 'in himself' a homosexual. These ambiguities, Sartre holds, enable one to account for self-deception without postulating an unconscious self that controls the conscious one: the phenomenon exemplifies the complexity of our reflexive structures, not the agency of a secret self.

absurd, the. A term used by existentialists to describe that which one might have thought to be amenable to reason but which turns out to be beyond the limits of rationality. For example, in Sartre's philosophy the 'original choice' of one's fundamental project is said to be 'absurd', since, although choices are normally made for reasons, this choice lies beyond reason because all reasons for choice are supposed to be grounded in one's fundamental project. Arguably, this case in fact shows that Sartre is mistaken in supposing that reasons for choice are themselves grounded in a choice; and one can argue that other cases which are supposed to involve experience of the 'absurd' are in fact a reductio ad absurdum of the assumptions which produce this conclusion. The 'absurd' does not in fact play an essential role within existentialist philosophy; but it is an important aspect of the broader cultural context of existentialism, for example in the 'theatre of the absurd', as exemplified by the plays of Samuel Beckett.

51st Session: Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 –***1980***)

Selected primary sources Critique of Critical Investigation from Critique of Dialectical Reason. Jean-Paul Sartre. 1960, pp. 47-48

2 Dialectical Reason as Intelligibility

In order to answer these questions we must have some guide-line; and is provided purely by what the object demands. We must turn, therefore, to this basic demand. But if this demand is reduced to the simple question, 'Are there ontological regions where the law of being correlatively, that of knowledge can be said to be dialectical?', there is a serious risk of making it unintelligible and of relapsing either into some form of hyper-empiricism or into the opacity and contingency of the laws formulated by Engels. If we were to discover these regions in the same way as natural regions (for example, an area of the together with its climate, hydrography, orography, flora and fauna, etc.) are discovered, then the discovery would share the opacity of something merely found. If, on the other hand, we were to ground our dialectical categories on the impossibility of experience without them, as Kant did for positivist Reason, then we would indeed attain but we would have contaminated it with the opacity of facts. Indeed, to say, 'If there is to be any such thing as experience, the human mind must be able to unify, sensuous diversity through svnthetic Judgments', is, ultimately, to base the whole critical edifice on the unintelligible Judgment (a Judgment of fact), 'But experience does occur.' And we shall see later that dialectical Reason is itself the intelligibility of positivist Reason; and this is precisely why positivist Reason presents itself' at first as the unintelligible law of empirical intelligibility. [I am thinking here of the *Critique of Pure Reason* rather than of Kant's later works. It has been clearly demonstrated that, in the very last part of Kant's life, the requirement of intelligibility led him right up to the threshold of dialectical Reason.]

If, however, dialectical Reason has to be grasped initially through human relations, then its fundamental characteristics imply that it appears as apodictic experience in its very intelligibility. It is not a matter of simply asserting its existence, but rather of directly experiencing its existence through its intelligibility, independent of any empirical discovery. In other words, if the dialectic is the reason of being and of knowledge, at least in certain regions, it must manifest itself as double intelligibility. Firstly, the dialectic as the law of the world and of knowledge must itself be intelligible; so that, unlike positivist Reason, it must include its own intelligibility within itself. Secondly, if some real fact — a historical process, for example — develops dialectically, the law of its appearing and its becoming must be — from the stand-point of knowledge — the pure ground of its intelligibility. For the present, we are concerned only with original intelligibility. This intelligibility — the translucidity of the dialectic cannot arise if one merely proclaims dialectical laws, like Engels and Naville, unless each of these laws is presented as a mere sketch, revealing the dialectic as a totality. The rules of positivist Reason appear as separate instructions (unless this Reason is envisaged as a limiting case of dialectical Reason and from its point of view). Each of the so-called 'laws' of dialectical Reason is the whole of the dialectic: otherwise the dialectic would cease to be a dialectical process, and thought, as the praxis of the theoretician, would necessarily be discontinuous. Thus the basic intelligibility of dialectical Reason, if it exists, is that of a totalisation. In other words, in terms of our distinction between being and knowledge, a dialectic exists if, in at least one ontological region, a totalisation is in progress which is immediately accessible to a thought which unceasingly totalises itself in its very comprehension of the totalisation from which it emanates and which makes itself its object.

It has often been observed that the laws stated by Hegel and his disciples do not at first seem intelligible; taken in isolation, they may even seem false or gratuitous. Hyppolite has shown convincingly that the negation of the negation — if this schema is envisaged in itself — is not

necessarily an affirmation. Similarly, at first glance, the opposition between contradictories does not seem to be necessarily the motive force of the dialectical process. Hamelin, for example, based his whole system on the opposition between contraries. Or, to give another example, it is difficult to see how a new reality, transcending contradictions while preserving them within itself, can be both irreducible to them and intelligible in terms of them. But, these difficulties arise only because the dialectical ‘principles’ are conceived either as mere data or as induced laws; in short, because they are seen from the point of view of positivist Reason in the same way as positivist Reason conceives its own ‘categories’. Each of these so called dialectical laws becomes perfectly intelligible when seen from the point of view of totalisation. It is therefore necessary for the critical investigation to ask the fundamental question: is there a region of being where totalisation is the very form of existence?